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Abstract

Information technology is expected to become an essential tool in providing
reliable information for supporting the delivery of health care services.
Nevertheless, incorporating such technologies to support the provision of
healthcare raises concerns over the protection of patient‟s information. The
technological, social and legal implications regarding the access and release of
medical data have to be considered carefully during the implementation of
interconnected health information systems. Secure and effective data exchange
along with the protection of patient‟s confidentiality are two issues that electronic
health records need to address to make them reliable and secure in a shared care
environment. In this thesis, the author explores these issues by analysing several
topics regarding electronic health records, communication, exchange of
information and security. The result of this analysis provides an understanding of
the framework required to support the exchange of EHRs in a shared care
environment. The core of this contribution consists in the description of an
approach which uses attribute-based encryption to protect the confidentiality of
v

patients‟ information during the exchange of electronic health records among
healthcare providers. Attribute-based encryption allows the reinforcing of access
policies and reduces the risk of unauthorized access to sensitive information. A
prototype version of a communication interface based on the proposed solution
has been implemented and tested to evaluate its viability. The prototype has
shown that attribute-based encryption provides an answer to restrictions presented
by traditional approaches and facilitate the reinforcing of existing security policies
over the transmitted data.

vi

Acknowledgements

My sincere gratitude goes to everyone that has supported me through this long
process.
To both my supervisors, Dr. Khin Than Win and Prof. Willy Susilo. I would like
to thank you for their guidance, patience and support through these years. They
never stop believing and supporting me in those difficult moments. I am honoured
to have been their student.
To the National Commission for Scientific research and technology (CONICYT),
Government of Chile, I would like to give my thanks for providing me with a
scholarship to support my permanence in the doctoral program at the University
of Wollongong. To the University of Talca, Chile, I give my gratitude for your
support.
To my family and friends back in Chile and here in Australia, thank you for your
understanding, friendship and support during this period.

vii

To Paulina, my beloved wife. Without your love and support I do not think I
would be in the position I am at this moment. This has been a long walk that is
finally coming to an end. Tomorrow we start our new path, but with you by my
side I know that the wherever that path lead us, I am sure it will be filled with joy
and hopes. Thank you for being there all the time.
Alejandro Flores

viii

Publications



Flores, A., & Win, K. (2007, August 20-24). Analyzing the Key Variables in
the Adoption Process of HL7. Proceedings of the 12th World Congress on
Health (Medical) Informatics (Medinfo 2007), Brisbane, Australia, pp 444448.



Flores, A., Win, K. T., & Susilo, W. (2010). Secure exchange of Electronic
Health Records. In I. Apostolakis, M. A. Chryssanthou & D. I. Varlamis
(Eds.), Certification and Security in Health-Related Web Applications:
Concepts and Solutions, IGI Global: Hershey PA.



Flores, A., Win, K., & Susilo, W. (2010). Biometrics for Electronic Health
Records. Journal of Medical Systems, Volume 34, Issue 5. Available online at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10916-009-9313-6.



Flores, A., Win, K., & Susilo, W. (2009, November 22-24). Securing
Electronic Health Records: An Overview. Proceedings of the Asia Pacific
Association for Medical Informatics (APAMI), Hiroshima, Japan, pp 17-24.

ix



Flores, A., Win, K., & Susilo, W. Functionalities of Free and Open Electronic
Health Records System. The International Journal of Technology Assessment
in

Health,

Volume

26,

Issue

04.

Available

online

at

http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=7
917209.

x

Contents

1

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1

1.1

Background ....................................................................................................................... 4

1.2

Purpose and Significance of the Study ............................................................................... 7

1.3

Statement of the Problem ............................................................................................... 10

1.4

Research Question .......................................................................................................... 12

1.5

Research Approach ......................................................................................................... 13

1.6

Research Scope ............................................................................................................... 14

1.7

Organisation of the Thesis ............................................................................................... 15

2

LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................................................. 17

2.1

Health Systems................................................................................................................ 18

2.1.1

Health Information Systems .................................................................................... 19

xi

2.1.2

Patient’s Health Records ......................................................................................... 21

2.1.3

Electronic Health Records ....................................................................................... 22

2.1.4

Purpose, Dimension and Functionalities of EHRs ..................................................... 25

2.1.5

Architectural Approaches of Electronic Health Record ............................................. 27

2.2

Security and Privacy of Patient’s EHRs............................................................................. 29

2.3

Social, Ethical and Legal Perspective of Protecting Patient’s Privacy ............................... 32

2.3.1

Privacy Protection from a International Perspective ................................................ 35

2.3.2

Australian Legislation for Privacy Protection............................................................ 36

2.3.3

Australian States Privacy Legislation for Health Information .................................... 39

2.4

Security and Privacy in a Shared Care Environment......................................................... 41

2.4.1

Interoperability of EHRs .......................................................................................... 43

2.4.2

Standardization and Interoperability in the Health Care Sector ................................ 45

2.4.3

International Standardization Initiatives .................................................................. 48

2.4.3.1

American National Standard Institute ............................................................ 48

2.4.3.2

The International Standard Organization........................................................ 48

2.4.3.3

The European Committee for Standards......................................................... 50

2.4.4

Commonly Used Information Standars in Medicine ................................................. 51

2.4.4.1

Common Object Request Broker Architecture ................................................ 51

2.4.4.2

Digital Imaging and Communication in Medicine ............................................ 51

2.4.4.3

Unified Medical Language System .................................................................. 52

2.4.4.4

Health Level 7 Messaging Standard ................................................................ 52

2.4.4.4.1

HL7 Version 2 ............................................................................................ 54

2.4.4.4.1.1

HL7 Version 2.x Messages................................................................... 54

2.4.4.4.1.2

HL7 version 2.x Message Rulers .......................................................... 56

2.4.4.4.1.3

HL7 version 2 XML Encoding Syntax .................................................... 57

2.4.4.4.1.4

HL7 v.2.x limitation............................................................................. 59

xii

2.4.4.4.2

HL7 Version 3 ............................................................................................ 60

2.4.4.4.2.1

HL7 Components ................................................................................ 61

2.4.4.4.2.2

Adoption of HL7 ................................................................................. 63

2.4.4.4.2.3

Technical Barriers for Adoption of HL7................................................ 64

2.4.5

Challenges of Securing Electronic Health Records .................................................... 66

2.4.6

Securing the Exchange of EHRs................................................................................ 68

2.4.6.1

Local Data Exchange and Security for Primary Use of Information .................. 71

2.4.6.2

Shared care data exchange and Security for Primary Use of Information ........ 73

2.4.6.3

Data exchange and Security for Secondary Use of Information ....................... 77

2.4.7

Analysis of Authentication and Access Control Methods .......................................... 80

2.4.7.1

Traditional Authentication Methods .............................................................. 80

2.4.7.2

Authentication Based on Biometric Technology ............................................. 81

2.4.7.2.1

Uses of Biometric in Healthcare................................................................. 84

2.4.7.2.1.1

Remote Access for Patients ................................................................ 84

2.4.7.2.1.2

Verifying Patient Identity .................................................................... 85

2.4.7.2.2

Limitation of Biometric Technology ........................................................... 87

2.4.7.2.3

Biometric Technology and Secure Exchange of EHRs .................................. 90

2.4.7.3

Traditional Access Control Models ................................................................. 90

2.4.7.3.1

Mandatory Access Control......................................................................... 90

2.4.7.3.2

Discretionary Access Control ..................................................................... 92

2.4.7.3.3

Role-based Access Control and Exchange of EHRs ...................................... 94

2.4.7.3.4

Role-based Access Control Model .............................................................. 95

2.4.7.3.4.1
2.4.7.3.5

Limitations of Roles ............................................................................ 97

Combining and Extending Access Control Models ...................................... 98

2.5

Chapter summary ...........................................................................................................101

3

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD ......................................................... 105
xiii

3.1

Research Design .............................................................................................................105

3.2

Research Methodology ..................................................................................................106

3.3

Research Stages .............................................................................................................108

3.4

Chapter Summary ..........................................................................................................110

4

CONCEPTUAL APPROACH ........................................................................ 113

4.1

Generic Scenario ............................................................................................................114

4.2

Proposed Architecture ...................................................................................................115

4.2.1

Main Functionalities ..............................................................................................115

4.2.2

Use Cases for Functional Requirements..................................................................115

4.2.2.1

Interface Requesting Role and Use Case Model .............................................117

4.2.2.2

Interface Sending Role and Use Case Model ..................................................120

4.2.3

Components ..........................................................................................................122

4.2.4

Attribute-Based Encryption Component .................................................................124

4.3

4.2.4.1

Overview ......................................................................................................124

4.2.4.2

Description of the Data Encryption Process ...................................................125

4.2.4.3

Security Module ...........................................................................................127

Information Flow during the Data Exchange ..................................................................130

4.3.1

State Machine for Data Request .............................................................................133

4.4

Chapter Summary ..........................................................................................................137

5

IMPLEMENTATION AND TESTING ......................................................... 139

5.1

Selection of EHR Systems ...............................................................................................140

5.1.1

Contextual Analysis................................................................................................144

xiv

5.1.2

Functional Analysis ................................................................................................145

5.1.3

Selected Alternatives .............................................................................................146

5.2

Implementation of the Prototype ..................................................................................147

5.2.1

Implementation .....................................................................................................148

5.2.2

Architecture...........................................................................................................148

5.3

Testing ...........................................................................................................................150

5.3.1

Test Planning .........................................................................................................150

5.3.1.1

Purpose of the tests ......................................................................................150

5.3.1.2

Test Design ...................................................................................................151

5.3.1.2.1

Setting the Case Study..............................................................................151

5.3.1.2.2

Case Study for Enforcing of Access Control Using Policies .........................152

5.3.1.2.3

Scenarios .................................................................................................153

5.3.1.2.3.1

Information Exchange .......................................................................153

5.3.1.2.3.2

Analysis .............................................................................................154

5.3.1.2.4

Access Delegation and Patient Control over Data Access ..........................157

5.3.1.2.4.1
5.3.1.3

Analysis .............................................................................................157

Performance Testing and Analysis .................................................................159

5.3.1.3.1

General Testing and Analysis ....................................................................159

5.3.1.3.2

Time for File Generation and Encryption...................................................159

5.3.1.3.3

Size of the File ..........................................................................................161

5.3.1.4

Specific Testing and Analysis .........................................................................162

5.3.1.4.1

Encryption Time .......................................................................................162

5.3.1.4.2

File Size ....................................................................................................164

5.4

Chapter Summary ..........................................................................................................165

6

DISCUSSION CASE STUDY ................................................................. 168
xv

6.1

KJ v Wentworth Area Health Service ..............................................................................169

6.1.1

Overview ...............................................................................................................169

6.1.2

Setting the Case Study ...........................................................................................170

6.1.3

The Case Study ......................................................................................................171

6.1.3.1

Background ..................................................................................................171

6.1.3.2

Issues ...........................................................................................................171

6.1.3.3

Collected Information ...................................................................................171

6.1.3.4

Disclosure of Personal Information ...............................................................172

6.1.3.5

Consent to Disclosure Information ................................................................172

6.1.4

6.2

Implication for the Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 .....................173

Analysis of the Case........................................................................................................174

6.2.1

Enforcing Access Policies ........................................................................................175

6.2.1.1

Sharing the Information within the Health Team ...........................................176

6.2.1.2

Access Tree...................................................................................................177

6.3

Chapter Summary ..........................................................................................................180

7

CONCLUSIONS.............................................................................................. 183

7.1

Summary and Research Results ......................................................................................184

7.2

Future Research Directions ............................................................................................191

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................... 193

xvi

List of Figures

FIGURE 2.1 : HEALTH INFORMATION STANDARDS .................................................................................. 47
FIGURE 2.2: HL7 VERSION 2 MESSAGE ............................................................................................... 55
FIGURE 2.3: ABSTRACT MESSAGE SYNTAX DEFINITION FOR MESSAGE TYPE ADT_A01 .................................... 56
FIGURE 2.4: ABSTRACT MESSAGE SYNTAX FOR MESSAGE TYPE ADT_01 AND HL7-XML MESSAGE ENCODING ..... 58
FIGURE 2.5: RBAC MODEL (SOURCE KIM, RAY, FRANCE, & LI, 2004) ........................................................ 96
FIGURE 3.1: SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT-METHODOLOGICAL RESEARCH CYCLE ..............................................107
FIGURE 3.2: RESEARCH METHOD .....................................................................................................109
FIGURE 4.1: PROCESS OVERVIEW .....................................................................................................117
FIGURE 4.2: INTERFACE REQUESTING AND RECEIVING ROLES ....................................................................120
FIGURE 4.3: INTERFACE SENDING ROLE USE CASE MODEL ........................................................................122
FIGURE 4.4: PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE .............................................................................................123
FIGURE 4.5: ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION .......................................................................................127
FIGURE 4.6: INFORMATION FLOW DURING THE DATA EXCHANGE ...............................................................132
FIGURE 4.7: ABSTRACT CLASS MESSAGEREQUEST ................................................................................134
FIGURE 4.8: STATE MACHINE - MESSAGE REQUEST ..............................................................................136
FIGURE 5.1: HEALTH INFORMATION SYSTEM ENVIRONMENT ...................................................................143
FIGURE 5.2: DEPLOYMENT ARCHITECTURE ..........................................................................................149

xvii

FIGURE 5.3: CASE ANALYSIS, INTERACTION AND EXPECTED FLOW OF INFORMATION .......................................153
FIGURE 5.4: CASE USE SCENARIO 1 ...................................................................................................155
FIGURE 5.5: ACCESS TREE PATIENT’S DATA .........................................................................................156
FIGURE 5.6: SEQUENCE DIAGRAM SCENARIO 1 ....................................................................................156
FIGURE 5.7: ACCESS TREE CONSIDERING ACCESS TO CARDIOLOGISTS CA-A AND CA-B....................................158
FIGURE 5.8: PROCESSING TIME ........................................................................................................160
FIGURE 5.9: FILE SIZE ....................................................................................................................162
FIGURE 5.10: INTERFACE PERFORMANCE ACCORDANTLY TO THE NUMBER OF ATTRIBUTES ...............................164
FIGURE 5.11: VARIATION OF THE FILE SIZE ..........................................................................................165
FIGURE 6.1: CASE ANALYSIS, INTERACTION AND EXPECTED FLOW OF INFORMATION KJ V WENTWORTH AREA HEALTH
SERVICE ............................................................................................................................175
FIGURE 6.2: ACCESS TREE CONSIDERING ACCESS TO KJ’S CANCER RELATED INFORMATION ...............................178
FIGURE 6.3: ACCESS TREE CONSIDERING ACCESS TO KJ’S PSYCHOLOGICAL RELATED INFORMATION .....................178
FIGURE 6.4: ACCESS TREE CONSIDERING ACCESS TO KJ’S CANCER RELATED INFORMATION INCLUDING NURSES ......179
FIGURE 6.5: ACCESS TREE CONSIDERING ACCESS TO KJ’S PSYCHOLOGICAL RELATED INFORMATION INCLUDING KJ’S
GENERAL PRACTITIONER ........................................................................................................180

xviii

List of Tables

TABLE 2.1: COMPARISON OF DATA PROTECTION PRINCIPLES .................................................................... 34
TABLE 2.2: ABSTRACT MESSAGE SYNTAX NOTATION AND CORRESPONDING DTD SPECIFICATION ....................... 57
TABLE 2.3: OVERVIEW OF COMMUNICATION AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ................................................. 69
TABLE 2.4: COMPARISON OF ACCESS CONTROL POLICIES .........................................................................100
TABLE 5.1: FAMILIES OR REQUIREMENT ACCORDINGLY TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT ..............................141
TABLE 5.2: LIST OF ANALYSED FOSS ALTERNATIVES: CONTEXTUAL ENVIRONMENTS ......................................145
TABLE 5.3: LIST OF ANALYSED FOSS ALTERNATIVES: FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS .......................................146

xix

xx

List of Abbreviations

ACR-MENA
ADT
AFL
AMS
ASCII
CCM
CDA
CEN
COAS
COM
CORBA
CORBAmed
C-RBAC
DAC
DICOM
D-MIN
DTD
EDIFACT
EHR
EHRA
EHCR-SupA
EPL
FAR
FOSS
FRR

American College of Radiology – the National Electrical
Manufacturers‟ Association
Admission, Discharge and Transfer
Academic Free Licence
Abstract Message Syntax
American Standard Code for Information Interchange
CORBA Component Model
Clinical Document Architecture
European Committee for Standards
Clinical Observation Access
Microsoft‟s Component Model
Common Object Request Broker Architecture
CORBA-based standards for healthcare
Contextual Role-Based Access Control
Discretionary Access Control
Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine
Document Type Definition
Electronic Data Interchange For Administration, Commerce and
Transport
Electronic Healthcare Record
Electronic Healthcare Record Architecture
Electronic Healthcare Record Support Action
Eclipse Public License
False acceptance rate
Free and open source software
False rejection rate
xxi

GCPR
GPL
HCU
HIPAA
HIS
HISB
HISPP
HL7
HSSP
ICT
IEC
IOM
ISO
ISO TC 215
LGPL
MAC
MPL
OCC
OMG
OSI
PDA
PHR
PIDS
PIN
RAD
RBAC
SOA
SOAP
S-RBAC
SSL/TLS
TQS
UML
UMLS
UP
WSDL
xDT
XML

Government Computer-Based Patient Records
GNU General Public License
Health Care Unit
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, USA
Health Information Systems
ANSI Healthcare informatics Standards Board
ANSI Healthcare Informatics Standards Planning Panel
Health Level 7 Protocol
OMG Health Service Specification Project
Information and Communication Technologies
International Electrotechnical Commission
U.S. Institute of Medicine
International Organization for Standardization
ISO - Technical committees 215 - Health informatics
GNU Lesser General Public License
Mandatory Access Control
Mozilla Public Licence
Original Component Complexes
Object Management Group
Open System Interconnection Reference Model
Personal digital assistant
Personal health record
Personal Identification Services
Personal identification number
Resource Access Decision
Role-Based Access Control
Service-oriented architecture
Simple Object Access Protocol
Situation Role-Based Access Control Model
Secure Socket Layer/ Transport Layer Security protocol
Terminology Query Services
Unified Modelling Language
Unified Medical Language System
Unified Process
Web Service Description Language
XML-based eXtensible Data Types definition protocol
Extensible Markup Language

xxii

xxiii

xxiv

Chapter 1

Introduction

1

Introduction

The incorporation of new technologies, specialization of health services the
increasing mobility of patients have modified the form in which health care
organizations provide their services. The concept of shared care, as well as the
technologies that make it possible, have become fundamental in the
modernization of the sector. In a shared care environment, remote access to
distant data repositories along with the exchange of relevant electronic health
records (EHRs) is essential not only for allowing communication among health
providers but also in providing valuable information for the integral delivery of
health care and related services. Under this reality, Internet becomes the natural
platform to support such functionalities. However, the insecure nature of the
network and the increased amount of health information transmitted through it
raise the concern over the secure exchange of EHRs and, therefore, the need for
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new methods and technologies to safely deliver highly sensitive information has it
is with EHRs (Ohno-Machadoa, Silveira, & Vinterbo, 2004).
The disclosure, transmission and use of patient‟s data with the purpose of
supporting the delivering health care services is an expanding practice that draws
the interest but also the concern among patients, physicians and health
institutions. The access and retrieval of sensitive information of individuals need
to take into account the fact that any inappropriate disclosure of data could
profoundly affect the personal or professional life of a patient. For this reason,
health information systems (HIS) should consider the incorporation of safeguards
to guarantee the confidentiality of the stored information. In a dynamic and
demanding environment, such as health care, a patient‟s confidentiality can only
be guaranteed by incorporating security services and mechanisms along with
common security policies and/or conflict resolution policies to protect the data not
only locally but also when information is shared with other health organizations
(Lopez & Blobel, 2009). Additionally, EHR systems should guarantee the
protection of patients‟ confidentiality and, at the same time, ensure the reliability
and integrity of the information gathered by health care professionals (Conrick &
Newell, 2006). Consequently, it is essential that health information systems
consider the privacy and integrity of the data and also allow the safe retrieval of
information for primary and secondary uses (Lusignan, Chan, Theadom, & Dhoul,
2007).
In the same line, projects centred in the interconnection and integration of health
information systems, such as national health information initiatives or multi-

2
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domain EHR systems, are expected to consider not only information and
functional requirements but also requirements oriented to protect the privacy and
confidentiality of the individuals. Protection of a patients‟ privacy and the secure
disclosure of health information are crucial functionalities that should be
embedded within the specifications of modern and reliable electronic health
record systems (Conrick & Newell, 2006; Ohno-Machadoa, et al., 2004; Safran, et
al., 2007). For this reason, the protection of a patient‟s privacy has to be
understood as a complex issue which requires the consideration of a set of
elements that include the correct authentication of users, access control methods,
secure transmission of data and security policies, either at the point of origin or at
the destination of the communication channel.
Access permissions could be violated even when transmissions have been
between trusted parties. For example, let us consider a scenario in which health
care institutions A and B are trusted parties that agreed in exchanging electronic
health information. Using public key technologies both institutions can transmit
information under a secure infrastructure. The secure channel guarantees
confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted information. Nevertheless, the
possible existence of different access policies may lead to a violation of access
permissions either at the point of origin or when the information reaches its
destination. Blobel (2006) has suggested the definition of common domain
policies to address differences or conflicts generated by differences in the
definition of security and access policies that would naturally emerge in a shared
care environment (Blobel, Nordberg, Davis, & Pharow, 2006). However,

3
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implementing this approach requires the existence of standardized vocabularies
and common policy structures, which are rather limited within the existing health
information infrastructure. Access permissions based on roles emerge as the main
approach for protecting the data during the communication of medical information
and posterior access to the records, access policies based on role-based access
control models may facilitate the overcoming of possible violation of access
permission (Blobel, et al., 2006; Gritzalis & Lambrinoudakis, 2004), however,
role-based access control models also present issues that may increase the risk of
unauthorized access to sensitive medical data (Alhaqbani & Fidge, 2007).
In summary, the secure exchange and release of electronic health records not only
requires the existence secure transmission protocols but also the definition and
implementation of adequate protocols and mechanisms for access and retrieve of
information. This thesis aims to address the issues of secure transmission of data
in a shared care environment and propose a specification for an information
exchange model that allows a secure and safe transmission and release of EHR.

1.1 Background
Electronic health record should not only be considered as a replacement for paperbased medical records but also as a mean to facilitate the access to relevant health
information. In addition, EHRs allow the implementation of information
infrastructure,

which

provides

support

for

shared

care

environments.

Communication and the ability to exchange EHRs among the staff involved in
providing care to a patient as well as the possibility to access remote data
repositories are essential activities for shared care. Additionally, the current and
4
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historical information maintained within the EHRs can also be used as knowledge
repositories for continuing treatment of the patient, information for further
treatment of the same patient, and for advanced research as well as medical
education.
The inclusion of information and communication technologies has facilitated the
emerging of software applications that support the activities and services provided
by healthcare institutions. In this sense, EHR systems provide a complete
information infrastructure that facilitates patient care services and also maintains
historical and current data suitable to be used for other purposes such as medical
research, development of public policies, medical education (Haux, 2006a) as
well as the implementation of profound reforms to health care systems (Haux,
2006b). In a share care environment, EHRs play an important role in the delivery
of an integral and professional health care. Nevertheless, sharing EHRs not only
should observe the information and technological requirements but also the need
for the protection of patients‟ confidentiality (Blobel, et al., 2006; Blobel &
Roger-France, 2001).
New communication technologies such as mobile devices, 3G and wireless
networks as well as the increasing interconnectivity provided by Internet facilitate
the exchange of health information and allow the access to relevant health data at
the point care. In the same way, standardized software make possible the
integration and interaction of highly heterogeneous software applications,
reducing the time required to exchange medical records through the health care
system (Choe & Yoo, 2008). Nevertheless, the application of such communication
5
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technologies carries new issues that need to be considered. In fact, Internet-based
management of EHRs requires both common standardized messages, that
facilitate the information exchange among heterogeneous electronic information
systems, and effective data protection methods, which are needed to ensure
confidentiality, reliability and validity of the exchanged information (Blobel, et
al., 2006; Choe & Yoo, 2008). Even though, incorporating secure measures during
the exchange of EHRs would protect the patient‟s privacy during the transference
of the information it does not ensure the preservation of confidentiality at the
communication end points. In effect, to ensure the confidentiality of the patient‟s
information in a share care environment it is necessary to incorporate security
services, security mechanisms and common privacy and security policies (Blobel,
et al., 2006)
In a shared care environment, protecting the confidentiality of a patient's
information is a task that could become rather complex. In fact, the correct
identification of users, assigning of access permissions, and resolution of conflict
are main points of interest in providing solutions for data exchange among health
care providers. Traditional approaches such as Mandatory Access Control,
Discretionary Access control and Role-Based Access Control policies do not
always provide suitable solutions for health care settings, especially in shared care
environments. These and other issues will be discussed in more detail in the
following sections of this Chapter. In section 1.2, purpose of and significance of
the study, a breakdown of the main issues regarding the access and exchange of
electronic health records will be presented. A statement of the problem and its

6
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ramifications is introduced and discussed in section 1.3. Finally, the research
question and approach are presented and described in section 1.4.

1.2 Purpose and Significance of the Study
The replacement of the paper-based record by EHRs has been considered an
important step forward in facilitating the delivery health services and the
enhancement of patient safety and value of health care (Heard, 2006). EHRs have
become suitable sources of information for healthcare professionals as well as an
essential instrument for

the delivery of quality health care (Bakker, 2004).

Modern EHR information systems provide benefits such as the existence of
reliable and accessible patients‟ data, the provision of support for logistic
activities such as order entry, appointments, discharge information, event
management, help and support for health professionals (Bakker, 2004), and
information for secondary use (e.g. analysis, research and education, quality and
safety measurement, public health and other business and commercial activities)
(Safran, et al., 2007). Even though electronic health record systems are considered
to be useful tools, there are issues that require to be addressed to gain their main
potential in shared care settings. On one hand, functional and reliable interdomain EHRs require the inclusion of shared concepts as well standardized
terminology and standardized information architectures. On the other hand, the
process of implementing EHR systems should also take into account the legal and
ethical implications of accessing, modifying and sharing medical data, such issues
refer to the protection of the confidentiality and privacy of the patient‟s medical
information (Anderson, 2007; Conrick & Newell, 2006).
7
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In a shared care environment, medical records are maintained by different Health
Care Units (HCU) involved in the care process. In fact, in a modern healthcare
environment different care services are offered by different HCU within the
organization or in the healthcare network that involves multiple organizations
(Gritzalis & Lambrinoudakis, 2004). Under these conditions, sharing medical
record becomes an important task during the provision of care services. Internet is
the environment that allows the exchange of EHRs and the interconnection of
medical applications (Gritzalis & Lambrinoudakis, 2004). Health information
systems developed under shared care environments require the ability of
exchanging relevant health information needed to carry on patient‟s treatments
within the health care network. However, the transmission of information under
Internet is not free of risk. In fact, Internet was originally designed without the
consideration of security measures, which makes the network unsecured by
nature. Nevertheless, it is possible to add additional security layers for protecting
the information when it is transmitted. Blobel and Roger-France used the concepts
of secure connections (secure channels) and secure messages (secure objects)
when referring to the use of well-known security technologies used over the
transport layer such as the SSL/TLS protocol and security enhanced message
technologies based on international health information standards (Blobel &
Roger-France, 2001). Such technologies provide security during the transmission
of the data but do not guarantee the confidentiality of the information when it
reaches the destination point. In fact, the protection of confidentiality would
depend on the existing security mechanism of both the sending and receiving
applications respectively. Moreover, it would also depend on domain
8
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specifications such as technology, environment and policies (Gritzalis &
Lambrinoudakis, 2004).
The exchange of information also requires the consideration of common good
practice policies of use and disclosure of medical records (Conrick, 2006; Safran,
et al., 2007). Although protection of patient confidentiality is a legal and ethical
issue observed by specific legislation, the technical dimension presents a
challenge that changes of technology not always address rigorously (Conrick &
Newell, 2006). The personal character and sensitivity of the information stored
by EHR makes necessary security services that allow the access to authorized
users whilst protecting the confidentiality of the patient‟s information (Blobel, et
al., 2006; Blobel & Roger-France, 2001; Gritzalis & Lambrinoudakis, 2004).
However, it is not a simple task to design and implement security measures for
protecting patient‟s confidentiality and, at the same time, facilitate the
communication of information between health professionals (Agrawal & Johnson,
2007; Gritzalis & Lambrinoudakis, 2004). Issues at this level are associated to the
correct establishment of access rights and the development of common policies or
conflict resolution policies for allowing the access to authorized users (Blobel, et
al., 2006; Blobel & Roger-France, 2001; Gritzalis & Lambrinoudakis, 2004).
Consequently, it is essential to explore the issues associated to the implementation
of EHR, especially those related to data security and protection of patient‟s
privacy. This will allow the definition of guidelines for addressing these issues.
This field of study provides the possibility to analyse critical issues such as the
secured exchange of information among complex information repositories within
9

Chapter1: Introduction
different aggregation levels, interoperability in inter-institutional scenarios and
patient‟s privacy policies at local and inter-institutional levels.

1.3 Statement of the Problem
An important functionality provided by EHR is the possibility of access to
pertinent health information at any time and location. In fact, electronic
information can be easily stored, carried or accessed by a variety of technologies
such as flash memories, smart cards and portable devices (laptop computer,
PDAs, and cellular phones). Electronic transference among different information
repositories also is possible through Internet. This technology facilitates the
exchange of health information among health care providers as well as other
actors of the health care system. Nevertheless, exchanging data and allowing
remote access to EHRs present the need of protecting the information from being
improperly released or accessed by unauthorized personnel. In other words,
protection of data during the exchange process and protection of patient‟s
confidentiality by the incorporation of security services and coherent policies for
primary and secondary are essential in modern EHR Systems (Conrick & Newell,
2006; Ohno-Machadoa, et al., 2004; Safran, et al., 2007).
Secure disclosure and exchange of electronic health records over unsecured
communication channels requires the implementation of comprehensive security
technologies to allow the exchange of data whilst the protection of patients‟
privacy is guaranteed (Choe & Yoo, 2008). These technologies should provide
mechanisms for access control and define access privileges for information
management and protection of data privacy, but at the same time guarantee the
10
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flow of information (Blobel, et al., 2006; Ohno-Machadoa, et al., 2004). At this
point, two issues have to be considered for protecting patients‟ information in a
share care environment: (1) secure transition of patient‟s data and (2) protection of
patient‟s privacy at the communication end points.
During the electronic exchange of medical data, patients‟ information always has
to remain protected, especially the information considered sensitive because the
legal and ethical consequences that its unauthorized release could carry.
Protection of patient‟s confidentiality also needs to be considered when the
information reaches the destination point. Both security services and mechanism
are essential for allowing access to authorized users as well for protecting
sensitive health care information (Blobel, 2004; Blobel, et al., 2006). The
unauthorized access and release of sensitive information is considered a breach of
confidentiality and could lead to issues of public concern such as discrimination,
embarrassment or economic harm (Ohno-Machadoa, et al., 2004). The secure
exchange of information among different health providers not only depends on
secure and standardized electronic mechanisms but also of standardized security
policies. In fact, different health institutions might have different security policies,
especially in terms of access privileges and release of electronic health records for
secondary uses. Incongruent polices may also generate security breaches in the
protection of patient‟s confidentiality and privacy (Choe & Yoo, 2008).
Standard infrastructures, protection of patient‟s confidentiality and coherent
standardized security policies are key elements for the secure exchange of EHRs.
A standard infrastructure provides the conceptual and technological framework to
11
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develop data messages for effective exchange of information among actors of a
health care network. The legal but also technological dimension of protecting
patient‟s confidentiality is a challenge that has not been effectively addressed by
the existing technology. Additionally, the establishment of good practice policies
of patient privacy for allowing the protection of the information, even if the
information is transferred from one health care provider to another, is also an
issue that has not been completely addressed by the current state of the
technology. Secure data exchange along with the protection of patient‟s privacy
are two issues that electric health records need to address to make them reliable
for an inter-institutional environment. This thesis has the purposes to research
issues associated with the secure exchange of EHR and provide a suitable
information exchange method for allowing the secure transmission and further use
of electronic health records in an inter-institutional scenario whilst confidentiality
of information is kept under protection.

1.4 Research Question
In shared care paradigms the access to different data repositories along with the
exchange of EHRs becomes essential for providing efficient health care (Blobel,
et al., 2006; Blobel & Roger-France, 2001). A shared care paradigm also imposes
issues related to access control and protection of patient‟s confidentiality (Choe
& Yoo, 2008; Gritzalis & Lambrinoudakis, 2004). In fact, secure transition of data
does not protect against the unauthorized release of information either at the point
of origin or destination. Patient‟s confidentiality can only be achieved by
incorporating security services and mechanisms to protect the data against being
12
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accessed by unauthorized users. Additionally, EHR systems not only should
guarantee the protection of patients‟ privacy and confidentiality but also assure
the reliability and integrity of the information gathered by health care
professionals (Conrick & Newell, 2006).
Therefore, secure transmission of data, access control and user privileges are
security requirements that modern EHR system should address. This research
aims to address some of the issues described specifically the definition and
specification of information exchange models that allow the secure and safe
exchange of electronic health records over insecure channels and the
incorporation of security mechanisms for protecting patient‟s privacy. More
specifically, to determine:
How could the secure exchange and release of electronic health records
be supported by incorporating security services in a shared care
environment?

1.5 Research Approach
This research will analyse different approaches used to protect information
content in Electronic Health Records and determine which are consistent to be
applied for protection of sensitive information. The research methodology is
focused on the study of cases and will consider the following stages.
1. Conduct a literature review of the topics associated with the studied domain.
The literature review will include the study of different approaches on
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information security for electronic health records as well as currently used
information standards for exchanging electronic health records, identifying
security frameworks currently provided by standards.
2. To define and provide a conceptual proposal for secure exchange of electronic
health record.
3. Analyse a set of Open-Source EHR systems in order to select suitable
software that will be used during the analysis of the proposed solution.
4. Modify the selected software by incorporating a prototype version of the
proposed security solution.
5. Define case studies in which the solution will be analysed and tested.
6. Run simulations and test the prototype based on the case study. The data
collected by these simulations and tests will facilitate the validation of a
proposal for secure exchange and release or electronic health records.

1.6 Research Scope
As it was discussed in the research question, the final aim of this research is to
provide an information exchange model for the secure transmission and release of
electronic health records in a shared care environment. Even though through the
thesis both primary and secondary use of the health information will be discussed,
the focus of the research is primary use and therefore the solution proposed will
be primary use of information.
A prototype version has been implemented in order to evaluate the software
specification been presented and discussed in the thesis. This implementation
would be used to test the proposed solution in a simulated environment based on
14
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case studies. Therefore the scope of this research is to provide a detailed software
specification for secure health information exchange at a conceptual level rather
than to provide completely functional software with that purpose.

1.7 Organisation of the Thesis
This thesis is organized in seven Chapters. Chapter one provides an overview of
the research, with emphasis on the purpose, significance, research goals and scope
of the research.
Chapter two gives background knowledge for the research topic through
discussions of literature review in the relevant topic area. The literature review
initially covers the concept, purpose and dimensions of Health Information
System focusing on Electronic Health record Systems. Security and privacy of
patient information as well as interpretatively of EHRs in a shared care
environment are also addressed in Chapter 2. Health information standards as well
as security requirements are the central point of discussion, which leads to a
comparison of actual access control models used in healthcare to guarantee the
secure access and retrieval of patients‟ medical information in a cooperative
environment. Chapter three describes the methodological process used to
undertake this research.
Evolving from this investigation was the development of a conceptual model that
allows the electronic exchange of health records using a data encryption method
based on attribute-based encryption. The conceptual approach is described in
Chapter four.
15
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Chapter five describes the implementation of a prototype based on open source
libraries for the three elemental components: HL7 message interface, attributebased encryption and electronic health record system. Chapter five also provides
a set of scenarios for testing the proposed solution and later discussion. The set of
scenarios has been developed in order to evaluate the performance of a prototype
based on the proposed solution.
Chapter six provides a case study which is used to analyse the viability of the
proposed solution under real world situation.
Chapter seven reports on the principal findings of the research as well as provides
recommendations based on the research.
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Literature Review
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Literature Review

As it has been discussed on sections 1.2 and 1.3 the secure transfer and use of
electronic health records depends of the existence and use of standards messaging
and data architectures, security services to protect the patient‟s information during
the communication process and the existence of security services and coherent
policies for primary and secondary use of information. In this Chapter, all the
components will be discussed in detail as well as concepts of health information
system (HIS) and electronic health record (EHR). Both, HIS and EHRs, are the
basic conceptual elements for posterior analysis and study of secure exchange of
information and retrieve in a shared care paradigm. Afterward, the discussion will
be centred on standard initiatives for messaging exchange among different health
information system, especial attention will be put on Health Level 7 messaging
standard. HL7 has the focus of interest of this research on the basis that the
proposed solution will be based on the secure exchange of HL7 version 3
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messages. Finally, the discussion will be centred on the security services and
mechanism for both secure transfer of data (communication security) and secure
access and release of information (application security) which is the main focus of
this research.

2.1 Health Systems
A system can be understood as an abstract representation of objects or processes,
a model or a natural artefact in the real word (Alexander, 1974; Stair & Reynolds,
2009). Following this interpretation, health system could be understood as (1) an
interpretation of the health system based on an abstract representation, (2) a
descriptive model representing the functionalities of a health system, or (3) the
technological, logistical and administrative infrastructure, which relates to the
health system. Any of the three, combinations of them or all together can be
considered as an interpretation of a health system (Coiera, 2003). A broad
interpretation of health care system was proposed by Field in 1973, in this
definition health system is understood as:
―... The aggregate of commitment or resources which any nation society
―invests‖ in the health concern, as distinguished for the other concerns.
The health system is viewed in a structural-functional perspective: it
provides services to individuals whose role performance might be
jeopardized by ill-health and it occupies a specific structural position in
social space.‖ (Field, 1973)
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This definition implies that a health system is a collection of resources
(workforce, infrastructure and technology) with a functional structure put in place
with the purposes of providing healthcare services to the community. The analysis
of the complex structure of Health system is not part of the aim of this research;
however, this definition provides a broad understanding of the role that the health
system has within the society. In this line, Health Information Systems (HIS) and
related technology are a crucial component of infrastructure of modern Health
Systems. For this reason, before starting to analyse the central topic of this
research it would be useful to understand the role of modern health information
systems in a shared care environment.

2.1.1 Health Information Systems
Computer-based information systems have been commonly used in healthcare
since 1960s. The principal focus of HIS between the 1960s and 1980s was limited
to departmental software applications such as laboratory, radiology and
management (Haux, 2006a). During the 1990s, the purpose of research and
commercial applications moved to a patient-centred data processing approach as
well as through the local and regional integration of health information systems
(Haux, 2006a). Currently, the central point of interest is the development of
secure and safe health care systems for maintaining electronic health records,
exchange of information among health care providers and the generation of
medical knowledge based on the health care information. According to Haux
(2006), Health Information Systems are applications that collect, store, process
and provide data, information and knowledge for the provision of multiple
19
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services in the health care domain. Long and Long (2005) defined the purpose of
health Information systems as:
―...to provide an organization with data processing capabilities, and
knowledge worker with the information required to make better quality
and more informed decisions.‖
Modern health Information systems provide a variety of services that support all
functions of health care institutions such as financial, management, resource
management (e.g., supply, storage, and human resource), departmental
management (e.g., laboratory, pharmacy, radiology and clinical services), decision
support and health knowledge (Ayres, Soar and Conrick, 2006). If a HIS is able
to interconnect more than one health care provider, it is known as transinstitutional or inter-instructional health information systems. Examples of transinstitutional HISs are regional health information systems. Regional HISs provide
transactional and communicational services for the exchange health information
among hospitals, general practitioners, clinics, pharmacies and medical centres.
When the health information system process data information and knowledge
related with national health indicators is known as a national health information
system (Haux, 2006b). In both cases, the information is integrated and shared
among several health related organizations.
Information is a critical element for the decision making process in health care. In
fact, quality and timely information has become a value resource for the delivery
of health care. A well structured and secure HIS provides access to reliable
information, which can be used to benefit the health care consumer (patients),
20
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clinicians, and management personnel. The information provided by a HIS could
be used for clinical purposes (diagnostic, therapeutic and other procedures),
supporting the decision making process, providing access to information needed
for advance research and medical education, and facilitating the access to
information required in the development of management public plans and policies
(Conrick, 2006).

2.1.2 Patient‟s Health Records
Traditionally, information of patient events and treatments has been kept in paperbased records in order to maintain a historical record that can serve to multiple
purposes (further visits, regional or national health indicators, research, etc.). In a
paper-based system, most of the collected information is stored in cabinets
organized by year, patient‟s names or other organization or classification method
that help to locate the information when needed. The information maintained in
this historical paper-based record is normally referred as patient‟s health records.
Patient‟s health records made possible the service delivery with a focus on patient
care in which member of the organization not only can retrieve the information
but also can share it with those responsible of a patient‟s care (Heard, 2006).
Although the fact that structured paper-based health records provide a method for
maintaining relevant information and support in the delivery of health care, it has
several setbacks:
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Historical information of a patient could become difficult to trace due to the
increasing numbers of forms used to collect information, redundant record
keeping and the loss or misplacement of records.



There is no automatic mechanism that could be used to relate or retrieve
relevant information.



Any aggregated information might require an important amount of time to be
generated.



Illegible writing makes patient record difficult to understand.



Misplacement of documents and the effect of environmental variables
(humidity, temperature, etc.) over the paper can result in the loss of some or
the complete historical information of a patient.

In contrast, the evolution of health information systems and the implementation of
communication and information technologies have made possible the collection,
storage, retrieval and transference of electronic health information. Patient‟s
information can now be captured and digitally preserved by electronically
generated health records. Electronic Health Records (EHR) systems are computerbased application that allows the storage of information collected during patients‟
events.

2.1.3 Electronic Health Records
EHRs have long been considered an important element in supporting the delivery
of health care services. According to Murphy, Waters and Amotegacul (1999)
Electronic Health Records can be defined as:
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―... any information relating to the past, present, or future
physical/mental health or condition of an individual which resides in an
electronic system(s) used to capture, storage, retrieve, link, and
manipulate multimedia data for the primarily purpose of providing
health care and health related services.‖
This definition is centred in the historical perspective of EHRs. The ownership of
the information is not determinate. Moreover, according to the definition, the use
of the information collected and stored in EHR is not only restricted to its primary
purpose of supporting health care services. In fact, most of the information
content by EHR can be used for other purposes such as research, health policies,
education, and a variety of commercial activities.
The disclosure of information for primary and secondary uses presents a challenge
for the development of secure EHR systems. Patient privacy and protection of
data confidentiality have become the main concerns nowadays, especially when
most of the information collected by EHR system may be used for other purposes
rather than for the delivery of health care. This point will be discussed in more
detail trough this chapter.
A definition provided by the Australian‟s Health Information Network (HIN)
(2000) provides a different perspective of electronic health record:
―An electronic, longitudinal collection of personal health information,
usually based on individuals, entered or accepted by health providers,
which can be distributed over a number of sites or aggregated at a
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particular source. The information is organized primarily to support
continuing, efficient and quality health care. The record is under the
control of the consumer and is stored and transmitted securely.‖
This definition emphasizes the personal nature of EHR, and the fact that access to
the information should be under the control of the patient which becomes the
owner. In this case, the owner of the information becomes clear. However, this
definition is close to the definition of Personal Health Records (PHR) rather than
what would be expected of EHRs. At this point, it would be important to make a
distinction between PHR and EHR. PHR could be considered as a variation of
EHR in which individuals (patients) can access, manage and share their own
health information in a private and secure environment (Tnag, Ash, Bates,
Overhage, & Sands, 2006). The information within the PHR is at the disposal of
the patient, who can share it with his health providers (Cheow & Win, 2007).
More precisely, the access to the information contents in the personal health
records would be provided by the patient when and where he is seeking for health
care services. On the contrary, EHRs are not always at the immediate disposal of
the patient, and they are collected, stored and maintained in the providers‟ health
information systems.
The International Standard Organization (ISO) (2004) has published the following
definition for EHRs:
―Electronic Health Record is a repository of information regarding the
health status of a subject of care in a computer processable form, storage
and transmitted securely, and accessible by multiple authorized users. It
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has a standardized or commonly agreed information model, which is
independent of the EHR system. Its primary purpose is the support of
continuing, efficient and quality integrated health care and it contains
information which is retrospective, concurrent, and prospective.‖
The ISO definition of EHR differs from the definition provided by the Australian
HIN, in both the ownership of the information and the access restrictions to the
stored data. The ISO definition does not establish a clear ownership over the
information storage in an EHR, leaving this aspect open to the specific legislative
requirement existing in the region where the health care system is implemented.
However, it is clearly implied that the access and transmission of the health
information should be protected and that access to medical data should only be
allowed to users that have the appropriate credential and access permissions.

2.1.4 Purpose, Dimension and Functionalities of EHRs
The main purpose of EHR is to provide care information for its use in delivering
of care services, treatment management, supporting of health care processes,
financial and administrative processes, and patient self-management (Bakker,
2004; Safran, et al., 2007). Additional purposes of EHR are the development of
quality management, use of the information for medical education and advanced
research, support the development of public and population health policies
(Heard, 2006).
According to the U.S. Institute of Medicine (IOM) electronic health record are
more than a replacement for paper-based health records. In fact, EHRs improve
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the accessibility to the health records, facilitate the communication between the
staff managing the treatment of a patient, are a repository for all information
collected during the treatment of the patient, are a supporting and knowledge
repository for continuing treatment of the patient, are a repository of information
for further treatment of the same patient, and are data source for advanced
research and medical education (Coiera, 2003).
During the implementation of EHR the following ten dimensions should be
considered: content of the health data, the captured information, the representation
of the information, general dimension and data model, clinical practice, decision
support, security, quality assurance, performance and applications.
The U.S. IOM identifies five criteria to define and determine the functionalities of
a modern and efficient EHR: (1) improvement of the patient safety, (2) support
the delivery of effective patient care, (3) facilitate the management of a chronic
health condition, (4) improve the efficiency of health care services, and (5) define
feasibility of implementation (Reel and Mendel, 2006). Some of the basic core
functionalities of EHR proposed by the U.S. IOM are (Reel and Mendel, 2006;
Englebardt and Nelson, 2002):


Management of complete and accurate patient data and information, ability to
study patient outcomes, continuous access for patient care support,
practitioner reminders and alerts, result management and clinical Decision
Support Systems



Electronic communication and connectivity to scientific knowledge,
institutional databases, registers and other external sources and integration of
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data of data and information for multiple health care disciplines and multiple
sites.


Administrative processing of data, data reporting and population health
management.



Facilitation of the use and access for patient, families and practitioners.



Strong protections of data, confidentiality, and privacy of patients.

2.1.5 Architectural Approaches of Electronic Health Record
One of the most important changes introduced by the modernization of the health
care sector is the ability of exchanging medical records using communication and
information technologies. An integrated networking electronic health records
(EHR) system facilitates the exchange of medical records across the health care
system. However, in order to make that possible, the implementation of a unified,
clear and standardized architectural model is required. Different approaches have
been proposed to assure the secure, efficient and standardized exchange of
medical information. In general, the Object-Oriented Methodology and
Document-Oriented Methodology are the two major approaches that have been
used in the development of standardized health electronic record architectures
(Takeda, et al., 2000).
The Object-Oriented Methodology is based on the object-oriented modelling and
developing of software. Synapse, Electronic Healthcare Record Support Action
(EHCR-SupA), CORBAmed, Government Computer-Based Patient Record US
(GCPR) and Health Level 7 (HL7) are some of the standards, which currently use
an Object-Oriented approach. Due to its architecture based on object and
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components that can communicate through messages, this methodology allows the
exchange of data residing in different health care platforms.
The Document-Oriented Methodology is focused on developing a common and
standardized architecture for different types of health care documents that can be
associated to the patient. A patient medical record contains different types of
documents (medical reports, test results, images, prescriptions, diagnosis, etc.)
which are associated to the type of service provided. The Document-Oriented
Methodology is utilized by the HL7 Clinical Document Architecture (CDA) and
by the Japanese MML (Dolin, et al., 2006; Guo, et al., 2005; Guo, et al., 2004;
Takeda, et al., 2000).
Another approach is proposed by Blobel (2006), according to his definition, a
system that supports the exchange of electronic health record should be under an
independent open platform, capable to be scalable, flexible and portable with
Internet access, and using international standards that guarantee security and
privacy (Blobel, 2006a). In order to accomplish that, Blobel has proposed a
Model–Driven Architecture. An approach based on the Model–Driven
Architecture and the ISO reference model which would support the entire life
cycle needed to develop a scalable and flexible EHR system. The model-drive
architecture supports both the Object-Oriented and Document-Oriented methods,
depending on what information is shared or exchanged.
Finally, on March 2005, the HL7 consortium group and the Object Management
Group (OMG) introduced the Health Service Specification Project (HSSP). This
initiative was derived in the development of a new paradigm for health care data
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exchange known as the Service Oriented Architecture (SOA). The concept of
SOA is not new in the IT domain and has been used in other information domain
and software architectures (Atman, 2006). Nevertheless, its incorporation to the
health information domain is rather recent. Normally, the architectures used with
SOA applications are web services. A web service is a piece of software
(component) that has a service behaviour which allows it to provide a diversity of
services upon request of client software (Dogac, et al., 2006). The web services
are designed to provide a platform for exchanging data based on existing
information and system architectures.
In summary, robust EHR architecture should consider the implementation of
international standard. The Object-Oriented, Document-Oriented, and Model–
Driven methods are the actual basis architecture for much of commercial
healthcare software. Moreover, in order to achieve the increasing necessity of
information exchange, the development of new health care systems should
consider the implementation architectures and interfaces suitable to communicate
with different medical software.

2.2 Security and Privacy of Patient‟s EHRs
The nature of medical records can be described as information provided by a
uniquely vulnerable human being, worried in some manner about the core of his
very existence, to a trusted person with superior knowledge (Eddy, 2000). In fact,
modern electronic health records contain extremely personal and sensitive
information regarding not only health history but also the dietary habits, sexual
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orientation, sexual activities, employment status, income, eligibility for public
assistance and family history of a patient (Choi, Capitan, Krause, & Streeper,
2006). Therefore, maintaining EHRs not only deals with the technological
requirements but also with the legal and ethical implications associated. Any
unauthorized access and release of personal information contained within a EHR
could cause harm on the private life of the patient (Anderson, 2007; Conrick &
Newell, 2006). Patients understand the importance of retaining medical
information to support and improve the delivery of health care even when they
recognize both the sensitive nature of the collected data and the fact that
information contended by computerized health information systems becomes
more accessible to health professionals, administration personnel, medical staff,
and third parties (Conrick & Newell, 2006). For these reasons, patients expect
secure health information systems in which personal data is protected and any
disclosed information would be used only for health care and related purposes
(Grain, 2006).
Even though protecting the confidentiality of patients‟ information has become a
fundamental requirement for modern electronic health record systems, the
implementation of security measures could become a rather difficult task. Safe
access and exchange of electronic health information requires not only the secure
transmission of data but also to ensure that information will be disclosed only to
those with the correct access privileges. This implies that protection of patients‟
privacy needs to be guaranteed during the whole process, this means at the source
point, when it is transmitted and when it reaches the destination. In order to
protect sensitive medical data, the principles of “need to know” and relevance
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apply. Under these premise users should be allowed to access a patient's EHR in
order to obtain the relevant information to carry out a task. This access should be
provided in concordance with the access and security policies of the organization
in which the patient has been treated (Blobel, 2004; Garson & Adams, 2008). The
principle of need-to-know is driven by the relevance that the accessed information
has in supporting the care of the patient. However, relevancy is an ambiguous
concept that depends on the context in which the information is generated and the
purposes for which the data has been released. Consequently, the information
accessed by a physician should be relevant but also sufficient to provide health
care services (van der Linden, Kalra, Hasman, & Talmon, 2009).
Securing medical information is not only a social, ethical and technological
matter, but is also about the establishment of well defined privacy policies and
legislation. The legal duty of confidentiality is embedded within the professional
relationship between physician and patient, and therefore, it has become an
essential aspect to be considered when exchanging medical records. In a shared
care paradigm, the traditional view of this relationship changes to a relation in
which several specialists share sensitive information of an individual. From a
perspective in which the mobility of patients as well as the exchange of
information becomes more common, the definition of means to efficiently protect
the privacy and confidentiality of the patients becomes even more necessary.
Both security services and mechanisms are essential for allowing access to
authorized users as well as for protecting sensitive medical information during the
exchange of data (Blobel, et al., 2006). Therefore, it is essential for health
31

Chapter 2: Literature Review
information systems to consider both the protection and privacy of patient‟s data
but also the safe and authorized retrieval of information. At this point, it is
important to consider that adding excessive security measures could lead to
inefficient, more time demanding and less user friendly access control methods. In
consequence, defining the correct balance between security requirement and
availability of information is a critical goal in a complex environment such as
health care (Lopez & Blobel, 2009).

2.3 Social, Ethical and Legal Perspective of Protecting
Patient‟s Privacy
The benefits of electronic health records and how the use of this technology could
impact in society are subjects still open for discussion. Nonetheless, the general
perception is that incorporating EHRs to medical practice provides a better
support in the delivery of health care than paper-based systems by facilitating the
access to historical and current medical data of patients (Agrawal & Johnson,
2007; Anderson, 2007). EHR systems are instrumental in maintaining nonfragmented and actualized health information. Therefore, it is essential that health
information systems not only be centred in protecting the confidentiality of
patient‟s data but also in allowing the safe retrieval of information for primary and
secondary uses.
The incorporation of EHRs and computer networks benefit different actors of the
healthcare industry. Studies indicate that fragmented and inaccessible paper-based
clinical information affects both the cost and quality in the delivery of health care
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and related services (Anderson, 2007). Therefore, information technology is
expected to be a necessary tool in solving these issues and supporting the delivery
of health care. Nevertheless, incorporating communication and information
technologies to support healthcare and related services raises concerns over how
privacy and confidentiality of patient information would be protected, especially
considering that information stored by EHR systems is extremely personal (Choi,
et al., 2006; Goldschmidt, 2005). In this sense, concern over protection of privacy
and confidentiality of patients‟ information has also become a barrier for the
adoption of Electronic Health Records. According to Anderson (2007) and Rash
(2005), many health professionals and patients fear that electronic health records
may present security breaches and that stored data, especially those data collected
by web-based EHR systems, may be easily accessed by unauthorized users
(Anderson, 2007; Rash, 2005). Having the complete medical history of an
individual within a highly accessible electronic format increases the public
concern regarding the protection of privacy of the individuals. Moreover, allowing
access not only to local user but also external parties has modified the traditional
approach regarding confidentiality of medical information. Traditionally,
protecting the confidentiality of the information has been the responsibility of the
physician and/or the institution that holds the patient‟s medical records. In a
shared care setting, the provision of health care services becomes a multitask
activity in which the interaction of multiple actors is required not only for
providing health care but also for keeping records and protecting the
confidentiality of health information (Blobel, et al., 2006).
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Table 2.1: Comparison of Data Protection Principles
General principles of
health informatics
ethics (1)

All persons have a
fundamental right to
their privacy, and use
of data about
themselves

European
convention for the
protection of
human rights,
Article 8 (1)
Everyone has the
right of respect for
his private life, his
home and his
correspondence

Convention:
automatic
processing of
personal data
(ETS)(1)
Data subjects should
be able to defend
their rights in
relation to their
automated data files

The European
Data
Protection
Directive (1)(3)
Personal data shall
be processed in
accordance with
individuals‟ rights

Australian Privacy
Principles Act 1998/
Summarise Privacy
Amendment Act 2000
(2)
Sensitive Information:
Limits on the use and
disclosure of personal
information

Manipulation of a
subjects‟ data must be
disclosed in an
appropriate and timely
fashion

Data subjects should
have
knowledge about the
existence
of an automated data
file and
its contents

Any data legitimately
held about a person
must be assured every
available security

There should be
specific security
measures for each
individual file that
are suitable to its
content and format

Personal data shall
have appropriate
security measures
in place

Data Security: Stored
and security of
personal information

The subject of any set
of data has every right
to amend said set of
data if appropriate

Subjects should be
able to rectify
erroneous or
inappropriate
information

Personal data shall
be accurate and up
to date where
necessary

Data Quality:
Solicitation of
personal information
generally
Access and correction:
Access to records
containing personal
information

The fundamental right
of control over
manipulation of
personal data is
conditioned only by
legitimate and
appropriate needs

Any infringement of a
person‟s privacy may
only occur in the least
intrusive fashion
Any infringement of a
person‟s privacy
rights must be
disclosed and justified
in an appropriate and
timely fashion
Sources:

Use and disclosure:
Solicitation of
personal information
from individual
concern
Identifiers: Alteration
of records containing
personal information

No interference by
a public authority
except in
accordance with
the law and
interests of national
security

Qualified disclosure of data does not map to data protection
principles

Collection: Manner
and purpose of
collection of personal
information
Openness: Information
relating to records kept
by record-keeper
Anonymity: Recordkeeper to check
accuracy of personal
information before use
Transformer Data:
personal information
to be use only for
relevant purposes

Qualified disclosure of data does not map to data protection
principles

1.

Lusignan S. d., Chan, T., Theadom, A., & Dhoul, N. (2007). The roles of policy and professionalism
in the protection of processed clinical data: A literature review. International Journal of Medical
Informatics, vol 76 p. 263.

2.

Conrick, M., & Newell, C. (2006). Issues of Ethics and Law. In M. Conrick (Ed.), Health
Informatics: Transforming Healthcare with Technology. Melbourne: Thomson Social Science Press.
pp. 327-329

3.

Agrawal, R., & Johnson, C. (2007). Securing electronic health records without impeding the flow of
information. International Journal of Medical Informatics, vol. 76, No. 5-6 p. 471
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The disclosure and reuse of patient data for purposes other than health care
delivery is also an expanding practice that concerns the interest of patients. The
information provided by historical records is a potential source of data for
research and knowledge generation that can be used for improving the delivery of
health care (Lusignan, et al., 2007). Moreover, electronic health records could also
be used for commercial purposes. Security's issues have reached the public
concern, especially considering the variety of uses that the stored medical data
could provide and the personal, legal and ethical effects that the unauthorized
release of information could have (Ohno-Machadoa, et al., 2004). In any case,
access to medical data repositories for either primary or secondary purposes has
become an essential functionality of modern health information systems.

2.3.1 Privacy Protection from a International Perspective
Under this complex scenario countries such as U.S., Canada, Japan and the
member of the European Union have incorporated laws and regulations that aim
to reduce fraud and abuse as well as protect patients‟ health information
(Anderson, 2007). International regulations such as that imposed by HIPAA
(Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) in the United States and the
European Data Protection Directive (Agrawal & Johnson, 2007; Lusignan, et al.,
2007) demand the highest level of security and protection during the access,
processing and exchange of information that involve sensitive data of individuals
(see Table 2.3).
The international principles and approaches regarding privacy protection can be
related the regulations and legislation that have been implemented by the national
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Australian Government as well as the governments of the states and territories. In
fact, Australia also possesses a set of privacy principles that regulates the
collection, use and disclosure of personal information. Additionally, Australian
legislation protects and provides a legal body for people that have suffered harm
as a product of unauthorized disclosure or use of private information. In the
following sections the more relevant regulations and legislations related to privacy
protection in Australia will be presented.

2.3.2 Australian Legislation for Privacy Protection
There are different legal bodies that apply to individual‟s information that is
collected and stored within Australia‟s private and public sectors. At the federal
level, the Federal Privacy Act covers the collection, use, disclosure, quality and
security of personal information. Privacy Act 1988 applies to the management of
information by Commonwealth public sector agencies. It provides a framework
for complaints concerning violations of privacy as well as defines and establishes
the role of the Federal Privacy Commissioner. The Federal Privacy Act also
applies to the private sector covering large organization, companies and banks as
well as small businesses that trade in personal information.
Several amendments have been made since its first publication in the year 1988,
especially regarding the management of information by the private sector. The
handling of information by private industry is regulated by the Privacy
Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000 (PPIPA, 2009). Both legal bodies are
based on a set of privacy principles that should apply during the collection, handle
and disclosure of personal information (HealthConnect, 2002). The current
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version of the act, promulgated on November 2008, contains 12 information
privacy principles that regulate the management of personal information by
Commonwealth and ACT government agencies whilst information managed by
health service providers and private sector businesses with an annual turnover of
over $3 million is governed by 10 national privacy principles. These privacy
principles are classified accordantly to (ComLaw, 2006; PPIPA, 2009):
a) Collection: establishes the approach and reasons of collecting individuals‟
personal information. It also describes the kind of information that
organization should provide during the data collection.
1. Lawful: The information mas be collected for a lawful purpose and
directly related to the activities of the agency collecting the data.
2. Direct: the information must be collected from the individual, unless
consent as been given otherwise.
3. Openness: establishes the responsibility that organizations have in
providing access to policies regarding the protection and use of collected
information as well as informing individual the reasons for which the
information has been collected.
4. Relevant: the information collected mas be relevant, up-to-day and not
excessive.
b) Storage
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5. Security: defines the obligation held by organization regarding the
protection of personal information.
c) Access: Access establishes the reasons for which access to information could
be granted or denied.
6. Transparent: the individual must be provided enough details about the
personal information that has been stored, the reason for why the
information has been stored and the right that the individual has to access
the information.
7. Accessible: the agency must allow access to the information been stored.
8. Correct: the agency must allow updating, correcting or amending personal
information if necessary.
d) Use
9. Accurate: institutes the responsibility set by organizations regarding the
integrity and accuracy of the collected, used and disclosed data.
10. Limited: information can only be used for the purpose for which it was
collected, for a directly related purpose, or for a purpose to which consent
has been given. Information can be used without consent in cases of
e) Disclosure: describe the reason for disclosure of information (primary and
secondary uses). The Act makes especial reference to the secondary use of
Health information.
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11. Restricted: information can only be disclose with the consent of the
individual. The agency can disclose information for a related purpose and
they don‟t think that individual would object. Information can be disclosed
without consent in cases of serious and imminent threat to any person‟s
health or safety.
12. Safeguarded: sensitive information cannot be disclose without the
individual consent. Information can be disclosed without consent in cases
of serious and imminent threat to any person‟s health or safety.

2.3.3 Australian States
Information

Privacy

Legislation

for

Health

Specific legislations regarding privacy of health information have been
implementing in different Australian States and territories. For example, the
Health Record Act 2000 is a legal body that governs the collection, use and
disclosure of individuals‟ medical information in the State of Victoria (HRAVIC,
2000). In the Australian Capital Territory, the Health Record (Privacy and
Access) Act 1997 is the main regulatory body regarding the management of
individual‟s personal health information, data integrity, data accessibility and
description of health information (HRPAACT, 1997). Although the Health
Service (Conciliation and Review) Act 1995 of Western Australia is not a specific
regulation concerning privacy and confidentiality of health information, it
establishes liability in those cases in which health providers deny access to
personal health data, disclosure information or use health records in means that
could compromise the confidentially of a patient (HSCAWA, 1995).
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The Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (or HRIP Act) is a
normative created to protect the privacy of health information in New South
Wales. The HRIP Act establishes regulations concerning the collection, use and
disclosure of personal health information in both public and private sectors. The
HRIP Act covers the management of personal information by public or private
hospitals, physicians, other health care organizations and other organizations that
could have access to any type of health information such as universities,
gymnasiums, companies and government agencies (HRIPNSW, 2002). Unlike the
Privacy Act 1988 and Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000 which are
based on 10 principles for the private sector, the Health Records and Information
Privacy Act 2002 Act contains 15 health privacy principles.

The principles

establish how health data must be collected, stored, used and disclosed so these
activities do not compromise the privacy and confidentiality of the individual
from who the information has been collected. These principles are established to
regard and regulate the purposes for collecting health information, the relevance
and accuracy of the data, the source of the information, openness, retention and
security, held information reporting, access, amendments, integrity, limitation of
use, limitation of disclosure, use of identifiers, anonymity, transference and data
flow and linkage of health records. The Health Records and Information Privacy
Act 2002 Act also provides for a number of legal exemptions in which these
principles may not apply (HRIPNSW, 2002).
The Federal Privacy Act, along with each of the Acts for privacy protection that
actually apply in the Australian territory, provides the principles for securing
health information. These principles should be considered when implementing a
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health information system that will manage highly sensitive information. In the
following sections the concept of security and privacy in shared care environment
will be introduced. At this point it is important to understand that each of the
principles previously discussed in this section provide the legal framework for
exchanging EHRs in a shared care scenario.

2.4 Security and Privacy in a Shared Care Environment
As it was mentioned in section1.2, in a shared care environment, different health
care units (HCU) are involved in the care process as well as in maintaining
accurate medical records. This requires the communication and cooperation
among all actors involved in the administration of patients‟ care (Choi, et al.,
2006). The responsibility of protecting the confidentiality of patients‟ information
is also reflected on the cooperation among the involved HCUs. As in paper-based
health records, physicians have an ethical and legal obligation of protecting
information of patients in order to prevent potential harm to individuals (Conrick
& Newell, 2006). Nevertheless, the nature of EHRs makes the duty of physicianpatient confidentiality a task even more complicated. Despite the personal nature
of health records, EHRs make patient‟s information potentially available to
anyone that has access to a health information system. Moreover, the current
technology also allows the remote access to data repositories in a matter of
seconds which intensify the concern regarding the security of electronic
transaction involving medical records (Anderson, 2007). This trend would
eventually alter the nature of the doctor–patient relationship and threat the quality
of health care (Choi, et al., 2006). These apprehensions are also shared by the
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public whose primary concern is the security, privacy, and confidentiality of their
personal health information (Goldschmidt, 2005; Rash, 2005).
In a shared care environment defining what is considered sensitive information as
well as what access permissions are granted to users become uncertain. In fact,
each participating institution of a health network would have different approaches
when defining the level of sensitivity associated to the information, access rights
and the level of security required to protect privacy of patients (Blobel, et al.,
2006). Those approaches not only depend on legal restrictions but also are built
based on the accumulated experience and the culture of organizations. Since the
conception of security and protection of patient‟s privacy differ from one
organization to another, methods for interconnecting health information systems
should consider a comprehensive understanding of the complexity of
requirements involving the secure exchange and release of medical data. In
general, an electronic health record system able to secure and protect the
confidentiality of patients should not only incorporate security requirements but
also guarantee the flow and availability of the information.
Implementing a shared care environment has several implications not only in how
the information is managed or which technology can be used but also in the way
in which information is collected, stored and accessed. The exchange of
information in a shared care environment exceeds the needs of a locally integrated
health information system and calls for the definition of a new set of
requirements. Even more, it requires a different approach to overcoming the
technical, legal and ethical issues that rise from exchanging highly sensitive
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information. In a shared care paradigm, the number of specialist that can have
access to EHRs increases and the information contained by EHRs can be broken
down among different health information systems within the organization or
among different healthcare providers. This disaggregation of information
increases the possibility of a security breach. In general, the implementation of the
share care paradigm not only requires the support of standardized information
system architectures, data exchange protocols and common vocabularies but also
protecting the privacy of patients, guaranteeing the authorized access to stored
data and protecting the integrity of the information (Blobel, et al., 2006).

2.4.1 Interoperability of EHRs
Achieving interoperability is a main goal of modern EHR systems. The inclusion
of the of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in the health care
sector has permitted the improvement of services, reduction of costs as well as
facilitated the flow of information between different actors of the health sector
(hospitals, clinics, physicians, researchers, patients, students, insurance offices,
general practice and government offices, etc.)(Hebda, Czar, & Mascara, 2005;
Shine, 1996). Moreover, the modernization of the health care sector, not only in
Australia but also in many developed and developing countries, has imposed the
necessity to exchange medical records among different participants of the health
care system (Grimson, 2001). However, the complexity of the health information
and different methods and systems used for obtaining and storage data have
increased the level of complexity in the development of systems capable of
sharing and exchanging medical data (Ammenwertha, et al., 2004; Grimson,
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2001). In this new scenario, the definition and adoption of national and
international standards has turned into a necessity (Blobel, 2006b; Brandt, 2000).
Therefore, the understanding and knowledge of those standards is essential in the
development and implementation of robust and functional medical information
systems. According to the National Health Information Management Advisory
Council of Australia (2001) a standard can be defined as:
―A published document which sets out specifications and procedures
designed to ensure that a material, product, method or service that is fit for
its purpose and consistently performs the way it was intended to.‖
This definition establishes that standards are specifications of what it is intended
to do, the method used to do it and what should be its result. In the health care
sector, information standards are used to provide frameworks that support the
accomplishment of a diversity of purposes depending on the type of information
and the health care domain. For instance, medical informatics standards are used
to specify data structure and representation, establish requirements of performance
and robustness of information systems, and state methods for the generation,
storage and flow of different types of information (management, financial,
medical, laboratory, studies, research, patient records, etc.) among health
information systems. The concept of information standard and its use in health
care information systems will be explored through this Chapter. Principal interest
will be centred in standard used for exchange of information, especially in Health
Level Seven (HL7) standard.
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2.4.2 Standardization and Interoperability in the Health Care
Sector
As it has been discussed before, health information systems have become
instrumental in providing support to health care activities, reducing the cost of
health care, improving the quality of the service, enhancing the health care
delivery and providing information for research and education (Haux, 2006a).
Furthermore, electronic health information systems facilitate the access to medical
information and reduce the time required to exchange medical record through a
health care system (Langer, 2002). However, the development and adoption of
non integrated health information systems, where implementation has been based
on different architectures, information structures and communication standards
had increased issues regarding the interoperability and compatibility of medical
records, and limited the collection of integrated patient and medical information
(Coonan, 2004). In fact, data collected by different health care providers, at
different moments and in different places are difficult to interpret and share
without considering an efficient information infrastructure based in consensus
standards.
The gradual incorporation of medical informatics standards allows the
development of adequate infrastructure for health care and overcomes the
limitation produced by the adoption of heterogeneous information systems
(Hammond, 1995). Additionally, standards facilitate the storage, indexation,
processing, and exchange of health care registers. The use of international
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standards also permits the achievement of important benefits such as integration
of medical information systems (decision support, record-keeping, order entry,
etc.), efficient and accurate exchange of medical records, accomplishment of
government and local requirements of information, the accessibility to medical
data under almost any circumstance and reduction of redundant and erroneous
information (Coonan, 2004). In general, the use of standards facilities
interoperability, increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the data exchange
process, and increase the information flow between applications in the health care
sector. Brandt (2000) has defined information standards in the health care sector
as:
"… a commonly agreed-upon manner of collecting, maintaining, or
transferring data between computers systems. Until health care providers
collect and maintain data in a standard format according to widely
accepted definition, it is nearly impossible to link data from one site to
another‖(Brandt, 2000).
This definition emphasizes the use of the data generated during the
accomplishment of medical activities and procedures rather than in the
implementation of robust and integrated health information systems. In fact,
medical information standards provide a common and agreed framework for the
development and implementation of integrated software solution.
Standards in health informatics differ according to their purpose and the specific
health domain. Hammond (1995) identified four broad categories of standards
based on their main purpose: (1) vocabulary, (2) structure and contents, (3)
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messaging and (4) security. Another classification establishes that standards are
grouped accordantly to the specificity of the standard: (1) general standards, (2)
specific standards, (3) contents standards, and (4) clinical vocabulary standards.
General standards provide a broad framework for representation, management and
exchange of health data. Specific standards afford specific needs related to
particular health domains (radiology, clinical care, clinical instruments, etc.).

Figure 2.1 : Health Information Standards (Source: Bloom A (2000), Context and Lead‐up to
health reform: Health Reform in Australia and New Zealand, p. 25)

Content standards are used to provide specific support in the development of
software such as dental information systems and electronic health records
systems. Clinical code standards provide code and vocabulary used to storage,
manage, and exchange health data. The main information standards used by health
information systems are shown in the Figure 2.1.
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2.4.3 International Standardization Initiatives

2.4.3.1 American National Standard Institute
The American National Standard Institute (ANSI) is an administrative and
coordinator institute that promotes and facilitates the voluntary agreement of
standards in the U.S. private sector. ANSI is an accreditation institute and does
not develop standards. However, the ANSI supports and encourages the
development of national and international standard by qualified groups
(Englebardt & Nelson, 2002). The ANSI has implemented two instances to
promote the development standards for the health care sector:
1. ANSI Healthcare informatics Standards Board (HISB) which provides an
open and public forum that coordinates the development of health care
information standards organization in United States.
2. ANSI Healthcare Informatics Standards Planning Panel (HISPP), which helps
in the coordination of standardization work developed by specific group.
The ANSI is not a standard developing institute, but it provides a framework and
support for the development of private standardization initiatives(Hammond &
Cimino, 2001).

2.4.3.2 The International Standard Organization
The ISO Technical Committee (TC) 215 was established in February 1998 in
order to facilitate the achievement of standards for the Healthcare Sector
(Englebardt & Nelson, 2002). The ISO TC-215 activities are divided into five
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working groups with specific orientations: (1) Health records and modelling (WG
1), (2) messaging and communications (WG 2), health concept and vocabulary
representation (WG 3), security in health information (WG 4), and (5) health
cards (WG 5). In 2004 the ISO TC-215 released the technical document
18308:2004: “Health informatics - Requirements for an electronic health record
architecture”. The ISO technical document 18308:2004 is a compendium of 124
clinical and technical requirements for a standardized Electronic Health Record
Architecture (EHRA) that supports the storing, use, sharing and exchange of EHR
across different models of health care. It is important to note that the ISO/TS
18208 provides a set of requirements for an EHRA but not establishes the
architecture itself (ISO/TC-215, 2004). By 2005, the ISO TC-215 released the
technical report 20514: “Health informatics - Electronic health record - Definition,
scope, and context”. The ISO technical report 20514 establishes the definition
scope, context, and a set of categories for electronic health records. Additionally it
provides a set of basics characteristics, classification and functional descriptions
for electronic health records systems (ISO/TC-215, 2005).
The ISO has developed the Open System Interaction (OSI) Model that provides a
basis for coordination and development of standard for interconnection of
computer systems (Englebardt & Nelson, 2002).
Due to the complexity of the distributed systems, the ISO recommends the use of
the object-oriented methodology (ISO/IEC, 1998).

Object-oriented permits

modelling and developing robust and well defined applications based on objects
and components capable to communicate and exchange information with each
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others. CEN, DICOM and HL7 are examples of approaches that use objectoriented methodologies for modelling and implementing standards.

2.4.3.3 The European Committee for Standards
The European Committee for Standards (CEN) was founded with the mission to
promote the voluntary technical standardization and harmonization in Europe
(Englebardt & Nelson, 2002).
The CEN had created the Technical Committee 251 in 1991 with the purpose of
developing information standards for the health care domain. Its principal focus is
the development of communication standards for data exchange as well as
medical records, code and vocabulary, imaging, security, privacy and
confidentiality through the health care system in Europe (Hammond & Cimino,
2001).. Additionally the CEN has developed the ENV 13606 „„EHCR
communication‟‟ that is a communication standard development initiative divided
into four components:
1. Extended architecture
2. Domain term list
3. Distribution rules
4. Messages for the exchange of information
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2.4.4 Commonly Used Information Standards in Medicine

2.4.4.1 Common Object Request Broker Architecture
The Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) is standard set
developed by the Object Management Group (OMG). The CORBA is a collection
of specification orientated to provide a framework for developing distributed and
heterogeneous applications (Englebardt & Nelson, 2002).
The CORBA Component Model (CCM) was designed to improve the
development and implementation of new distributed applications. Additionally,
CORBA definitions have been designed to support different types of platforms
(hardware and software), programming languages, and network architectures
(Englebardt & Nelson, 2002). One of those specific definitions is CORBAMed,
which has been designed to support and use existing health care standards and
applications such as HL7, Unified Medical Language (UMLS), and CEN TC 251.
The design of CORBA is based on the ISO standard translation for common
middleware technologies such as DICOM, JAVA, CORBA, and XML
(Englebardt & Nelson, 2002).

2.4.4.2 Digital Imaging and Communication in Medicine
The Digital Imaging and Communication in Medicine (DICOM) is an industrial
standard used to storage and transfer radiological digital images. The DICOM was
developed by the American College of Radiology – the National Electrical
Manufacturers‟ Association (ACR-MENA) in 1983 (Hammond & Cimino, 2001).
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DICOM establishes the message format and standards for communication of
diagnostic images (Englebardt & Nelson, 2002).The DICOM provides a complete
network capability and incorporates an object oriented data model and support for
ISO standard communications. It also includes specification for related-image
information management and exchange. Additionally, DICOM has the capability
of interaction with management information systems and radiology information
systems, facilitating the access to radiological documents and images (Hammond
& Cimino, 2001).

2.4.4.3 Unified Medical Language System
The Unified Medical Language System (UMLS) is a product published by the
National Library of Medicine since 1986. The UMLS contains technical medical
terms used in the development of medical information applications in order to
interpret user‟s queries, to draw terms for appropriate medical vocabulary used in
schemas and to provide a basis for data structured (Engelbrecht, Ingenerf, &
Reiner, 2006).
The UMSL contents 800.000 concepts descriptions and around of 1.9 millions of
concept names that have been collected from different source vocabulary. It also
contains linguistic information of medical terms, syntactic and spelling
information that permit the language processing(Engelbrecht, et al., 2006).

2.4.4.4 Health Level 7 Messaging Standard
Health Level seven (HL7) consortium was founded in 1986 to research and
develop a set of standards for electronic data exchange in the heath care domain
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(Huang, Hsiao, & Liou, 2003). Level seven refers to the application layer, the
highest level of the ISO Communication Model. This layer provides the software
infrastructure responsible for the data exchange, establishes the time required
during the exchange of information, and communicates certain errors generated
during the exchange process (Beeler, 1998; Tanenbaum, 2003).
After years of research and development, HL7 has become the most widely used
messaging standard for clinical and administrative data exchange among health
care applications (Henderson, 2003). The aim of HL7 is to produce standards for
particular health care domains and allow the development of specifications for
messages model and implementations of software interfaces (Beeler, 1998). To
accomplish this aim, HL7 has established a set of standardized information and
message models, document architectures and health information vocabulary for
the development and implementation of health information software interfaces. As
a result of this effort, HL7 standard has become a structured framework for the
communication and transmission of medical data among heterogeneous health
information systems (Henderson, 2003; Hinchley, 2005).
Since its beginning, the HL7 standard has pursued the improvement of
communication and information exchange in the healthcare domain. In more
detail, HL7 has provided standards and frameworks that support the exchange of
information among systems implemented in a wide variety of software
environments, facilitate the immediate transference of single or multiple data
transactions, achieve the best possible degree of standardization, and support
evolutionary growth of the standard as new requirements are incorporated. HL7
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has been built considering existing production protocols and accepted standard
protocols suitable to define new message formats and protocols for computer
applications in the healthcare domain. It also considers the diverse nature of
business processes and information generated during the healthcare delivery, and
facilitates the collaboration with other related healthcare standards efforts (HL7,
2006).

2.4.4.4.1 HL7 Version 2
The HL7 version 2.x series have provided a complete and structured framework
for both the development of common and well defined communication interfaces
and the design of new message specifications. The scope of HL7 version 2.x
messages have been the development of evolutionary message specifications for
the exchange of medical information through the health care domain (Henderson,
2003). This section contains a description of HL7 version 2.x standard series,
codification rules for both ASCII encoding and XML encoding, and its potential
limitations.
2.4.4.4.1.1 HL7 Version 2.x Messages
In the HL7 version 2 standard the information contents in the message is
combined into logical groups or segments delimited by ASCII characters. Each
segment, which may be defined as required or optional, begins with a literal value
compounded by three identified characters. Some of the segments or segment
groups may repeat. An example of a HL7 version 2.x message is presented in
Figure 2.2 (Beeler, 1998; Henderson, 2003).
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The message exchange process is initialized by a trigger event, which indicates
the cause of the message generation (Henderson, 2003). When the trigger event is
activated the information is mapped according to its correspondent Abstract
Message Syntax (AMS). The AMS provides segment identifiers and indicates the
Chapter of the segment (Beeler, 1998; Henderson, 2003). When the computer
application establishes the contents required by the trigger it sends the message
through the network. Finally, the message is received and interpreted by the
software application located in the destination node.

HL7 Message version 2.x
MSH | A\&| MegaReg | UABHospC | ImgOrdMgr | UABImgCtr | 200105290901
31-05001| |ADT^AO1|010S2901|P|2.3.1
EVN | | 20010529090 | | | | 1200105290900
PID| | | 56782445^^^UAReg^PI~999855750^^^USSSA^SS| |IKLEINSAMPL
E^BARRY^Q^JR| |196209101M1 20289^^HL70005^RA99113^^XYZ|260 GOODWIN CREST
DRIVE^^BIRMINGHAM^AL^352O9^^H|| | | | | |0105I30001^^^99DEF^AN
PV1| |I|W^389^1^UABH^^^^3| | | |
1234S^MORGAN^REX^J^^^MD^0010^U
AMC^L| |67890^GRAINGER^LUCY^X^^^MD^0010^UAMC^L|MED| | | | |AO
| |13579^POTTER^SHERMAN^T^^^MD^0010^UAMC^L
OBX|1|NM|^BOdy Height| |1.8O|m^Meter^ISO+| | | | |F
OBX|2|NM|^BOdy Weight| 79|kg^Kilogram^ISO+| | | | | F
AL1|1| |^ASPIRIN
Source: Henderson M. (2003). HL7 Messaging:
The HL7 Message structire, p. 23

Figure 2.2: HL7 version 2 message

Figure 2.3 presents an Abstract Message Syntax definition for ADT. Some of the
trigger events for ADT are admit/visit notification, patient transference,
discharge/end visit, patient registration, patient pre-admission, changing
outpatient into inpatient, changing inpatient into outpatient, patient information
update, admit/visit cancellation, transfer cancellation, discharge cancellation, preadmit cancellation and merge patient and patient identifiers listing.
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ADT^A01^ADT A01
MSH
EVN
PID
[ PD1 ]
[ { KM 1 } ]
PV1
[ PV2 ]
[ { DB1 } ]
[ { OBX } ]
[ { AL1 } ]
[ { DG1 } ]
[ DRG ]
[ {
PR1
[ { ROL } ]
} ]
[ { GT1 } ]
[ {
IN1
[ IN2 ]
[ { IN3 } ]
} ]

ADT Message
Chapter
Message Header
2
Event Type
3
Patient Identification
3
Additional Demographics
3
Next of Kin / Associated Parties
3
Patient Visit
3
Patient Visit – Additional Information
3
Disability Information
3
Observation/Result
7
Allergy Information
3
Diagnosis Information
6
Diagnosis Related Group
6
--- PROCEDURE Begin
Procedures
6
Role
12
--- PROCEDURE end
Guarantor
6
--- INSURANCE Begin
Insurance
6
Insurance Additional Information
6
Insurance Additional Information – Cert.
6
--- INSURANCE end
Source: ANSI/HL7 V2 XML Encoding Syntax, Release 1 (2003). p. 9

Figure 2.3: Abstract Message Syntax definition for message type ADT_A01

2.4.4.4.1.2 HL7 version 2.x Message Rulers
The HL7 version 2.x family standard states the following structural and encoding
rules that should be accomplished by any HL7 message:
1. The abstract message representation uses brackets [] to indicate that a segment
or segment group can be considered optional (Henderson, 2003). This implies
that a segment or segment group included within the brackets is considered a
required element. For example, according to the ADT^01 abstract message
syntax the segment MSH, EVN and PID are required elements during the
message exchange.
2. The abstract message syntax uses braces {} to indicate that a segment or a
segment group may be repeat (Henderson, 2003). This implies that a segment
or segment group without braces may be not repeated.
56

Chapter 2: Literature Review

3. Segment or segment group should be included in the message in the same
order that is specified in its correspondent Abstract Message Syntax
(Henderson, 2003).
4. Local variations should consider that the only required fields are those
logically required in the corresponding Abstract Message Syntax, other fields
must be considered optional (Henderson, 2003).
5. New transactional data elements or fields included to the HL7 standard or to
local variation that are implemented in the data source or sender system,
should be considered optional fields to avoid conflicts reviving systems not
yet updated (Henderson, 2003).
2.4.4.4.1.3 HL7 version 2 XML Encoding Syntax
The HL7 has introduced a second encoding normative based on the Extensible
Mark-up Language (XML) for version 2.x messages. The new encoding
normative has been developed in the basis that XML provides an explicit
representation of HL7 requirement, facilitates the generation of messages, and
allows the exchange of messages not only within the healthcare sector but also
with other business areas (Heitmann, 2003).
Table 2.2: Abstract Message Syntax Notation and corresponding DTD specification
HL7 Abstract Message
Syntax

[]
{}
{[]} [{}]
No bracket or brace

Equivalent Cardinality in XML
Schema (minOccurs .. maxOccurs)
0..1

Equivalent XML DTD
Occurrence indicator
?

1..unbounded

+

0..unbounded

*

1..1

No occurrence indicator
(one exactly)
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The HL7-XML encoding rules state that HL7 segment identifiers are represented
as XML elements, and optional or repeated fields are represented with
cardinalities within the XML schemas or document type definition (DTD) (Table
2.2).
ADT^A01^ADT A01
MSH
EVN
PID
...
[ {
PR1
[ { ROL } ]
} ]
...
[ {
IN1
[ IN2 ]
[ { IN3 } ]
[ { ROL } ]
} ]

ADT Message
Message Header
Event Type
Patient Identification
--- PROCEDURE Begin
Procedures
Role
--- PROCEDURE end
--- INSURANCE Begin
Insurance
Insurance Additional Information
Insurance Additional Information – Cert.
Role

Chapter
2
3
3

6
12

6
6
6
12

--- INSURANCE end

<ADT_A01>
<MSH>...</MSH>
<EVN>...</EVN>
<PID>...</PID>
<ADT_A01.PROCEDURE>
<PR1>...</PR1>
<ROL>...</ROL>
</ADT_A01.PROCEDURE>
...
<ADT_A01.INSURANCE>
<IN1>...</IN1>
<IN2>...</IN2>
<IN3>...</IN3>
<ROL>...</ROL>
</ADT_A01.INSURANCE>
...
</ADT_A01>

Source: ANSI/HL7 V2 XML Encoding Syntax,
Release 1 (2003). p. 13

Figure 2.4: Abstract Message Syntax for message Type ADT_01 and HL7-XML message
encoding

The structure of a HL7-XML encoded message follows the same patterns of its
corresponding ASCII Abstract Massage Syntax representation. This implies that
an HL7-XML message contains the type, trigger event, and message ID of the
AMS. As in the ASCII representation where messages with the same structure
refer to a basic AMS, then all HL7-XML messages with the same structure refer
to a singular XML schema. The segments are represented as XML elements with
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a three-character literal that identifies the element. Group of segments are
represented as a sequence of elements grouped by an identifier complex type
element. Figure 2.4 shows an Abstract Message Syntax and its corresponding
XML message encoding for ADT.
2.4.4.4.1.4 HL7 v.2.x limitation
Regardless of the spread use of the HL7 v2.x family, this has presented the
following limitations (Beeler, 1998):
1. The

complexity of the

standard

generates

difficulties

during

the

implementation.
2. The communication system should consider the same semantic interpretation
of the data elements content message. Additionally, the systems should be
agreed in how to use and how to interpret the optional fields.
3. Without the correct analysis, an HL7 message could present inconsistencies
either inherent on the standard or in the interpretation of the standard.
4. The HL7 version 2 has a large number of optional segments that require a
rigorous testing process. This fact could enhance the complexity of the system
and increase the time required for its implementation.
5. The amorphous developed process makes collaboration difficult.
6. The standard cannot be implemented in alternative communication protocols.
Additionally, the use of different version of the HL7 standard has generated
incompatibility problems in the communication process between different health
care systems (Bicer, Laleci, Dogac, & Kabak, 2005).
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Despite the problem presented with the use of the HL7 v2.x standards, the
adoption of HL7 provides a baseline platform that simplifies the interoperability
between different healthcare systems (Berler, Pavlopoulos, & Koutsouris, 2004).
However, the level of interoperability has not yet reached the three levels of
interoperability recognized by the US National Committee on Vital and Health
Statistic in 2000 (Heitmann, 2003). Additionally, a more depurated methodology
is required to develop truly interoperable software applications (Hinchley, 2005).

2.4.4.4.2 HL7 Version 3
As a response to the limitation of the previous version and considering the
technologies available, a new version of set of HL7 standards have been
developed. This new version reflects the actual trends in software interoperability,
diminishes the optional use of segments generated during the development of
previous version of the standard, includes international paradigms and facilitates
its implementation. As a result of these new requirements, the HL7 Task Force
released the HL7 version 3, which considers an Information Model, Interaction
Model, Message Design Model, Clinical Document Architecture (CDA), and a
framework for HL7 message implementation, making the standard compatible
with modern development techniques and reduction of its implementation costs
(Beeler, 1998; Hinchley, 2005).
1. HL7 is based on a set of principles that provides a development philosophy to
the standard.
2. The new version provides mechanisms and specification that support the
design and development of software application throughout the world.
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3. HL7 version 3 provides capability support for previous version of the standard
(version 2.x family).
4. HL7 framework has been designed to provide a maximum degree of
interoperability among software applications implemented within different
version of the HL7 standard.
2.4.4.4.2.1 HL7 Components
HL7 version 3 provides a set of component developed to facilitate both the
incorporation of new message definitions and the development of new software
interfere for data exchange in the health care sector. These components are:
1. The Information Model: it recognizes three interrelated information models.
2. The Reference Information Model (RIM) is the basis for the HL7 message
development process. The RIM is an object-oriented data model which
contains the basis structure for clinical data domain. It also identifies the life
cycle of events that a message or group of messages will carry (Beeler, 1998).
Additionally, the RIM provides a coherent information structure, consistent
data and concept needed to develop messages to share medical information
between different applications in the health care domain (HL7, 2006).
3. Domain Message Information Model (D-MIM) is a subset of the RIM that
includes the relevant data structure, based on classes, required to create a
message in a specific domain (Hinchley, 2005; HL7, 2006).
4. Reference Message Information Model (R-MIM) is a subset of a D-MIM used
to represent the data contented by a message or set of messages. It also
contains the specific annotations and definitions that facilitate the
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implementation of the messages or set of messages (Hinchley, 2005; HL7,
2006).
5. The standard HL7 framework: it states the principles for the development of
new messages in an international collaboration scenario. The Framework is
based on the following elements: communication adaptability, collaboration
standard development, adoption of codes and vocabulary, and specialization to
meet region or nation-specific requirements.
6. Clinical Document Architecture (CDA): the CDA is a header and body
document specification. The header identifies and classifies the document and
provides information regarding the encounter, patient and provider. The body
contains clinical records, which are organized in sections (Dolin, et al., 2006;
Morrison, 2000). Both header and body are RIM derived contents. In
summary, the CDA is a complete information object to standard mark-up
document that provides the structure and semantics to a clinical document
with the purpose of interchange (Dolin, et al., 2006). The CDA document is
encoded in Extensible Mark-up Language (XML) developed by the World
Wide Web Consortium in 1998 (Morrison, 2000), which allows to share
multimedia information (text, images, sound and video).
7. Vocabulary Domain: it provides a common and standard vocabulary used in
coded fields for HL7 messages. The principal source of codes is the preexistent standards terminology, when there is not a standard term for a single
entry HL7 should provide a correct solution.

62

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.4.4.4.2.2 Adoption of HL7
The main characteristics of HL7 Messaging Standard were discussed and
presented through the previous sections. The intention of this section is to provide
an analysis of variables that could affect the adoption of HL7. This analysis will
permit to identify benefits of the use, understand the adoption process and
recognize limitation and barriers that should be considered during the
implementation of HL7 standard.
The use and adoption of HL7 allows the implementation of integrated health care
systems. In addition, HL7 provides a native and robust interoperability framework
for software development and deployment. Moreover, HL7 reduces the cost of
moving existing documents to new standards (Müller, ÜCkert, Bürkle, &
Prokosch, 2005) and enhances the work flow between health information systems
(Marcheschi, Mazzarisi, Dalmiani, & Benassi, 2004). For these reasons most
authors explicitly agree that HL7 is a recommended and required standard for
information exchange among health care applications. They also suggested the
adoption and use of the different components of HL7 (Message models, RIM,
CDA and vocabulary) could generate an important reduction of time and cost in
the health care delivery service.
However, adoptions of HL7 have to consider several issues that should be
addressed to better implementation plans. Some of them are adoption limitation
over ad hoc UML modelling of HL7 (Fernandez & Sorgente, 2005 ), complexity
of the implementation over large information systems, high cost, restrictions of
vocabulary and the consideration of other communication standards that provide
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better support over a specific domain, e.g. The Digital Imaging and
Communications in Medicine (DICOM) for radiology exchange of information
(Um, Kwak, Cho, & Kim, 2005).
2.4.4.4.2.3 Technical Barriers for Adoption of HL7
HL7 provides a wide range of guidelines and specification for the implementation
of data structures and messages for health software interfaces (Henderson, 2003).
Instead, HL7 has several technical limitations that increase the complexity and
cost during the implementation process. Some of these limitations are related to
information model specifications, message definitions, document structures and
vocabulary applied to specific health care domains.
According to the definitions of HL7 standard, messages should contain a basic set
of fields, which must hold the critical information required for exchange;
additional information should be provided using optional fields (Beeler, 1998;
Danko, et al., 2003). This fact does not represent a real inconvenience for local
implementations (Bilykh, Jahnke, McCallum, & Price, 2006; Heitmann,
Schweiger, & Dudeck, 2003). However, the optional use of fields and segments
could increase time, costs and efforts required to implement HL7 messages in
inter-institutional scenarios (Müller, et al., 2005).
The Reference Information Model has structural limitations for representing and
mapping data and information for some health care domains (Liaw, et al., 2003;
Lyman, Boyd, Dalton, & Egybazy, 2003). According to Danko et al. (2003), the
RIM class Act is unable to represent complete model structures for nursing
information systems. Moreover, they suggested that, to ensure a correct message
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definition for nursing activities, the RIM should be adapted to include additional
attributes to the Act class and the HL7 vocabulary should be enhanced to include
nursing information. Furthermore, the limited representation and limited
vocabulary also affect the development of software interfaces and data mapping in
other domains such as general practice (Liaw, et al., 2003), and the exchange of
referral and discharge letters (Heitmann, et al., 2003).
The CDA provides a framework for developing document representation and
communication message based on HL7 standards. However, the CDA framework
is in a development process. This implies that CDA does not provide a complete
data representation for some specific health domains or local requirements
(Heitmann, et al., 2003). Moreover, limitations of HL7 vocabulary and data
structure make necessary the development of local solutions, which are not totally
compatible for inter-institutional information exchange (Danko, et al., 2003;
Heitmann, et al., 2003). In addition, software‟s vendors do not provide complete
support for certain external data integration, and local implementations are
restricted to internal needs (Müller, et al., 2005). These issues add levels of
complexity to the development process and increase the cost of implementing
HL7-CDA message interfaces for inter-institutional health information systems.
Additional limitations are related the cost and time required for implementation
and the complexity of the existent HL7 artefacts (Um, et al., 2005). The
implementation of HL7 messages based on CDA-XML requires an important
amount of time and cost of development. Moreover, the implementation of CDA
templates increases the cost and efforts (Heitmann, et al., 2003). In addition, the
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deployment of large health information systems, under HL7 message standard and
related components, makes the development and implementation process highly
difficult and requires additional resources (Katirai & Sax, 2005; Langer, 2002;
Sakamoto & Nakaya, 2005.).
In conclusion, HL7 offers a helpful framework for developing and implementing
health information message interfaces. However, there still exist some issues to
address in order to improve the standard. First, HL7 message implementation for
large or inter-institutional health information systems requires a considerable
amount of time and costs. Second, the RIM has provided structural basics for the
definition of messages; however, it is limited for representing and mapping data
for specific domain such as nursing and general practice in-formation systems.
Finally, the CDA has become a basic requirement for clinical document
representation and message implementation but, has presented limitations in the
representation of specific local health information domains and inter-institutional
information.

2.4.5 Challenges of Securing Electronic Health Records
Securing electronic health records, in a scenario where information is potentially
accessed by multiple actors, could become a complex and costly activity. To
provide a framework for secure maintenance and release of health care
information, the European Committee for Standardization has released a set of
information security standards for health information systems (CEN-ENV, 2000a,
2000b, 2000c). CEN standards recognize four global security needs that any
health information system should accomplish. The four global security need
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described by the CEB standards are: availability, confidentiality, integrity and
accountability (CEN-ENV, 2000a). The definition of a secure model for data
exchange would reuire the application of these principles. With that purpose the
relation between the global security needs and their application are described and
discussed in this section.
Availability of the information refers to the level of accessibility of the
information upon request from a user. In healthcare, availability of the
information is essential in the provision of integral health services. However,
availability of information should be provided under a secure scheme in which
confidentiality of information is also guaranteed. To protect the confidentiality of
the information, access to patient‟s data should be carried out under the principles
of relevance and need-to-know (Garson & Adams, 2008). The principle of
relevance prevents the information overload and protects the patient‟s privacy by
restricting the release of information to the relevant data required to support the
health care process (Berner, 2008; van der Linden, et al., 2009). In the same way,
the principle of “need-to-know” guarantees that only personnel who required the
information and have the access privileges will be allowed to extract the data.
Defining the correct balance between availability and security of information is a
critical goal in a complex environment such as health care.
A security breach poses a threat for protecting the integrity of electronic health
records as well as for providing reliable information for accountability purposes.
Integrity of the information is not only guaranteed by incorporating additional
security mechanisms within the system or for securing a communication channel,
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when information is exchanged between systems, but also by ensuring that only
authorized user can have access, add or alter stored data (Blobel, et al., 2006;
Blobel & Roger-France, 2001). In a shared care environment controlling who is
accessing the information turns into complex and time demanding task.
Accountability of information also becomes less accurate when non-authorized
users are able to access and manipulate data regardless of the fact that they do not
have the privileges to execute such activities (Shin, Lee, Shin, & Choi, 2008). The
solution proposed would need to address the four global security needs. As it will
be discussed in the following sections, the availability of the information becomes
essential in a shared care environment. A software specification will be required
to observe the principles of relevance and “need to know” as a method to
guarantee the correct access to the information. The challenges discussed on this
section are analysed in more detail in the following sections. The section 2.4.6
presents a general analysis of the requirements for allowing data exchange in a
shared care setting, the analysis is made considering a bi-dimensional view of the
information shared in a health care environment.

2.4.6 Securing the Exchange of EHRs
Health information standards provide the basic framework to developing robust
interconnected health applications. However, the secure exchange and disclosure
of electronic health records over insecure channels such as internet also requires
the implementation of comprehensive security technologies that allows the
exchange of data (Choe & Yoo, 2008). Security technologies should provide
mechanisms for access control and define access privileges for protection of data
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privacy and information management (Blobel, et al., 2006; Ohno-Machadoa, et
al., 2004). Patient‟s sensitive information always has to be protected during the
electronic exchange of medical data; especially the information considered
sensitive. The unauthorized access and release of sensitive information are
considered a breach of confidentiality and could lead to issues of public concern
such as discrimination, embarrassment or economic harm (Ohno-Machadoa, et al.,
2004). At this point, the following issues need to be taken under consideration:


Origin of the information



Reason for its release and destination



Secure transmission of data



Protection of patient‟s privacy
Table 2.3: Overview of communication and security requirements

Primary

Secondary

Local
 Standards domain software interfaces
 Standard domain message definitions
 Import/Export
functionalities
for
compatible applications
 Local access and security policies
 Role-based Access control policies
 Local Communication security
 Application
security
(availability,
identification
and
authentication,
confidentiality, data integrity, accountability
and traceability)

Inter-Institutional
 Standards
multi-domain
software
interfaces
 Standard
multi-domain
message
definitions
 Standardized access and security policies
 Common definitions for role-based
access control policies
 Access and security policy agreements
 Inter domain communication security
(Authorization
and
access
control,
confidentiality, data integrity, accountability
and traceability)

 Ambiguation and anonymization of
electronic health records
 Security policies for secondary release
and use of EHRs
 Security policies for third party release
and use of EHRs
 Local application and communication
security

 Data integration, Ambiguation and
anonymization of disseminated EHRs
 Common and agreement policies for
access and release for secondary use of
EHRs
 Common / agreement policies for third
party release / use of EHRs
 Inter
domain
application
and
communication security
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The origin of the information refers to who and where the data has been collected.
Health information can be collected by different organizations and can serve a
variety of purposes, and its storage can be local or external. Information locally
stored can be promptly available and can be accessed by a user at any time and
location within the organization. On the contrary, external health data is usually
retrieved from information systems that do not provide direct access rights to
users. In this case, access rights are provided based on common agreements
between the organizations involved (Lopez & Blobel, 2009; van der Linden, et al.,
2009).
The reason for the disclosure of information is an important element in defining
an efficient security strategy. Detailed information is normally required to support
primary services such as the treatment of a subject of care. On the contrary,
information required for secondary uses should not be linkable to the patient
(Agrawal & Johnson, 2007). The destination of the information also affects the
definition of a security strategy. Local security needs substantially vary from the
requirement of a shared care scenario (van der Linden, et al., 2009). Locally,
standard security measures and standardized messages allow the secure access and
disclosure of information. However, the secure exchange and release of
information among different health providers not only depend on secure and
standardized electronic mechanisms but also on standardized security and access
policies (Lopez & Blobel, 2009). In fact, different health institutions might have
different security policies, especially in terms of access privileges and release of
electronic health records for primary and secondary uses. Incongruent security
polices could generate security breaches which compromise the confidentiality
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and privacy of patients‟ medical data (Choe & Yoo, 2008). The Table 2.3 presents
an overview of the requirements that need to be fulfilled depending on the use of
the information and its destination. In the following section each one of the
quadrant of the table will be analysed in more detail.

2.4.6.1 Local Data Exchange and Security for Primary Use of
Information
Local EHR implementations have become a key element in supporting health care
activities, reducing the cost of health care, improving the quality of the service,
enhancing health care delivery and providing support for primary and secondary
use of information. In order to facilitate the access to information storage in local
EHRs, health information systems should be interoperable in a secure fashion. In
general, local EHRs implementations should consider the existence of
heterogeneous sources of information, security requirements for protection of
patients‟ medical data and the implementation of security policies for access and
release of the data.
The existence of heterogeneous health information systems has increased issues
related to interoperability and compatibility of medical records, and limited the
collection of integrated patient and medical information from local information
architectures (Coonan, 2004). The incorporation of medical informatics standards
allows the development of adequate infrastructure for health care (Hammond,
1995; Hammond & Cimino, 2001) and overcomes the limitation generated by the
adoption of heterogeneous information systems. Standard domain software
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interfaces, standard domain message definitions and importing/exporting
functionalities for compatible applications are the keystones for allowing local
communication and interoperability of health information systems and providing
access to electronic health records.
Security requirements for accessing and protecting patients‟ medical information
are also crucial components for integrated local health information architectures.
Local communication and application security should ensure availability of
information, confidentiality, user identification and authentication, data integrity,
accountability and traceability of accessed information. Availability of the
information is another important element in obtaining functional electronic health
record systems. Users with the right to access information should be allowed to do
so in order to perform their duties (Blobel, 2004; Garson & Adams, 2008). As
information happens to be more available for all users within the organization the
concern over the protection of patients‟ privacy becomes an important factor that
drives the implementation of security measures (Anderson, 2007; Blobel, 2006a).
Integrity, reliability and accountability are also crucial requirements that a health
information system should meet in order to ensure the maintenance of a secure
electronic health record platform.
Under these circumstances, management of security services for authentication
and assigning access privileges is a critical task for securing EHRs (Blobel, 2004).
Consequently, accurate authentication of the user as well as a correct assignation
of access privileges become crucial in order to guarantee that information is
accessed, added and modified only by individuals with the privileges to perform
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such activities (Blobel, 2004). The role-based access control (RBAC) model has
been presented as an appropriate solution for granting access privileges to
patient‟s information. RBAC provides a solution for the indirect assignment of
access privileges based on the role of the individual within the organization
(Blobel, 2004) but also allows grained customization of access privileges for users
under specific circumstances (Peleg, Beimel, Dori, & Denekamp, 2008). RBAC
model their benefits and limitations will be discussed in more detail later on in
this Chapter.
Domain and sub-domain access and security policies should cover legislation and
regulations regarding secrecy and confidentiality of personal information by
providing an internal normative concerning the release of data. In order to prevent
an unauthorized release of information, health information systems should provide
a security infrastructure for protecting the principles embedded within
organizational security policies (Agrawal & Johnson, 2007; Conrick & Newell,
2006; Lusignan, et al., 2007).

2.4.6.2 Shared care data exchange and Security for Primary Use of
Information
Electronic exchange of EHRs requires both common standardized messages that
facilitate the information exchange among heterogeneous electronic information
systems and effective data protection models, which need to be established to
ensure confidentiality, reliability and validity of the exchanged information
(Blobel, et al., 2006; Choe & Yoo, 2008). Even when incorporating secure
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measures to protect the exchange of EHRs may guarantee the secrecy of the
patient‟s information during the transference of data, it will not ensure the
preservation of confidentiality at the communication end points. In effect, it is
necessary to incorporate standard message definition, security services, security
mechanisms and common access and security policies in order to protect the
confidentiality of the patient‟s information in a shared care environment (Blobel,
et al., 2006).
Health information systems developed under the premises previously mentioned,
require the ability of exchanging relevant data to carry on patients‟ treatments
within the health care network. According to the International Organization for
Standardization, a standardized electronic health record system should include the
ability of exchanging a complete EHR or a part of it and provide support for
serialization of databases under standard messages and data architectures.
Moreover, the system should facilitate the semantic interpretation of merging data
from an extracted EHR; include support for audit trail of exchange processes;
provide rules covering the exchange of an extract of the record; and allow the
semantic interoperability of clinical concepts (ISO/TC-215, 2004). Exchanging
health information could be achieved by importing/exporting records in the case
of compatible software application or by using standardized messages in a
scenario with a heterogeneous use of both information architecture approaches
and software platforms (Danko, et al., 2003; Müller, et al., 2005). Health Level
Seven (HL7), the ASTM International, formerly the American Society for Testing
and Material, and the European Committee of Normalization (CEN) have
provided standard frameworks and message definitions that facilitate the
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development of software interfaces for the exchange of electronic medical
information using public networks such as Internet (Blobel, 2006a; McDonald,
Overhage, Dexter, Takesue, & Suico, 1998).
In a shared care scenario, the responsibility of maintaining confidentiality over
information is shared among the different organizations participating in the health
network. This responsibility not only should be considered but also reflected in
the selected health information architecture. Meeting confidentiality and security
needs is vital for electronic health records systems in order to provide a secure,
safe and reliable environment for co-operation and communication among
healthcare providers. Security may not only consider the services that will be put
in place to avoid the unauthorized access to sensitive information but also
mechanisms that will be used to protect the patients‟ data and prevent an
unauthorized release of information at any point in the communication channel
(Blobel, 2000; Blobel, et al., 2006; Blobel & Roger-France, 2001).
Communication security and application security are the two main elements that
require

special

attention

when

sensitive

information

is

transmitted.

Communication security describes all components required for a safe exchange of
data between software applications whilst application security refers to security
measures used by information systems in order to protect the information
contented on database and documents. A set of standardized mechanisms and
services can be used to protect the information during the exchange; however, the
main issue is how to ensure the safe release of the information when it reaches its
destination.
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The exchange of information also requires the consideration of common good
practice policies of use and disclosure of medical information (Conrick, 2006;
Safran, et al., 2007). Although protection of patient confidentiality is a legal and
ethical issue regarded by specific legislation, the technical dimension presents a
challenge that changes of technology not always address rigorously (Conrick &
Newell, 2006). The personal character and sensitivity of the information stored on
EHR makes necessary the consideration of security services that allow the access
to authorized users whilst protecting the confidentiality of the patient‟s
information (Blobel, et al., 2006; Blobel & Roger-France, 2001; Gritzalis &
Lambrinoudakis, 2004). However, it is not a simple task to design and implement
security measures for protecting patients‟ confidentiality and, at the same time,
facilitate the communication of information between health professionals
(Agrawal & Johnson, 2007; Gritzalis & Lambrinoudakis, 2004). Problems at this
level are not only associated with correctly assigning access rights for transmitted
information; but also are linked to the development of common policies or
conflict resolution policies for allowing the access to authorized users (Blobel, et
al., 2006; Blobel & Roger-France, 2001; Gritzalis & Lambrinoudakis, 2004).
A solution proposed by Agrawal and Johnson states the use of a “sticky policy”
which is endorsed to the exchange of information. The endorsed policy contains
the original access control policy that is enforced over the transferred data
(Agrawal & Johnson, 2007). However, this not only requires the use of
standardised policies languages for the correct interpretation of the transferred
policies but also poses the inconvenience that local policies could eventually be in
disagreement with an endorsed policy. In addition, access control and privacy
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policies are managed by each institution separately based not only in legal bodies
and regulations but also in the ethical principles that govern the culture of an
organization (Choe & Yoo, 2008). Blobel proposed a multi-domain policy model
in which common domain policy agreements are defined. Common domain policy
agreements are policy definitions established between health organizations to
solve inconsistencies between policies during the exchange of information
(Blobel, 2004). In this case, the interpretation of policy will depend on syntax,
semantic, vocabulary and operation of policies that may present issues when
information is exchanged between domains that do not share similar technological
infrastructure and policies definitions (Blobel, 2000; Blobel, et al., 2006; Blobel
& Roger-France, 2001). Normalization of policies as well as a common definition
of vocabulary and interpretation of policies are essentials for the implementation
of this approach. However, a formal framework for policy definitions has not been
defined within the health care sector (Gritzalis & Lambrinoudakis, 2004). Neither
normalization and/or standardization of policy definitions have been formally
proposed.

2.4.6.3 Data exchange and Security for Secondary Use of Information
Even though the scope of this research is to provide a data exchange specification
for secure transition and release of primary health information in a shared care
environment, the discussion of secondary use of information and its security
requirements would provide a better understanding of the Table 2.3. Secondary
information obtained from electronic health information systems is not only useful
for the improvement of health delivery but also can be used as historical source of
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medical data for research and educational purposes (Haux, 2006b). Nevertheless,
as secondary data is obtained from patients‟ electronic information, a release of it
without the proper privacy and confidentiality protection could eventually result
in harming individuals. Thus, any association of data that can eventually lead to
the identification of patients should be avoided in order to protect the privacy and
confidentiality of individuals.
Ambiguation and anonymization of data are the fundamentals for protecting
privacy and confidentiality of patients whilst the flow of information for
secondary uses is maintained (Ohno-Machadoa, et al., 2004). Techniques and
software applications that provide answers to securing anonymity of the patient
data are already under development. However, there is no consensus on what
constitutes an anonymized data set, and how the degree of anonymity can be
quantified in order to provide mechanisms for formalizing the problem, or even
more which information should be considered to be sensitive. This issue has an
important impact in distributed systems and data repositories. Since there is not a
common concept for anonymization and it is not clear which data is considered
sensitive, the information collected from different data repositories could
eventually contain data sets with information that can be linked to individuals
(Ohno-Machadoa, et al., 2004). In the case of multi-domain scenarios, in which
not all involved organizations share the same technology, the secure access and
release of information could not be entirely guaranteed (Agrawal & Johnson,
2007). For example, in wide range studies, in which information is collected from
a variety of data repositories, the existence of different approaches for both
establishment of sensitive data sets and technologies for ambiguation and
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anonymization could turn into security risks that would threaten the privacy and
confidentiality of patients‟ information.
The use of EHRs for secondary purposes also has a normative component which
requires consideration. Legislation and regulations define who accesses
information and how the information could be released. Furthermore, it serves as
a framework from which access and security policies are established. Policies for
secondary release and use of information as well as policies for third party release
and use of EHRs are not only defined according to the relevant legislation and
normative but also are based on the culture, experiences and ethical values of the
organizations. Additionally, the technology used to maintain policies and define
access to the stored data differs from one organization to another. Considering
these facts, it is clear that any sharing of secondary information between
organizations would eventually face incompatible or contrasting polices (Agrawal
& Johnson, 2007). The Implementation of policy agreements could provide
solutions to issues regarding the existence of differences between policies during
the collection and exchange of the stored data. Nevertheless, as it has been
discussed previously, the interoperability of release policies will also depend on
how well information systems are able to interpret them (Blobel, 2000; Blobel, et
al., 2006; Blobel & Roger-France, 2001). Normalization of policies as well as
common definition of vocabularies for interpretation is a key factor for the secure
release of secondary health information not only for local environments but also
in inter-institutional scenarios.
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2.4.7 Analysis of Authentication and Access Control Methods
In a shared care context, the concepts of privacy, confidentiality, and security
become fundamentals for secure exchange of electronic health records. In order to
provide a secure, safe and reliable environment for cooperation and
communication, several security requirements need to be taken into consideration.
Security may not only consider the services that will be implemented to avoid the
unauthorized access to sensitive information but also should incorporate
mechanisms that prevent unauthorized access and release of patient‟s data.

2.4.7.1 Traditional Authentication Methods
Existing authentication and access control models require safekeeping PINs,
passwords or smartcards in order to provide access to restricted facilities and
information. However, the nature of the activities executed by physicians and
medical personnel requires mobility and multiple accesses to different terminals
within the organization or even remotely in the case of web based health
information systems or integrated multi-domain systems (Garson & Adams, 2008;
Shin, et al., 2008). Considering that access to different systems may require
multiple authentication methods, it is usual to find that PINs and passwords are
maintained stored on the computer terminals used by physicians, stick papers on
the office, laboratories, medical consult or at home, or become a simple
combination of well known numbers or digits such as phone extension, date of
birth or pseudonyms, which are easy to remember but also relatively less efficient
in avoiding security breaches (Garson & Adams, 2008; Shin, et al., 2008). The
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use of smartcards also may present certain disadvantages such as deterioration and
accidental lost. Additionally, if physicians forget their PIN/passwords or misplace
their smartcards a reissuance process must take place (Shin, et al., 2008).
Consequently, existing models become inappropriate and less reliable for a
medical environment.
The other issue associated to the use of traditional models is medical disputes
generated by delegation of authentication codes (Chen, et al., 2008; Heckle &
Lutters, 2007). Delegation of private authentication codes is generated when a
member of a hospital‟s medical staff delegates his PIN/password or other
authentication feature to another physician or nurse to access, modify or add
information on behalf of the owner of the private authentication codes (Heckle &
Lutters, 2007; Shin, et al., 2008). The delegation of access rights may grant access
to sensitive information to non-authorized users by breaking established policies
of information privacy and confidentiality (Heckle & Lutters, 2007; Shin, et al.,
2008). This also may have legal implications when restricted information is
leaked to third parties without the proper authorization of the patient or when the
addition of erroneous information compromises the safety of patients.

2.4.7.2 Authentication Based on Biometric Technology
In healthcare, biometric technology has been gradually introduced as a method to
secure and restrict access to medical facilities, protect and manage confidential
information, identify patients and reduce fraud in healthcare programs (Marohn,
2006). As biometric technology uses unique physical features of a person, the
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level of security is increased by preventing the fraudulent access to restrict
information. In this context, biometric technology provides a mechanism for
identification or identity verification depending on what organizations need in
order to protect their resources and information. Using biometric to provide
security services can be a noteworthy alternative considering the flow of sensitive
information presents in large software applications and the resources required to
manage complex information systems that can be accessed by hundreds or
thousands of local and remote users. Biometric technology presents several
advantages in comparison to traditional methods such as providing a friendly and
easy to use access control method, the restrictions in the delegation of access
rights, increase of security and discourage fraudulent access to restricted
information.
Even though biometric technologies offer a more compiling and secure method
for restricting the access to health facilities and health information than traditional
technologies, it has not been addressed as a suitable alternative for protecting
patient‟s privacy and confidentiality (Shin, et al., 2008). Technology based on
biometric provides a suitable and more secure method for identification and
access control than traditional technologies as well as the ability of encrypting
sensitive information for local applications or in a shared care environment
(Gates, 2007; Shin, et al., 2008).

Additionally, international regulations and

legislations that promote protection of patient confidentiality have pushed forward
the concern regarding unauthorized access and release of information (Agrawal &
Johnson, 2007; Conrick & Newell, 2006; Lusignan, et al., 2007). In this scenario,
biometric technology provides a reliable solution for ensuring that only authorized
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personnel have access to patient‟s information. Biometric technology also could
be used to protect patient‟s privacy in share care scenarios by making information
network systems more secure (Atkins, 2000; Marohn, 2006).
Approaches based on biometric technology have demonstrated to be reliable
mechanisms by restricting the delegation of access rights as well as discouraging
fraudulent access or impersonation of users (Shin, et al., 2008). Biometrics
features are almost impossible to reproduce and user can be easily identified based
on their physical or behavioural characteristics (Delac & Grgic, 2004). In
addition, the use of biometrics dramatically reduces the chances for unauthorized
delegation of access rights as well as facilitates the maintenance of appropriate
access privileges, positioning this technology as a suitable solution for
guaranteeing security and accessibility to electronic health records (Gates, 2007;
Shin, et al., 2008). In the same way, biometric allows the elimination of end-user
generation of passwords as primary source of information for system security,
which has become a main security issue for current information systems (Gates,
2007; Shin, et al., 2008).
Implementation of biometric authentication technology also facilitates the remote
access to electronic health records by using a biometric feature as a method of
authentication. This has become beneficial in the management of treatment for
aged patients in remote areas, as well as allowing patients to update their online
personal health records (Marohn, 2006). Additionally, it also has been used to
reduce fraud in health insurance, protect facilities, reduce costs of maintenance,
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promote and protect patient privacy, help in the management of confidential data
and identify patients (Marohn, 2006).
In general, using biometric technology as an authentication and access control
method enhances the protection of patient privacy by adding an accurate
authentication technology, eliminates costs associated to password maintenance,
reduces unauthorized access to sensitive information by restricting delegation of
access right and impersonation of individuals, reduce fraud associated to
insurance claims and become a long term solution for access system management
(Gates, 2007).

2.4.7.2.1 Uses of Biometric in Healthcare
2.4.7.2.1.1 Remote Access for Patients
A specific application of biometric technology is identification of patients for
remote access to personal medical information. In this case, patients can have
access to their personal information by using a biometric feature such as
fingerprint. In this context, a biometric scanner would be able to capture an image
of the biometric feature and send it to a centralized system for verification
purposes. The image is matched with the stored biometric profile of the patient.
When the identity of the patient is verified the system sends back the information
originally requested by the patient (Flores Zuniga, Win, & Susilo, 2009).
Authentication technology other than biometrics does not guarantee that the
person remotely accessing personal records is who claims to be. In the previous
section, it was discussed several security issues regarding the use of personal key
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(passwords and PIN) normally generated by the end-user (Gates, 2007; Shin, et
al., 2008). Although, patients, who are accessing medical records, are not allowed
to modify medical information, the unauthorized access to the remote repository
could have personal, legal or social repercussions. Biometric technology helps to
prevent the unauthorized access to remote repositories by avoiding impersonation
of individuals (IBG, 2008; Shin, et al., 2008). Biometric technology could also be
used to encrypt the medical data. In this perspective, patients would be able to
access personal data remotely; the system would be able to encrypt the
information using the biometric profile of the patient and then transmit the
encrypted data to the patient‟s computer.
Experiences using this model have been implemented in the United Kingdom and
South Africa. In United Kingdom a web based application with fingerprint
technology has been developed to allow the remote identification and access to
aged patients‟ electronic health records. Patients in this program are able to access
their medical records, prescription and medical procedures as well as indications
made by physicians. A similar system has been implemented and used in South
Africa to facilitate the patient identification and provides access to historical
electronic health records (Flores Zuniga, et al., 2009; Marohn, 2006).
2.4.7.2.1.2 Verifying Patient Identity
Biometric identification and verification of patient‟s identity have been used
mainly to prevent fraud in insurance claims and for the application of healthcare
programs. Several experiences have reported successful results in countries such
as USA, Australia, the United Kingdom and South Africa. Identification of both
85

Chapter 2: Literature Review
healthcare provider and patients has been the primary purpose of the use of such
technologies. For example, in Texas (USA) a biometrics-smartcard program has
been implemented for recipient authentication at the attention point to reduce
fraud associated to the provision of healthcare services, in Australia a retina
verification system has been employed to support the treatment of patients
addicted to heroin (Marohn, 2006).
Fingerprint biometrics also can be used for purposes of patient registration and
identification. Under a biometric identification system, a non-registered patient
entering healthcare service may place a biometric feature (iris, fingerprint, etc.) on
a biometric scanner to generate a biometric profile. The biometric profile is then
used for identity verification purposes during patient‟s further visits. The
technology could also restrict the access to electronic health records, unless the
identity of the patient has been verified. A system with these characteristics has
been implemented and used at Lourdes Hospital in Kentucky, USA (Atkins, 2000;
Flores Zuniga, et al., 2009).
Biometric profiles also have been used to identify patients in emergency
situations. When biometric profiles are linked to the electronic health records the
information can be accessed even when no information or identification of the
patient can be provided. For example, if unconscious patients are brought to a
health service they could be identified based on their biometric profiles and then
linked to their personal records. The data would be released providing to the
medical staff with the information required to offer an efficient medical care
service. Furthermore, the released information may prove to be beneficial for
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other purposes such as contact the family of the patient. The Ballard Hospital,
Washington, has used this method to identify unconscious assault victims that are
received in the emergency services. Moreover, after the devastating effects of the
hurricane Katrina, emergency services used biometrics‟ profiles to identify
unconscious patients and victims (Marohn, 2006).
The attention at the point of care also may be benefited using biometric
identification methods. The remote access to electronics health records by PDA,
smart phones or laptop computers also is possible by using biometric for security
purposes. A biometrical sensor, which is used to capture a biometrical sample of
the patient, can be added to a portable devise. The image captured by the sensor is
sent to a centralized system that matches the image with the stored biometric
profile. When the identity is verified the patient information is released and sent to
the portable device. The portable device displays the information that is used to
provide a better health service. This technology has been used in USA to provide
better medical care to patients and victims during emergency situations such as
car accidents, fire incidents, and natural disasters (Flores Zuniga, et al., 2009;
Marohn, 2006).

2.4.7.2.2 Limitation of Biometric Technology
Even though, biometric technology offers several advantages in comparison to
traditional authentication methods, it also presents usability setbacks. In fact, there
are technical and usability issues to be considered when selecting and using
biometric technology such as accuracy of the biometric lecture, technological
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obsolescence of the scanners, the existence of the biometric feature, enrollability
and suitability for the medical environment.
The accuracy of the biometric technology depends on the ability of the system in
obtaining a good initial image of the biometric feature as well as the ability of
matching individual with their original templates. The false acceptance rate (FAR)
and false rejection rate (FRR) can be affected by factors such as incorrect
placement of the biometric feature, dirt, humidity and changes in the biometric
feature (Garson & Adams, 2008; Pierce, 2003). Degradation of the biometric
feature also affects the accuracy of the matching system (Pons & Polak, 2008) and
raises the necessity of maintenance and re-enrolment of existing users.
Enrollability of user is also the other issue that can affect the accuracy of the
matching system. For example, optical fingerprint scanners fail to read a
significant portion of the population such as older people with dry skin and
children (Pons & Polak, 2008). It is also the possibility of damage or inexistence
of the biometric feature which is generated by injuries or mutilation (Garson &
Adams, 2008).
Users require placing their biometric feature in a specific position, heat, cold and
perspiration can affect the accuracy of the lecture, which makes the technology
unsuitable for certain cases. For example, fingerprint technology can be easily
implemented for accessing electronic health records in several health care settings.
However, the fact that many health care staff would be usually wearing hygienic
gloves becomes a usability problem in this case (Garson & Adams, 2008). Iris
recognition is more accurate technology and also provides a solution to several
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usability issues. However, the high cost, reticence of users and the fact that this
technology has not been tested for large implementation makes it less suitable for
several health care settings (Reynolds, 2004).
Additionally, biometric implementations assume that electronic health records are
applications based on private, and most of the time, local networks that do not
need external communication (Shin, et al., 2008). This assumption is not entirely
accurate for a shared care paradigm (Blobel, 2004, 2007; Blobel, et al., 2006).
Nowadays, it is common to observe that patient‟s medical information is shared
among different health providers or used not only for primary purposes but also
for secondary reasons (Safran, et al., 2007). However, sharing sensitive
information brings the concern that the overall security will be as strong as the
weakest system within the network. Therefore, to become a valid alternative,
biometric technology requires the consideration of multi-domain environments,
where information is transferred among different domains within the organization
or among health care providers.
In general, biometric technology does offer several advantages over traditional
method, especially in matters related to security and authentication. However,
several issues rise from the usability perspective that could affect the accuracy of
the technology and that needs to be considered to reduce the rates for false
acceptance and false rejection.
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2.4.7.2.3 Biometric Technology and Secure Exchange of EHRs
The solution proposed, which is discussed in chapters 4 and 5, would also allow
the use of biometric technology for the authentication of the medical staff. In fact,
the model is based in a attribute security model which also has been applied as
fuzzy-attribute based encryption scheme for biometric technology. This approach
and it related model will be discussed in Chapter 5.

2.4.7.3 Traditional Access Control Models
In the following sections traditional access control models, such as DAC, MAC,
RBAC, will be presented. In order to do so, a paradigm will be used, where a
doctor needs to acquire information regarding a patient‟s medical history from
external institutions in order to handle the patient‟s case. This case is described in
more detail in section 4.1.

2.4.7.3.1 Mandatory Access Control
Mandatory access control polices (MAC) govern access based on classification of
subjects and objects within a system. The decisions regarding access control are
made by a centralized authority that determines, on one hand, the level of security
required for each object and, on the other hand, the trustworthiness level of
subjects for accessing the protected information (R. S. Sandhu & Samarati, 1994).
Access control is based on comparing security levels, which indicate how
sensitive data is and it is performed by assessing security clearances, which
indicate the entities that are allowed to access such data. To access the
information a subject should have at least a level of security clearance equal to the
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security level of the object being accessed (Stallings & Brown, 2008). MAC
policies established that users cannot delegate access rights in this way enforcing
protection of the data “level”, this guarantees the confidentiality of the accessed
data (Stallings & Brown, 2008). MAC policies also allow the establishment of
fine-grained access rights over data and, at the same time, reinforce established
access restrictions. However, MAC policies are rather rigid, which make them
unsuitable for a shared care environment, especially considering that in MAC
more than one security level cannot be assigned to the same data object (Hafner
et. all, 2008).
For example, and considering the case study presented in section 5.3.1.2.2, a
situation where information of patient 'A' is maintained under MAC policies,
doctor 'DC' will be required to provide the necessary clearances to retrieve the
data from clinic 'CL' and hospital HB information systems. In this case, the data
fields confining patient 'A' information would be maintained labelled with
different levels of security accordant with the sensitivity of the information.
Doctor 'DC' would be able to retrieve the data that reflect the access right
provided by the clearances that he possesses. In fact, to maintain the principles of
need-to-know and relevance 'DC' would only have access to the relevant
information needed to perform the task. However, a physician with the same
security clearances to 'DC' would also be allowed to access the retrieved data,
which would not reflect the consent provided by patient 'A' to doctor 'DC'. MAC
policies are centred on the level of sensitive of the information rather than rights
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and permissions that users or user groups have to access the data, which does not
allow discriminating among users with the same clearances.
Furthermore, in a shared care context where data can be exchanged between
multiple organizations, delegated and accessed by multiple individuals, users can
play different roles and have access to information under different contexts
(Alhaqbani & Fidge, 2007). However, delegation of information and establishing
hierarchies of access permissions are not allowed by MAC policies. In general,
although MAC policies are less complex to define and allow the establishment of
fine-grained access permissions based on the sensitivity of the information, they
are extremely rigid for a health care environment, especially in managing users
and user groups and delegation of access permissions (Hafner, Memon, & Alam,
2008)

2.4.7.3.2 Discretionary Access Control
Discretionary access control (DAC) is based on the identity of the requestor (user
or system process) and on access rules, which establishes what the requestor is
allowed to do. Access will be granted to the user accordantly to the permissions
that the user has over the object at the moment of accessing it. DAC policies allow
users to provide access permissions to another entity (user or system process).
However, they do not impose restrictions in how information will be managed
when it is received by a user. In fact, a user could pass the data to another user not
authorized to access it.
A key element of DAC is the ownership of the information, especially because
owners are allowed to grant access to the stored data. However, in health care
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ownership of the information is not always clear. In fact, EHRs belong to a patient
but are created and modified by health care professionals and the information is
not only shared but also could be maintained by different health organizations,
which could claim ownership of the data (Alhaqbani & Fidge, 2007; Hafner, et
al., 2008). Considering the situation of patient 'A', the data retrieved by doctor
'DC' from clinic 'CL' and Hospitals 'HA' and 'HB' correspond to her personal
health information; however, ownership of the data is not clear. In the case of
patient „A‟, contents of her electronic health records have been created and
accessed by physicians of the three organizations as well as information has been
collected from other external sources (radiology results and postmenopausal
symptoms in the case of clinic 'CL'). Additionally, patient 'A' electronic health
records is distributed in the information systems of all three organizations that, in
principle, would have different access principles and security policies. The
example shows that information could be created by various collaborative partners
that could not claim complete ownership of the data.
Although, access policies are flexible, the model lacks the ability of supporting
dynamic change of access rights. Additionally, fined grained access privileges are
difficult to be managed, especially when users are allowed to grant access rights
to other users. DAC is centred in users rather than user groups; however, if the
model is extended by including categories or group definitions, group
management is possible.
In general, DAC policies are less complex to implement if compared to RBAC,
they are also flexible but still restricted for a shared care environment and increase
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the complexity of defining fine-grained access to stored data. Implementing DAC
in shared care settings could result in additional security problems (R. S. Sandhu
& Samarati, 1994; Stallings & Brown, 2008).

2.4.7.3.3 Role-based Access Control and Exchange of EHRs
Role-based access control (RBAC) has been used as a mechanism to guarantee
authorized access to electronic health resources, especially during the exchange of
EHRs. Role-based access control (RBAC) is used to protect information resources
from unauthorized access based on the roles that user could have or perform
within an organization. RBAC was first introduced by David Ferraiolo and
Richard Kuhn in 1992 as a mean to provide manageable access privileges to
identifiable groups of users (Ferraiolo & Kuhn, 1992). The Ferraiolo-Kuhn model
was later integrated with the framework proposed by Sandhu et al. (Sandhu,
Coynek, Feinsteink, & Youmank, 1996) and published as the NIST RBAC model
in 2000 (Sandhu, Ferraiolot, & Kuhnt, 2000). The integrated framework proposed
by Ferraiolo, Sandhu and Richard was adopted as ANSI/INCITS standard in
2004.
The central idea of the RBAC model is that users can perform multiple roles and
roles can be associated to multiple access permissions. In RBAC permissions are
represented by the relation existing between resources and operations over those
resources (Lee, Kim, Kim, & Yeh, 2004). In practice, RBAC models are based on
access policies defined in terms of permissions that are associated with roles
assigned to users. Permissions will determinate the operations that a role is able to
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perform on information resources and, therefore, all users that have assigned that
specific role (Kim, Ray, France, & Li, 2004).
RBAC has been proposed and used to provide access privileges to information
contained within electronic health records. Hoverer, even when RBAC models
provide simple mechanisms for granting or restricting access to information by
associating each user to roles, it faces the issue that role definitions (descriptions
as well as access privileges) could differ significantly from one organization to
another (Peleg, et al., 2008). The definition of access privileges not only depends
on the conceptual definition of roles but also of intrinsic practices within the
organization. Consequently, a role-based access control model may not entirely
provide a suitable solution for inter-institutional scenarios. In fact, RBAC models
are established according to particular requirements defined for each institution in
the network. Therefore, it is expected that conflicts and ambiguity would take
place when agreement policies are stated (Blobel, 2000; Blobel, et al., 2006;
Blobel & Roger-France, 2001). Common and agreement policies regarding rolebased access privileges could prove to be an efficient way to solve this issue in the
short term. However, standardized role definition and access privileges at the
conceptual and practical levels will be required in order to solve ambiguity issues
in the definition of roles in the long term (Blobel, 2004).

2.4.7.3.4 Role-based Access Control Model
Constrains associated to role-base access control model (Figure 2.5) can be
classified as core RBAC, hierarchical RBAC (RH), static separation of duty
(SSD) RBAC and dynamic separation of duty (DSD) RBAC. Core or flat RBAC
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requires that user be assigned to roles to obtain access to information resources.
At this level user can be assigned with access to multiple roles without specifying
constrains regarding the relation between the user and the roles assigned to him.
Hierarchical RBAC provide features for hierarchical representation of the
structure of roles in an organization. Static and dynamic separation of duty RBAC
constrains relations aim to avoid conflicts of interest that may rise when more
than one role is assigned to a user (Kim, et al., 2004; Sandhu, et al., 2000).
In general, roles are defined accordantly to the structure of the organization or
based on the functional role or roles that the user may perform. Role based on
organizational structures are static rigid and represent a structural and hierarchical
relationship between entities within the organization. In contrast, functional roles
are highly dynamic and reflect functional aspects of relationships between entities
(Blobel, et al., 2006).

Figure 2.5: RBAC model (source Kim, Ray, France, & Li, 2004)

An important feature of RBAC is its ability to be used in a multi-domain
environment. Mapping the security access policies of two domains can be used to
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define integrated or multi-domain policies that facilitate the access control and
secure interoperation between the domains (Blobel, et al., 2006; Joshi, Aref,
Ghafoor, & Spafford, 2001). However, the inherent disparity of roles as well as
access permission, which can be expected when working with multiple domains,
can limit the effectiveness of using a role-based access control model in a shared
care environment. This is discussed in more detail in the following section.
2.4.7.3.4.1 Limitations of Roles
As it was previously presented, roles can be defined based on the structure of the
organization or functions that members perform within the organization. This
could lead to an ambiguous definition of access permission that can generate
security issues when information is exchanged among organizations. Since in
RBAC models operations are generically assigned to roles, it is difficult to
separate into individual access permissions. However, when the patient 'A' is
admitted to 'HA', the assignation of the access permission is done based on the
consent given by the patient and not by the access privileged that could be
associated to roles. For example, the patient will be treated by Cardiologist 'CA-A'
but not the Cardiologist 'CA-B'. Therefore, even though both Cardiologists could
have the same role, only cardiologist attending A should be allowed to access the
patient‟s information. Furthermore, in a shared care environment the team of
physicians taking care of patient A should be the only ones with access to his
medical records. In this case, roles are not sufficient to determine access
privileges, but the function of the physician within the team or been part of the
team would provide a clear discriminator. In reality, access to the health
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information is given to the members of the 'team' treating the patient and not to all
physicians with similar roles within the organization. Under these conditions,
role-base access control will not provide a suitable solution to the problem of
restricting access to those users that are not taking part of the patient treatment.
Since in role-based access control models access permissions are determined by
the role assigned to a user, the control that the patient has over the access to
specific and sensitive information will be intrinsically limited. In fact, in a
conventional RBAC model patient A would not have control whatsoever over
permission assigned to his medical records.

2.4.7.3.5 Combining and Extending Access Control Models
Alhaqbani and Fidge proposed a security access control protocol based on a three
level access security model. The proposed protocol combines Discretionary
Access Control (DAC), Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and Role-Based access
control in hierarchically layered security mechanism, which determine access to
data depending on a set of rules and policies evaluated at each level (Alhaqbani &
Fidge, 2007). According to the access hierarchy of the model, access to sensitive
information will be determined by a Mandatory Access Control Policy, which
provides

a

solution

to

the

previously

described

scenario.

However,

implementation of this model in a shared care environment would be rather
complex. In fact, the complexity of EHRs would limit the usability of DAC in a
shared care setting since role definition can differ among health providers.
Moreover, the complexity of all models could be reduced by reinforcing the
policy that allows/restrict access to information stated as sensitive.
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Motta and Furuie proposed a Contextual Role-Based Access Control (C-RBAC)
model, which extends the conventional RBAC definitions by including contextual
information to determine access permissions to patients‟ data (Motta & Furuie,
2003). In this case, the model allows the statement of pacific restriction by adding
contextual data to restrict the access to the information. Context information such
as physicians assessing of patient, location and time can be used to determine if a
user can be granted with access to information. The model was developed to be
flexible in granting fine-grained access privileges in large health care centres
using RBAC. Nonetheless, its definition and structure limits the model to local
environments, which made the model unsuitable for shared care environments
with participation of multiple health care providers.
Peleg et. al proposed a solution based on contextual RBAC model, which
considers the definition of scenarios, which are called situations, in which user
would be allowed to access EHRs. Situations are described and classified, and
each classification would define a pattern that can be applied when a user is
requesting access to information (Peleg, et al., 2008). The Situational Role-Based
Access Control (S-RBAC) model could also be used to manage access
permissions over remote repositories by applying patterns that define situations in
which inter-institutional exchange of information is allowed. However, the model
was developed using a patient centric approach which did not directly consider
requirements of all possible stakeholders. Additionally, since the model is based
on RBAC, conflicting roles and access policies would be expected when data is
exchanged among different health care providers, which will increase the
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complexity in defining situational patterns for data exchange and release. Also, if
additional health providers and all possible stakeholders‟ scenarios are described
and included, the number of pattern would potentially increase as well as the
complexity of managing access permissions.
Table 2.4: Comparison of access control policies
MAC
Complexity
Multiple
users
Policy
management
Fine-Grained
access

Pros

DAC

C-RBAC

S-RBAC

Low

Medium

High

High

Restricted

Restricted

Possible

Possible

Possible

Rigid/Restricted

Flexible/Restricted

Applicable

Applicable

Applicable

Applicable

Restricted

Restricted

Applicable

Applicable

Guarantees
protection over
accessed data

Allows management
of access right at
group level
Policies are Flexible

Allow Fine-Grained
access restrictions

Protection policies
are centred on the
information rather
that user or user
groups.

Cons

RBAC

Low

Difficult to
implement in large
organization with
multiple user and
groups accessing the
data

Establishment of
ownership over the
data is rather
difficult in shared
care environments.
The model lack the
ability to support
dynamic change of
access right
It is limited and
difficult to manage
in a shared care
scenarios

Facilitate the
management of
access right in large
organizations

Considers the
contextual
information to
determine finegrained access to
medical records

Different role
definitions could be
present when
information is
exchange among
health providers

Is designed for share
care settings
Model is mainly
patient centred, and
does not consider all
stakeholders

Lacks the ability to
specify fine-grained
access right for users
Constraints are not
flexible

Considers the
contextual
information to
determine finegrained access to
medical records

Is not designed for
share care settings

Level of complexity
potentially increase
with the inclusion of
additional situations
Different role
definitions could be
present when
information is
exchange among
health providers

All models require memorization of PIN or passwords. Inherent security issues related to the use of PIN, passwords or
Smartcards such as allow unauthorized share and delegation of access rights, impersonation and accidental lost of
access credential.
In each case it is more likely that users would be able of refuting electronic transactions.
Current research and implementation are exploring share care environment scenarios.
Higher maintenance costs
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2.5 Chapter summary
In this Chapter, the concept of health information systems was introduced on
section 2.1. Special focus was put on Electronic health record systems and their
significance for shared care environments. Security and privacy of Electronic
health record along with the ethical and legal implications of protecting the
privacy and confidentiality of patients were discussed on sections 2.2 and 2.3.
Section 2.4 introduces and discusses the concept of shared care environment and
interoperability of electronic health record systems. A broad introduction to
standard for interoperability is also included in this section. HL7 its use and
limitation are largely discussed in this section; this is because this standard has
been selected in the implementation of a prototype based on the proposed
solution. The prototype and its description is disused later in Chapter 5.
Security issues for interoperable electronic health records in a shared care
environment have been discussed through sections 2.4.5. An analysis of
information and security requirements for data exchange in different health care
settings is discussed on section 2.4.6. At this point it is important to understand
that any solution, and therefore the solution proposed in this thesis, should
consider the four global security needs with their implications. Availability of the
information should not only guarantee the access but also ensure the principles of
relevance and “need to know”. On one hand, the principle of relevance would
warranty that only the required information is released. On the other hand, the
principle of “need to know” would guarantee that those that require the access
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would be allowed to retrieve the information. In this way, in a shared care
environment the confidentiality of the information not only applies to the
transmission of information but also at any point in which the information can be
accessed.
Section 2.4.7 present the traditional authentication and access control approaches
used by modern health information systems to protect electronic medical data.
Biometric technology and it use in health information is presented as an approach
used to increase and facilitate the protection of health information. The security
technologies that have been reviewed are: Discretionary Access Control (DAC),
Mandatory Access Control (MAC), Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) and
extended Access control models (The three Level Access Security Model,
Contextual Role-Based Access Control Model and Situation Role-Based Access
Control Model). A comparative analysis which points out the main characteristics
as well as limitations of each approach is also discussed in this section. In fact,
form this analysis can be implied that actual access control methods do not
provide a solution for a share care environment. Access controls, security,
interpretatively of EHRs are essentials in shared care. In the same way,
organization policies and consent are necessary to protect the information
confidentiality when patient data is share among health care units. The solution
proposed in Chapter 4 collects these elements and provide a specification that
guarantees the confidentiality of the information.
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In the next Chapter, a privacy protection approach which uses attribute-based
encryption mechanism to grant access to transmit electronic medical records is
presented.
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Research Design and Method

The methodological approach and research stages will be introduced and
described in detail. The research will be undertaken considering an analytic
generalization of a case study. A prototype implementation followed by test and
simulation would be conducted to analyse the proposed solution.

3.1 Research Design
The exploratory research has been based on the analytic generalization of a case
study. The research will be focused on the analysis of case studies, modelling of a
software specification and the controlled simulation and test of a security
mechanism. The security mechanism will be design as a communication interface
which will allow the exchange of medical records between electronic health
record systems. The cases studies will provide scenarios in which information is
exchange among health care units. The simulated case study described in Chapter
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5 will be used to analyse and test a prototype implementation of the proposed
solution. Meanwhile, Chapter 6 will provide a real situation in which the proposed
solution can operate.
The simulated case will be based on a standardized representation of an Electronic
Health Record system and will consider the following requirements:
1. The simulated scenario will consider both data exchanged within a single unit
and an inter-institutional prospective.
2. The data will be exchanged using HL7 messaging standard.
3. The data does not have any level of aggregation.
The selected unit of analysis will allow an in depth study of how proposed
security approach can be implemented under a complex health care environment.

3.2 Research Methodology
This research is based on the analysis of case studies and the development of
software components as a method of study. The development of a prototype
software interface will facilitate the analysis of security measures for data
exchange under a shared care environment. Therefore, the assumptions obtained
would be based on an analytical generalization of the data collected through the
different stages of this research.
The prototype development is a useful method to study the effective design,
delivery, use and impact of information technology (Keen, 1987). System
development approach is considered an applied research method which is used to
test the validity and limitations of a proposed theory (Burstein, 2002). In this line,
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system development method allows both the implementation of application used
to illustrate a theory and the refinement of the proposed theory based on the data
obtained from observations made during its implementation and testing (Burstein
& Gregor, 1999; Parker, Wafula, & Swatman, 1994). Therefore, system
development could be a central component of a multi-Methodological research
cycle (Nunamaker, Chen, & Purdin, 1991). In order to conduct the software
analysis, a prototype version of the proposed architecture would be implemented.
The prototype will be configured as a set of integrated libraries and components
based on a conceptual approach for secure exchange of electronic health records,
this is described in chapter 4.

Figure 3.1: Software development-Methodological research cycle (adapted from Nunamaker et al.
1991, p.94)

The conceptual approach as well as the prototype implementation and testing of
the proposed solution are discussed in Chapter 4 and in Chapter 5 respectively.
The conceptual component if this research will be centred in literature review and
conceptualization obtained by the analysis of case studies which are included in
Chapter 2, 5 and 6. As it is shown in Figure 3.1, the prototype component of
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research will centred in theory building and the development of a conceptual
framework (requirements for a shared care environment) based on system
development and experimentation, and it will not include observations such as
cost studies, survey studies or field studies.

3.3 Research Stages
The research has been divided into six stages and four supporting activities and
methods. The first stage, Literature Review, has the purpose of analysing the state
of art regarding to the security mechanisms and approaches used to protect the
access and exchange of electronic health records, with special interest in the
protection of patient‟s confidentiality. A discussion of the standards used in
Australia for definition and exchange of Electronic Health Records is also
included at this stage. The importance of this discussion is the later establishment
of the minimal requirement of a standard data repository that would be used
during simulations. Finally, determining security issues that current approaches
may present and how these issues may affect the protection of patient‟s
confidentiality during the exchange of medical records are also included in this
stage.
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Figure 3.2: Research Method

The second, third and fourth stages consist in the definition of the security
features required for the secure exchange and release of the information. At this
stage an approach for secure exchange of data will be described. At this point, an
analysis of open-source EHR applications in order to select a software application
is conducted (section 5.1). A prototype interface which incorporates the basic
features of the proposed architecture and uses the selected open-source EHR
system would be implemented at this stage (section 5.2). A set of scenarios based
on a case study are used as test of simulation models (section 5.3 and Chapter 6).
The analysis of the tests will help to determine the performance of the proposal
for protecting health care information (section 3). In stage five, the data collected
from the tests and simulations of the scenarios will be in the analysis (section
5.3.1.3). At this point the data collected will allow the understanding of the
behaviour of the proposed security implementation. The result generated from the
tests will help to determine the viability of the proposal for secure exchange and
release of electronic health records (stage 6).
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The supporting activity of “Requirements” will be conducted to identify the
information needed for a secure electronic health record system (section 4.2.1).
This activity will be conducted considering the requirements and principles for
patient‟s privacy and confidentiality. A simulation methodology will be used to
follow the experiment procedures.
Finally, the Unified Process (UP) of Software Development will be employed as a
main methodology for the design, development of both the simulation case and
the final proposal (sections 4.2, and 4.3). The Unified Modelling Language
(UML) will be used as the visual language for modelling the components of the
prototype (Arlow & Neustadt, 2005).

3.4 Chapter Summary
The methodological process used to undertake this research has been described in
this Chapter. The research has been divided into six stages from literature review
through the final proposal definition. In order to conduct the research case studies
will be used and a software prototype will be implemented and tested against the
case studies. The design and implementation of the prototype are described in
Chapters 4 and 5. The case studies are described in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
In the next Chapter, a privacy protection approach which uses attribute-based
encryption mechanism to grant access to transmit electronic medical records is
presented.
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Conceptual Approach

This Chapter describes the conceptual approach of the proposed solution for
secure access in a shared care environment. The proposed approach uses
Attribute-based encryption to encrypt a codified HL7 message which is
transmitted through an insecure channel. To explore and describe the proposed
model a generic case is presented and discussed through the Chapter. The
requirements and analysis that describe the model definition and the further
implementation of a prototype interface for secure exchange of HL7 messages as
well as the security components are also included in this Chapter. The aim is to
provide a specification of software that allows the exchange and release of
information in a share care environment. This includes not only the secure
transference of the information but also the observation of the policies and
consent provided by the patient. This concepts have been largely discussed in
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chapter 2, moreover Chapter 6 provide a real case scenario in which this is
exemplified in more detal.

4.1 Generic Scenario
As a simplification of the problem and with the purpose of providing a framework
for the analysis of the requirements let us assume the following generic scenario.
A common activity in a shared care environment is sharing information among the
team involve in the care of a patient. Considering the existence of an integrated
multi-institutional health information system in which access can be granted to all
members of the team and information can be remotely requested and retrieved.
The generic scenario is the remote information request and access of partial or
complete electronic health record of a patient. The first component to be described
is the formatting of the message. Has it has been disused in Chapter 2, HL7 will
be used for the generation of a standardized message. Therefore, The HL7
message module for data exchange between two Electronic Health records
Systems is the first component of the proposed specification. In this case, the
information of the message will be mapped from the original databases into
standard HL7 messages for data exchange. The information is collected from an
external data repository, encrypted accordantly to a set of attributes (policies) and
securely transmitted to the requested destination. Once the message is received the
encrypted data can be retrieved only by users that have a secret key with a
minimal set of attribute values that overlap those of the encrypted data as it is
described in section 4.2.4.
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4.2 Proposed Architecture
4.2.1 Main Functionalities
The proposed interface should be able to play three roles: requesting, sender and
receiver. In this sense, the system should be able to,


Accept an information request from a local user and redirect the request to a
remote repository (information system). In this case, the system plays the role
of a requesting process.



Receive, process and answer requests posted by remote processes (system). In
this case, the system plays the role of a sender application.



Accept and process information received from a remote sender application. In
this case, the system plays the role of receiver application. The information
will be processed and stored on local files or/and databases.

In addition, the interface should guarantee the authorized access to remote EHR
repositories and be able to secure the information during the transference and
release of the message.

4.2.2 Use Cases for Functional Requirements
As it was explained previously, the functionalities have been divided into three
families depending of the role that the interface will play during the transference
of messages. The starting role is requesting; the local user will require to the
interface the sending of a request for partial or complete EHR regarding a subject
of care. In this case, the interface will play the role of a “requesting process”. The
remote interface will process the request and return a standard HL7 message to
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fulfil the request; in this case, the remote interface plays the role of “sender”.
Finally, the local interface will receive the message and inform to the user that the
information has been received; the user will be able to access the HL7 standard
document received and save the data within the message in the local database or
document in a local directory (or both).
Figure 4.1 shows an overview of the communication between system interfaces,
and how user and system will interact with each other. This abstract
representation of the system considers the users and processes. A user is the
person who is requesting the information, such person is an authorized user that
has accessed the local system. In a multi domain environment it is assumed that
role policies may vary in definition and scope from one domain to another and,
therefore, the access permission for specific roles also may differ. For the purpose
of this abstract representation, it is assumed that a policy controversy model has
been considered. Therefore, it is understood that any request of information made
by an authorized user will be processed considering the credentials used by the
user at the time of the request.
The actor process is an abstract generalization of the local and remote interfaces,
this generalization has been represented as a method to simplify the representation
of the system and, therefore, facilitate the understanding of the problem. It also
assumes that both interfaces may perform similar tasks at certain given time. For
example, considering interfaces A and B, A represents the local interface that will
be accessed by the user to request information from a remote system; B is an
interface located at the remote system. In this case, A will send a message that

116

Chapter 4: Conceptual Approach
includes the information requested by the user; B will process the request and
return a message with the information originally requested. For the contrary, if
interface B request information to interface A, B will submit the request and A
will process and send back the information requested by the user. This analogy
can describe any pair of interfaces that are exchanging information at any given
time.

Figure 4.1: Process Overview

This model representation provide the conceptual communication infrastructure
for data exchange. In the following sections, both roles requesting and sending
are described in more detail.

4.2.2.1 Interface Requesting Role and Use Case Model
Five use cases describe the requesting and receiving roles of the interface. In this
case, the interface behaves as a remote client that requests a set of data from an
electronic health record repository (Figure 4.2). The use cases are described as:
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Information Request (InformationRequest): Local user request a message
from a remote repository (remote Electronic Health Record System) according
to the following flow:
1. The user requests a partial or complete electronic health record from a
remote information repository.
2. The system asks for request criteria.
3. The user enters the request criteria.
4. Systems send a message request to a remote process (remote interface).
5. System changes state of message requests to Requesting Information.
6. Remote process accepts the request.



Information Replay (InformationReplay): Local system retrieves information
sent by the remote process according to:
1. The remote process sends an encrypted message that contains the required
information to the local system interface.
2. The system interface recovers the message with the information sent by
the remote system.
3. The message is temporarily stored.
4. The system flags the user to indicate the availability of requested
information (change the status of the request message to receive a message)



Access to Information (InformationAccess): Local user recovers the receive
a message that contains the information originally requested from a remote
repository.
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1. The user receives a flag indication that the information is available for
retrieval.
2. The user requests access to the information.
3. The system will retrieve the message to the user as a medical document
containing the original requested information. To allow the access to the
encrypted data the user provides a secret key with the minimal set of
attributes for decrypting the data. More detail of this process is provided in
the following sections.
4. The system displays the medical document on the screen.
5. System changes the status of the request message to Read.


Save information in database (SaveInDatabase): Local user recovers the
received message and request to store the data in the local database.
1. The user selects the option saved in the database.
2. The interface formats the data within the received HL7 messages to fulfil
local database requirements (vocabulary and structure).
3. The interface accesses the local database.
4. The interface stores the data.
5. The system sends a successful status message to the local user and changes
the status of the request message to saved.



Save Message as a file (SaveAsDocument): Local user recovers the message
received and requests to sore the message as medical document in a local
directory.
1. The user selects the option to save as medical document.
2. The interface saves the document in a predefined local directory.
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3. The interface accesses the local database.
4. The interface stores a link to the medical document.
5. The system sends a successful status message to the local user and changes
the status of the request message to saved.

Figure 4.2: Interface requesting and receiving roles

4.2.2.2 Interface Sending Role and Use Case Model
Five use cases describe the sending role of the interface. In this case, the interface
performs as a remote service that accepts remote requests and returns standard
HL7 messages (Figure 4.3). The use cases are described as:


Information Request (InformationRequest): Remote process requests
medical information (partial or total electronic health record of a patient).
1. A remote process triggers a request to the local interface system.
2. The software interface accepts the request.
3. The software interface returns an acceptance request message to the
remote system.
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4. The local system changes the state of the status of the message request to
processing.


Process the request (ProcessRequest): The system processes the information
request.
1. System checks information for availability.
2. System maps the information required to define a standard message.
3. The system interface formats the collected data accordantly to standard
HL7 vocabulary.
4. The system instantiates a message based on standard HL7 definitions.



Replay to request (SendReplay): The system interface replies to the remote
request.
1. Include (ProcessRequest).
2. The system interface serializes message content.
3. The system interface sends the message.



Validation of the remote process (ValidateUser): The system interface
verifies the credentials provided by the remote process requesting the
information.
1. The system interface verifies the user credentials.
2. The system interface determines that the client process has the rights for
accessing the requested information.



Verification of the request (VerifyRequest): The system interface verifies the
request.
1. The system interface verifies if the local database has the critical
information required to create the standards HL7 messages.
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2. The system accepts the request and proceeds processing the message
replay.

Figure 4.3: Interface sending role use case model

4.2.3 Components
The proposed architecture is described by a set of components that conforms a
software interface. The interoperation between interfaces is provided as remote
services. In a communication between electronic health records systems both
interfaces will operate first as coding or decoding HL7 messages, second
encrypting or decrypting a message using attribute-based encryption and finally
sending or receiving the message using internet as a communication platform.
It is understood that both interfaces would be independent and can operate with
other interfaces of the same nature as well as other electronic health record
systems. Figure 4.4 presents a graphical representation of each one of the
components as well the information flow of the proposed interface.
In the model, the local system describes the existing software platform which
includes an electronic health record systems and a data repository. The electronic
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health record system provides the user interface for both requesting information
from an external repository and retrieving information received form an external
repository. The data repository is the source of information used to generate the
messages as well as the local storage unit where the received messages will be
maintained.

Figure 4.4: Proposed Architecture

The second component of this generic architecture is the interface which is
divided into four subcomponents. Each subcomponent has been specified to
perform a specific task. The first component is the HL7 coding and decoding
module. The HL7 module is a set of libraries based on the HL7 application
programming interface (HAPI). The HAPI library is an open-source, objectoriented HL7 parser library for Java applications. The HAPI project was initiated
by University Health Network in Toronto, Canada. Message, is the resultant
object of encoding a set of records retrieved from an electronic health record
repository. In the model, the module is used to produce HL7 messages that will be
produced upon request as well as to decode messages that have been received
from an external application.
The security module is divided into two subcomponents. The first component is
used for encrypting the generated HL7 message based on a set of attributes
(policies). The second component is used for decrypting the received encrypted
HL7 message. Attribute-based encryption is used as the security mechanism to
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encrypt and decrypt the message. The encryption procedure is described in detail
through the section 4.2.4. The final component of the interface is the
communication module. The communication module provides a connection with
an external source in order to request or receive an encoded and encrypted
message.

4.2.4 Attribute-Based Encryption Component

4.2.4.1 Overview
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) has its origins in Identity-Based Encryption
(IBE) schemes, firstly, proposed in (Boneh & Franklin, 2001). The IBE scheme
allows a sender to encrypt a message using an identity without the use of a public
key infrastructure (Sahai & Waters, 2005; Shamir, 1985). In this case, the identity
is viewed as a string of characters that represent a certain number of attributes
(e.g. user‟s name, an email address, or telephone number) that serve as a user‟s
public key (Liu, Guo, & Zhang, 2009). A secret key, which is provided by a
trusted private key generator (PKG), is used to decrypt the data. The secret key is
provided only if the user has been successfully identified by the PKG (Au, et al.,
2008)
Sahai and Waters introduced the notion of attribute-based encryption (ABE) as a
security approach for reinforcing access control (Sahai & Waters, 2005, 2008).
The attribute-based encryption approach allows a ciphertexts to be decrypted by
more than one recipient, unlike the traditional public key cryptography methods
(Bethencourt, Sahai, & Waters, 2007). In its place, both the users‟ secret keys and
124

Chapter 4: Conceptual Approach
ciphertexts are associated with a set of attributes or policies that are used to grant
access to the encrypted data. Attributes are defined as set of strings, in this case
represented by access policies, which are associated to an access structure or
access tree that is applied to the encrypted data. A user would be able to decrypt
an encrypted data only if he/she possesses a secret key with attributes that overlap
the attributes used during the encryption of ciphertext (Bethencourt, et al., 2007;
Ibraimi, Tang, Hartel, & Jonker, 2009). In other words, to allow a user to decrypt
a ciphertext, at least k attributes must overlap between the identity used to
generate the ciphertext and his secret keys. Note that not all but k attributes are
sufficient to grant access to the encrypted data, which is represented as an errortolerance in the model (Sahai & Waters, 2008). This error-tolerance would also
allow the implementation of Fuzzy Identities or Attribute-Based Encryption
schemes for biometric technology (Sahai & Waters, 2005). Fuzzy Attribute-based
encryption is not disused on this thesis; however, the paper “Biometric for
Electronic Health Records” provide more details in how this approach can be used
in a health environment (Flores Zuniga, et al., 2009). In this section, we will
present and describe an Attribute-Based Encryption scheme and how it can be
applied to protect the information of parties during the exchange and release of
EHRs.

4.2.4.2 Description of the Data Encryption Process
Considering the scenarios previously described, the exchanged information is
maintained encrypted until an authorized user, with the sufficient k attributes,
proceeds to decrypt the message completely or partially. In this case, a secret key,
SK, is used to decrypt the ciphertext encrypted with the initial attribute set (access
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policies), Ap, if and only if the attributes that the user possesses are sufficient as
measured by the “set overlap” distance metric for the security policies used to
encrypt the data (Sahai & Waters, 2005). The scheme requires of a trusted
authority, known as the Private Key Generator (PKG), with the task of generating
the secret key (SK). The PKG will provide such a secret key only after the user
has been successfully identified (Au, et al., 2008). The generated key can then be
used to decrypt the ciphertext originally received from the sender. In the Figure
4.5, k denotes the minimal number of attributes that the user must have in order to
decrypt the message or part of it.
This approach guarantees that only users that have access privileges (appropriated
attributes) would be allowed to access the encrypted data. The access privileges
are described by the security policies used to encrypt the data. A user that does not
have the attributes required to decrypt the data will not be able to access the
information. If the security policies attached are hierarchically associated to
information, the access could be provided at different levels for different users. In
this case, user will be able to access different level or contents within the
encrypted data depending on the attributes associated to their access privileges.
This is known as access tree.
The access tree indicates the different levels in which the encrypted information
can be accessed by the authorized users. Each node of the tree represents a set of
attributes and the conditions required to decrypt the message. The access tree
provides to the proposed solution the required flexibility in the definition of the

126

Chapter 4: Conceptual Approach
access privileges needed in a shared care environment. The implication of the
access tree is discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.
Sender

Private Key Generator (Admin)

Receiver

C = E Ap (m)

C (sent)

(Ap,{attributes })

Ap

SK= f(Ap, ms)

SK

Where: Secret Key (SK)
ms (master SK)

Decrypt (C, SK, Ap,{attributes }) = m

iff

| Ap  {attributes } | < k

Figure 4.5: Attribute-based encryption

4.2.4.3 Security Module
The security module has been implemented based on an open source encryption
tool kit developed and distributed under GNU General Public License (GPL) by
John Bethencourt (Bethencourt, et al., 2007). The selected toolkit is available
under the Advanced Crypto Software Collection website of the Department of
Computer Science at University of Texas at Austin. The model of the module
assumes the following construction.
Let

be a bilinear group of prime order p, and let g be a generator of

addition, let

0.

In

denote the bilinear map. A security parameter, κ,

will determine the size of the groups. The Lagrange coefficient is defined as ∆ i,S
for i ∈ ℤp. and a set, S, of elements in ℤp:
function

∈

and the hash

which is modelled as a random oracle.

The function will map any attribute described as a binary string to a random group
element.
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of prime order p with

Setup. The setup algorithm chooses a bilinear group

0

generator g. Next it chooses two random exponents

∈ ℤ . The public key is

published as:

And the master key MK is

.

Encrypt (PK, m, Ap). The encryption algorithm encrypts a message m under the
tree access structure Ap, which describes the set of attributes (polices) that will be
applied. The algorithm first chooses a polynomial qx for each node x (including
the leaves) of the access structure. These polynomials are chosen following a top
down approach, starting from the root node R. For each node x of the access
structure, set the degree dx of the polynomial qx to be one less than the threshold
value kx of that node, that is,

.

The algorithm chooses a random s ∈ ℤp staring at the root node R and then
sets

. Afterwards, it chooses dR other points of the polynomial qR

randomly to define it completely. For any other node x of the access structure, the
algorithm sets

and chooses dx other points

randomly to completely define qx.
Let, Y be the set of leaf nodes of the access structure Ap. The ciphertext is then
constructed by giving the tree access structure Ap and computing

∈
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KeyGen(MK, S). The key generation algorithm takes a set of attributes S and
provides as output a key which identifies with the attribute set. A random r ∈ ℤp is
first chosen by the algorithm, and then a random rj ∈ ℤp for each attribute j ∈ S is
selected. The key is provided accordantly to
∈
Decrypt (CT, SK). The decryption is managed by a recursive algorithm that takes
∈

the ciphertext

, a secret key SK, which is

associated to a set of attributes S, and a node x from the access stricture.
If the node x is a leaf node, then let i = att(x) and define as follows: If i ∈ S, then

If i ∉ S, then define DecryptNode(CT, SK, x) = ⊥.
When x is a non-leaf node the algorithm DecryptNode(CT, SK, x) proceeds as
follows: For all nodes z that are children of x, it calls DecryptNode(CT, SK, z) and
stores the output as Fz. Let Sx be an arbitrary kx-sized set of child nodes z such that
Fz ≠ ⊥. If no such set exists then the node was not satisfied and the function
returns ⊥.
Otherwise, it computes

∈
∈

∈
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∈

∈

Finally the decryption algorithm is started by a simply calling of the function on
the root node R of the access structure. If the access structure is satisfied by S
is set. Then the
algorithm decrypts by computing

4.3 Information Flow during the Data Exchange
The activity diagram is an UML artefact that provides an overview of the different
activities contained within a complex process (Arlow & Neustadt, 2005). For the
proposed solution, the activity diagram represents the information flow during the
request and retrieves of electronic health records. To provide a better
understanding of the situation, the diagram has been partitioned in two swim-lines
that represent both the local and the remote system. A swim-line represents the
information flow between subsystems or, in this case, systems. Each swim-line
includes a defined set of activities that each interface will perform during the
process of information exchange. The process of requesting/retrieving information
has eleven activities six executed by the local interface and five by the remote
system interface.
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The activities associated to this particular process are described as follows:
1. Information request: the local user requests information from a remote
data source. After the user is validated at the local system, he will request
information that is available on a remote source. To make the request the
user should introduce a request criterion. The request criteria will be used
to recover the information at the remote system. The criteria introduced by
the user will depend on the type of information that will be requested, in
any case the criteria will be used by the remote application in order to
search and retrieve the specific information requested by the user.
2. Verify user: this activity verifies the validity of the request in terms of
access rights that the user may have. If the user does not have the
appropriate rights to access the request information the remote system will
reject the requests. Otherwise, the system will proceed with the request.
3. Check Availability: the remote system will check if the requested
information (based on the criteria provided) is available or not. If the
information is available the system will proceed with the request,
otherwise the system will reject it based on the fact that the information is
not available.
4. Send rejection message: the remote system interface will send a
message to the local system in the case that the request has been rejected.
The two possible reasons of rejection are that the user does not have the
rights to access the information or that the information requested is not
available.
5. Inform rejection: this activity only will be executed if the original
request has been rejected. The local system will be informed that the
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request has been rejected by the remote system. The message will also
include the reason why the request has been rejected.
6. Process request: the remote system will proceed by processing the
request, this activity involves: 1) retrieving the necessary information from
the database (map the database) and generating the standard HL7 message.
7. Send replay: a replay with the standard HL7 message will be returned to
the local interface.

Information Flow: Exange of EHR
Local System

Remote System
[Secure Channel]

Information Request

Verify User

[Reject Request]
[Accept Request]

[Secure Channel]

Send rejection
Message

Inform User

Check Availability

[No]
[Yes]
Process Request

[Secure Channel]
Receive Information

Send Replay

Access Information

[Save Data]

Save as Data

[Save File]

Save as File

Figure 4.6: Information flow during the data exchange
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8. Receive Information: The information will be retrieved and saved
temporarily by the local interface. The interface will signal to the user
informing the availability of the message.
9. Access Information: The user will request the recovery of the Hl7 message;
it will be displayed on screen.
10. Save data: The user may select save the information as data in the local
database or as an associated file within the system. In case that the data is
stored on the local database, the system interface will proceed with
restructuring the data accordantly to local requirements. Finally, the
information will be stored on the local data repository.
11. Save as Document: this option will allow the local interface to save the
information as a file in a local directory.

4.3.1 State Machine for Data Request
The state machine is a UML artefact that provides a dynamic behaviour of the life
cycle of a simple object, represented as a finite number of states (Arlow &
Neustadt, 2005). The state machine diagram for the information request shows the
different states of a single request message. At any time the object of the state
diagram is associated to a specific request. Even though during the request and
retrieve of electronic health records, there will be several object interacting
MessageRequest will be considered as a single object that will be changing
states and signalling during the process of information exchange.
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Visual Paradigm for UML Community Edition [not for commercial use]

MessageRequest

-messageId : int
-date : date
-criteria : char
-state : int
-reject : int

Figure 4.7: Abstract Class MessageRequest

The classification MessageRequest represents persistent objects that have the
following attributes:


messageId: an integer number that is used as an identification of the message

request.


date: stores the date of the request



criteria: a multi-value attribute that maintains the selection criteria used

during the retrieved of information.


state: an integer attribute that maintains the actual status of the request



reject: an integer attribute that maintains the rejection value associated to: 1)

rejection based on insufficient user rights and 2) rejection based on
unavailability of required information.
Seven possible states, that cover the complete life cycle of requesting-retrieving
process, have been defined for the Message Request object. They are described as
follows:
1. Requesting information (RequestingInfo): during this state, the user will
post a request partial or complete retrieve of information of a patient‟s
electronic health record. To proceed with the request the user will
introduce request criteria (identification information) for data retrieve. The
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software interface will retrieve the request criteria, prepare the requested
and send the message request to a specific remote system interface.
2. Processing (Processing): if the request for information is accepted, the
remote software interface will start processing the request. At this point,
the MessageRequest objects will change state to possessing and the
software interface will signal the change of state. During the processing
state two possible outcomes can be generated. If the required information
is available on the system a standard HL7 message will be produced.
Otherwise, the system will reject the request in the basis that the
information required is not available.
3. Rejecting request (RejectingRequest): the rejection of a request can be
generated under two circumstances 1) unauthorized access to requested
information and 2) unavailability of the information. In the first case, the
system will reject the request based on the fact that according to the local
requirements, local and common policies and security restrictions, the user
who has requested the data does not have the required credentials to access
the information. The second case, the request will be rejected based on the
unavailability of the requested information. In both cases, the remote
interface will signal the circumstances in which the rejection was
produced. In this case, the signal will contain a message request Id, date
and rejection circumstances.
4. Replaying request (ReplayingRequest): before sending the standard HL7
message the remote interface will precede with the encryption of the
message in order to generate a secure message.
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5. Receiving message (ReceivingMessage): this is a control state in which
the local interface will signal the user to inform that the request message
as arrived or that the request as been rejected by the remote system.
6. Read (Read): this is a control state in which the local user will indicate that
he/she has read the message. If the message is a rejection it will become
the final stage of the associated MessageRequest object.

State Machine: Message Request

requestMessage : Request
RequestInfo
entry / Activity
do / ProcessRequestMessage
exit / RequestMessage

Processing
entry / RequestMessage
do / HL7-XMLMessage
exit / BuildHL7-XMLMessage

ReturnRequest : Unauthorized, noInfo

create : Message

EncryptingMessage
entry / HL7-XMLMessage
do / SecureMessage
exit / EncryptedMessage
replay : EncryptedMessage
ReplayingRequest
entry / EncryptedMessage
do / SendMessage
exit / Message

RejectingRequest
do / SendRejection

SendMessage : Message

sendRejection

ReceivingMessage
entry / SecureMessage
do / FlagUser
flag
ChangeToRead
do / ChangeToRead
save
Save
do / SaveData
exit / SecureMessage

Figure 4.8: State Machine - Message Request

7. Save (save): this is the final state of a success message request. The user
will be allowed to save the information as an Electronic Document and/or
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as records in the local database. The local interface will change the state of
the associated “Message Request” object to indicate that the information
received has been stored by the user.

4.4 Chapter Summary
In this Chapter, a conceptual approach for access control which reinforces access
policies using attribute-based encryption schemes has been presented and
discussed. Attribute-based encryption allows the encryption and decryption of
data based on policies, which are represented as attributes associated to the
information. The approach allows an independent but secure method to protect the
privacy and confidentiality of patients‟ information transmitted over insecure
channels. The model is flexible in providing access to multiple users based on
security policies, which describe the access permissions over encrypted data. This
characteristic is essential to provide a suitable secure access solution for a shared
care environment. The applicability of the access tree will be conceptually and
practically described in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively.
A detailed description of the proposed model and the flow of information is also
presented and discussed in this Chapter. The description of the state machine for a
message request, and the possible states that a message request could have, are
described in the section 4.3.1.
The next Chapter will describe the implementation and testing of the prototype
interface. Several scenarios are described and later implemented with its analysis
and results.
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Implementation and Testing
5

Implementation and Testing

The purpose of this Chapter is to provide an overview of the implementation and
the behaviour of a prototype interface for secure exchange medical data. The use
of prototyping techniques allows testing the viability of the proposed solution by
using a simulated environment. The implementation is a prototype version which
uses HL7 messages and Attribute-based encryption to securely transmit
standardized messages containing health records in a shared care environment.
The selection of the software platform (electronic health record system and data
repository) that will be used during the implementation is explained at the
beginning of the Chapter. Secondly, the description of the components used to
generate message requests, standard HL7 messages and encrypt/decrypt the
information will be presented and discussed in section 5.2. Then, a scenario that
will facilitate the understanding and testing of the interface behaviour is presented
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and described in section 5.3. Finally, test results regarding the performance of the
software interface are also presented and discussed in section 5.3.

5.1 Selection of EHR Systems
The first step of the implementation was the selection of the electronic health
record systems that would be used to implement and test the proposed solution.
Several open source electronic health record softwares were selected and then
analysed with that purpose. From the selected software only two were used to
provide a suitable scenario for implementing and testing the prototype.
The purpose of the analysis has been the examination of open-source EHR
systems to determine how their functionalities and architectures conciliate with
international standards. To reach that goal, the analysis was based on the level of
accomplishment of a set of standard requirements contends in the ISO/TR 20514
and ISO/TS 18308 reports. The ISO/TR 20514 report states standard definition,
scope and context for Electronic Health Record Systems (EHRS) meanwhile the
ISO/TS 18308 establishes a set of standard requirements for Electronic Health
Record Architectures (EHRA) (ISO/TC-215, 2004).
To conduct the analysis twelve active open-source FOSS projects of electronic
health records systems (alternatives) were selected 1. The data used to analyse the
software was gathered from the project‟s web pages, existing product review and
documentation, accessing to the source code, and exploring the software

1

Software analysed: CHITS, Cottege Med, Elexi, FreeMED, GNUmed, MedClipse, MirrorMed, OpenEMR, OpenMRS,
OSCAR, PatientOS and Tolven.
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functionalities by accessing installed practice sites and the installation of the
softwares in testing computers.
Table 5.1: Families or requirement accordingly to the environmental context
Main classes
Structure
(n=50)

Sections
Record organisation

Data organisation

Type and form of data

Supporting health concept
representation
Process
(n=24)

Clinical processes

Record processes

Communicat
ion
(n=7)
Privacy and
security
(n=15)

Medico-legal
(n=20)

Ethical
(n=1)
Consume/cul
tural (n=4)
Evolution
(n=3)

Messaging
Record exchange

Sub-sections
Sections
EHR format
Portability
Secondary uses
Archiving
Structured data
Non-structured data
Clinical Data
Administrative data
Data types
Support for different types of data
Reference data
Contextual data
Links
Support for multiple coding systems
Unique representation of information
Representation of text
Support for clinical processes
Problems/issues and health status
Clinical reasoning
Decision support, guidelines, and protocols
Care Planning
Orders & service processes
Integrated care
Quality assurance
Data capture
Retrieval/query/views of data
Presentation of data
Scalability
Support for messaging
Support for record exchange

MF
1
1

FF

PE

1
1
1
5
4
1
6
11
1
1
7
2
3
2
1

1

4
3
1
3
1
2

1

1
1
3
1
1
1

1
1
6

Privacy and confidentiality
Consent
Access control
Data integrity
Auditability of access
Support
for
legal
requirements
Actors

Clinical
competence/governance
Faithfulness
Preservation of context
Permanence
Version control
Support
for
ethical
justification
Consumer issues
Cultural issues
EHR architecture and EHR
system evolution

Support for privacy and confidentiality
Support for consent
Support for access control
Support for data integrity
Support for auditability of access
Support for legal requirements
Attestation of entries
Author responsibility
Clinician identification
Patient identification
Subject of healthcare
User Identification
Support for clinical
competence/governance
Support for faithfulness
Support for preservation of context
Support for permanence
Support for version control
Support for ethical justification
Support for consumer issues
Support for cultural issues
Support for EHR architecture and EHR
system evolution
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4
1
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
2

1

1
2
2
1
2
1
3
1
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Two computers were used as testing machines. For Linux based applications a
compute with Pentium IV 2.4 Mhz. processor, 500MB RAM, and GNU Debian
4.0r3 Linux Distribution was used. Applications that run under Windows
operative system were tested in a computer with Core Duo 2.1 Mhz. Processor,
2G RAM and Windows OS.
Web applications were implemented on Linux, accordingly with the
recommendation of the software developers and available documentation, and
tested in both machines using Internet Explorer and Mozilla Firefox respectively.
The selection of the twelve alternatives was made considering that the project
provides software and source code under an open-source licence (GPL, LGPL,
Academic Free Licence (AFL), Mozilla Public Licence (MPL), or Eclipse Public
License (EPL), has been developed to manage information regarding the health
status of a subject of care, and has demonstrated the capability of managing
clinical data.
As a starting point the data obtained was organized in order to explore the
environment context of each of the analysed alternatives. The first step was the
elaboration of a classification table associating each of the 124 requirements
contained in the ISO/TS 18308 within one of the three contexts that describe the
environment of an integrated EHR system (Table 5.1). Finally, each requirement
was classified in one of the three environmental contexts as it was described in
Figure 5.1. According to this categorization, a total of 64 requirements were
classified as minimally functional, 44 as fully functional and 16 as provider
enterprise.
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The analysis of the result was conducted considering two methods that reflect the
approach used to collect the data and facilitate the interpretation of the results
obtained. First, an initial analysis was done considering both dimensions
separately. Even though the initial analysis does not combine both dimensions, it
provides a comparative view of the environmental context of each application as
well as the families of requirements in which each FOSS project has concentrated
their development efforts. Meanwhile, the cross analysis combines both
dimensions to provide a comprehensive and integral analysis of the level of
accomplishment for each alternative within each environmental context. The
environmental context classified each one of the requirement within three
classifications. Minimal functional requirements will include the core requirement
of an electronic health system environment, e.g. the storage and management of
medical records. Fully functional include high level requirements, e.g.
management of aggregated information, system security, etc. Provider Enterprise
includes additional requirements at the business and interconnection level, e.g.
billing, provision of aggregated information for research and governmental
requirements, etc.

Figure 5.1: Health Information System Environment
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5.1.1 Contextual Analysis
Table 5.2 presents the assessment of the twelve alternatives based on the
environmental classification of requirements. The average evaluation for minimal
functional (MF) requirements showed that in average 42 of the 64 (65.6%)
requirements were present. For fully functional (FF) and provider enterprise (PE)
the averages were 16 (36.4%) and 4 (25%) requirements have been incorporated
respectively. This result implies that in general the analysed FOSS EHR projects
have concentrated their development efforts in the core functional features of
EHR systems. Exceptions to these results are the alternatives A02 (MF=77.8%,
FF=40.9% and PE=53.1%) and alternative A10 (MF=81.7%, FF=54.5% and
PE=71.9%) that not only emphasised the development on minimally functional
requirements, but also presented a relevant incorporation of fully functional and
provider enterprise functionalities in comparison to the remaining analysed
software. The alternative A12 has 52.3 (83.3%) minimally functional
requirements implemented, which was the highest value obtained at this context.
It also has accomplished 24 (47.7%) requirements at the fully functional context,
which is the second highest value. However at the provided enterprise context it
only accomplished 5 of the 17 requirements (31%).
This results show that in general the applications have a minimum of one
requirement implemented at any contextual level with the exception of alternative
A11. Even though, alternatives A02 and A10 are the only ones that had reached
several requirements at the provider enterprise level.
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Table 5.2: List of Analysed FOSS alternatives: Contextual environments
Alternative

Licenc
e

Platform

Minimally
Functional (MF)
(n=64)

Fully
Provider
Total
Functional
Enterprise
(n=124)
(FF)
(n=16)
(n=44)
GPL
Cross-platform
30.9
10
1
41.9
A01
GPL
Windows OS
49.8
18
8.5
76.3
A02
GPL
Windows OS
37.5
14
3
54.5
A03
GPL
Cross-platform
43.2
14
1
58.2
A04
GPL
Cross-platform
48.8
20
3.5
72.3
A05
GPL
Cross-platform
32.8
15
2
49.8
A06
LGPL
Windows OS
39.3
17
2
58.3
A07
EPL
Cross-platform
30.3
11
2
43.3
A08
GPL
Cross-platform
43.3
17
1
61.3
A09
GPL
Cross-platform
52.3
24
11.5
87.8
A10
EPL
Cross-platform
44.3
14
0
58.3
A11
GPL
Linux
53.3
21
5
79.3
A12
Average
42
16
4
61.6
Software analized : CHITS, Cottege Med, Elexi, FreeMED, GNUmed, MedClipse, MirrorMed, OpenEMR, OpenMRS,
OSCAR, PatientOS and Tolven.

5.1.2 Functional Analysis
The next step of the analysis was focused on the level of accomplishment of the
systems according to requirements defined in the ISO/TS 18308. The data
collected was organized according to the families of requirements and analysed
alternatives. The data was aggregated to provide an overview of the development
level reached by each alternative considering each family of requirements. Table
5.3 shows the summary of the results after all 12 FOSS were tested.
The results show that the central focus of open-source EHR projects have been the
implementation of structural (29.5 of 50), procedural (14.4 of 24) and medicolegal (11.2 of 20) requirements. Meanwhile communication, evolution,
consumer/cultural issues and privacy and security have presented a limited or null
coverage, and ethical issues have not been considered at all. Again, alternatives
A02, A10 and A12 show a harmonically distributed development for each group
or requirements.
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Table 5.3: List of Analysed FOSS alternatives: Functional requirements
Structure
(n=50)

Process
(n=24)

Communication
(n=7)

Privacy and
security
(n=15)

Medicolegal
(n=20)

Ethical
(n=1)

Consumer/
cultural
(n=4)

Evolution
(n=3)

Total

A01

23.6

A02

35.8

4.3

1

17

4.5

2

9

0

0

2

41.9

4

12

0

2

1

76.3

A03
A04

31.5

15

1

32.2

10

0

0

5

0

0

2

54.5

4

10

0

0

2

A05

34.8

15

58.2

2.5

5

13

0

0

2

72.3

A06

19.8

A07

26.3

14

0

2

12

0

0

2

49.8

16

0

4

12

0

0

0

58.3

A08
A09

23.3

14

0

0

6

0

0

0

43.3

26.3

15

0

4

13

0

0

3

61.3

A10

37.3

19

5.5

8

15

0

3

0

87.8

A11

30.3

15

0

3

10

0

0

0

58.3

A12

33.3

18

4

7

17

0

0

0

79.3

AVG

29.5

14.4

1.5

3.4

11.2

0

0.4

1.2

61.6

The alternatives A02 (76.3), A05 (72.3), A10 (87.8) and A12 (79.3) present the
highest level of accomplishment of the 12 analysed software. However, all of the
analysed software have a limited level of development in two key families of
requirements, communication and privacy/security. In fact, communication
(messaging and records exchange) has an average accomplishment of 1.5 (21.1%).
The FOSS presented a relative limited level of development of requirement
regarding security and privacy (22.6%).

5.1.3 Selected Alternatives
After the analysis of each of the FOSS EHR systems, alternatives A10 and A12
were selected from the list of the analysed software. The selected software has
been utilized for the purpose of implementing the prototype interface. The
selection was based on the fact that both electronic health record systems have
been built with HL7 support at the application level as well as the data level
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which eliminates the need to implement a HL7 module for each application or
modified the data repository to accommodate HL7 messages. In addition, both are
web oriented application, which is ideal for testing with platform independence.
This allows focusing in the functionality of the prototype, which is the scope of
this research, rather than the portability of the application. Finally, both
alternatives scored high level of accomplishment in each of the contextual
classifications. This also implies that no modifications of the selected software
will be needed, except for the inclusion of a user interface that allows access to
the functionalities provided by the prototype.
Considering that the scope of the implementation is a prototype, which has been
used to evaluate functionality and performance, alternatives A10 and A12 offered
the best environments for implementing and testing based on in the previous
mentioned elements. However, since the prototype has been designed as an
independent piece of software, it would be possible to be modified to perform
with other EHR systems.

5.2 Implementation of the Prototype
After selecting the electronic health records, the software architecture proposed
was implemented using a prototype approach. The purpose of the prototype is to
have an implementation of the proposed solution capable of performing the key
functionalities described in Chapter 4 and, at the same time, evaluate its viability
using a simulated scenario. The implementation and testing of the prototype
version would provide a validation of the proposed solution and give an answer to
points 4 and 6 of the research approach described in Chapter 1.
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5.2.1 Implementation
The prototype was designed to be platform independent and was built using Java
language for the main components and PHP scripting language for the web
interface, the same language used in the implementation of the selected electronic
health records systems. The message request database, which contains the sets of
tables that storage the messages request and times logs, was implemented using
MySQL server. Both electronic health record databases were also implemented in
MySQL, accordantly to the developer specifications. Two computers were used
server machines: a Linux based server and a Window based server. The selected
EHR systems were installed one in each server. A prototype implementation of
the interface was adapted for each EHR system.

5.2.2 Architecture
To recreate the concept of client-server architecture each one of the severs posed a
role during the communication process. The electronic health record system
implemented in the windows based server posed as the client (the one posting
requests) whilst the other selected system installed on Linux was the server (the
one accepting the request).
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Figure 5.2: Deployment Architecture

Figure 5.2 shows the deployment architecture for the prototype. An access
module has been implemented for each module. The message request is placed
using a communication channel between both access modules. The server
interface receives the request and creates a HL7 message by retrieving the
necessary data from the database using HAPI HL7 library. After the message is
created the interface will encrypt it using the attribute-based encryption module
(messageEncryption) and send the encrypted file over the internet back to the
requesting client.
At the client side, the message is received by the communication component
making it available for access. The user will be able to access the encrypted
message through the access module that has been incorporated to the local EHR
system. The message can be retrieved and displayed to the user through the access
module.
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5.3 Testing
The implementation of the prototype, based on the requirements described in
section 4.2.1 main functionalities, has shown that a solution for secure data
exchange using attribute-based encryption is possible. However, that alone is not
sufficient to determine if the proposed architecture would perform adequately in a
health environment.

For this reason, a set of tests based on a case were

conducted. The test results have provided an understanding of the behaviour of
the proposed solution and demonstrate its viability of implementation based on
the architecture that has been described in section 2 of Chapter 4.

5.3.1 Test Planning
Two types of tests were performed in order to analyse the implemented prototype.
A functionality test based on a case study, which is described in section 5.3.1.2
and performance tests, which are described in section 5.3.1.3.

5.3.1.1 Purpose of the tests
The goal of the testing is to evaluate the viability of implementation of the
proposed software architecture. The simulated scenario will facilitate the testing
of the prototype. The data collected from the simulations and tests will facilitate
the functional validation of a proposal as well as analyse the performance of the
modelled architecture.
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5.3.1.2 Test Design
As it was explained previously, the tests have been based on a case study that
simulates the scenario in which a patient care is assessed in a shared care
environment. The setting and description of the case study will be described in
this section.

5.3.1.2.1 Setting the Case Study
Let us consider that Hospitals 'HA', 'HB' and Clinic 'CL' have previously agreed in
a set of principles that allow them the exchange of information. Those principles
have been set on contracts that permit the transference of any relevant data
regarding health history, which can be required during the treatment of a patient.
All institutions have defined independent security approaches and mechanism for
protecting the information that is managed on their system, 'HA' and 'HB' being
public hospitals and according to the health policy guidelines for a public hospital,
'CL', being a General Practice, following the guideline for security from the
General Practice Computing Group. Therefore, there could be differences in
access control, security and information release polices. To avoid controversies
policy reinforcing method is used during the exchange and release of information.
The method proposed is reinforcing security policies by using an attribute-based
encryption scheme. In this case, the access policies are used to encrypt the
information that has been exchanged, allowing only users with the correct access
privileges to decrypt and access the information.
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5.3.1.2.2 Case Study for Enforcing of Access Control Using Policies
The scenario described in this section is used as case study in analysis of the
proposed solution. Figure 5.3 shows a graphical representation of the relation and
flow of information of the actors historically involved in the treatment of patient
'A' described in Figure 5.2.
The paradigm used presents difficulties that arise in providing health care in
today‟s interconnected medical environments. These difficulties require efficient
access control mechanisms in order to ensure, for example, in the used paradigm
that only doctor 'DC' who has the patient‟s consent accesses the patient‟s medical
data. Traditional access control models try to cope with these kinds of difficulties
giving access to a patient‟s EHR only to the rightful owner.
Case: 68 years old lady 'A' was admitted to the hospital 'HA' with
abdominal pain and doctor 'DC' has been assigned to her case. The
patient has indicated having a history of chronic diseases. 'A' has been
previously hospitalized at hospital 'HB' for chest pain and followed up
treatment with the cardiologist 'C' for Atrial Fibrillation, Hypertension
and Recurrent Angina, also radiological information of the patient are
maintain in the hospital records. Additionally, she has been diagnosed
with diabetes for 20 years and has been visiting clinic 'CL' for her regular
medical treatment. She has checked her blood according to the doctor's
order at the local pathology 'P' regularly. 'A' has also been seen by the
Dietitian 'D', Ophthalmologist 'O', podiatrist 'PO', Exercise Physician
'EX' for her diabetes and diabetes related complications. She visited
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gynecologist 'G' for postmenopausal symptoms 2 years back and had an
episode of knee pain 3 weeks ago having taken an x'ray at the Radiology
'R'. She is on several medications for different conditions. As an elderly
lady with multiple pathologies, the doctor 'DC' has decided to trace back
her history from her healthcare providers. The patient has also given
consent for the doctor to do that.

Figure 5.3: Case analysis, interaction and expected flow of information

5.3.1.2.3 Scenarios
5.3.1.2.3.1 Information Exchange
After patient A is admitted to hospital 'HA' and her first encounter with physician
'DC', doctor 'DC' starts collecting patient 'A' historical medical data. The
collection starts with the remote request of data from clinic 'CL' and hospital 'HB'
health information systems. To guarantee the confidentiality of the information,
the data is encrypted using attributes associated to physician 'DC'. Since the
transference of data is done by reinforcing access policies only doctor 'DC' will
initially be authorized to decrypt the data provided by clinic 'CL' and hospital
'HB'. Considering that patient 'A' will not only be treated by physician 'DC' but
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also by a team of physicians and medical staff, the access permissions will
eventually be modified in order to provide access to all personnel involved in with
patient‟s 'A' care. This can be done by providing a secret Key to each member of
the staff assuming responsibility with patient‟s 'A' care; each member will be
allowed to retrieve the information depending on the described access policies
described by the attributes associated to their secret keys. For example, physician
treating patient 'A' will have access to all relevant medical history of the patient,
on the contrary nurses and administrative staff would be provided with restricted
access to the data.
5.3.1.2.3.2 Analysis
This case presents a normal encounter patient-physician in which the historical
information of patient A can only access by the primary physician at hospital
'HA', Doctor 'DC'. To simplify the analysis let us assume that the consent policy
has been created during the first encounter (steps 1 and 2 in Figure 5.6). As it has
been described previously, the policy defines a set of attributes that establishes
who would be able to access the medical information of patient A. In this case a
set of attributes ({Pat.A},{D.GP, Clinic.CL}) is used to describe the access
permission to patient A‟s information.
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Figure 5.4: Case use Scenario 1

Even though the patient has moved through the health system, the information
gathered from the counter, encounters and reports can be shared using electronic
communications. An information request made by doctor DC would start the
process as is shown in steps 3 and 4 of Figure 5.6. he information contended in the
EHRs of hospital 'HB' and clinic 'CL' can be encrypted using the attributes
({Pat.A},{ D.DC, Depto.ME, Hosp.HA }) and send directly to the electronic health
record system in the hospital A, which is shown steps 5 and 6 of Figure 5.6. In
this case, the access policy for the data is described as M(data)= (Pat.A)  (D.DC 
Depto.ME  Hosp.HA). Since patient cannot possess a secret key that includes the
attributes {D.DC, Depto.ME, Hosp.HA } the access tree has the outcomes
described in Figure 5.5.
In this scenario, the transference of information is directly managed between
sender ('HB' and 'CL' information systems) and receiver (Doctor 'DC'). Since the
information

is

shared

between
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{D.DC,Depto.ME,H.HA} is applied to encrypt the relevant medical information
associated to patient A, and then sent to the HA‟s information system.

Figure 5.5: Access tree Patient‟s Data

Figure 5.6: Sequence Diagram Scenario 1

The information collected and sent directly to the 'HA' systems, can be accessed
by 'DC', as it is show in steps 7 and 8 of Figure 5.6. At this point, the transferred
data has been protected using an enforced access policy approach; therefore, the
information can only be accessed by Doctor 'DC'. To provide access to other
members of the staff access permissions can be modified by associating the new
access key to the encrypted data. For example, by allowing Cardiology 'CA-A' to
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have access the patient medical history. This delegation of access to specific users
is possible because attribute-based encryption supports partial delegation of
access permissions. To enforce that only 'CA-A' is able to access the data the
information the following attributes will be incorporated to the access permissions
({ D.DC, Depto.ME}).

5.3.1.2.4 Access Delegation and Patient Control over Data Access
Now consider the situation presented in role definition. According to the access
and security policies of hospital 'HA' only member of the team attending the
patient can have access to his EHRs. Since originally the information was
requested and collected by doctor 'DC' of the Medicine Department the data could
be encrypted using the following attribute set M(data)= (Pat.A) 

(D.DC

Depto.ME). However, to allow other physician access to patients 'A' data, a new
set of attributes need to be incorporated. In this case, physicians could be provided
with secret key and assume specific responsibilities, which are described by a
specific set of attributes (policies). Additionally, information could be restricted in
some specific cases, which can be described by a specific set of attributes
(policies). Each specialist will be able to decrypt the data, which is under his
responsibility, but will not be able to decrypt the data that has been restricted. This
provides a solution for restricting access only to members of the team treating the
patient and to patient‟s control over access permissions. This last point will be
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
5.3.1.2.4.1 Analysis
Initially only doctor 'DC' has access to the patient information. To allow access to
cardiologists 'CA-A' and 'CA-B' a new set attribute can be added to the access
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policy of patient 'A', the new set will incorporate attribute sets associated to 'CA'A'. Since cardiologists 'CA-A' and 'CA-B' works the Cardiology department of
hospital 'HA', the new set of attributes would be M(data)= (Pat.A)  (H.HA 
((D.DCDepto.ME)  (Depto.CAR (D.CA-A D.CA-B)))). No other cardiologist
will have the attributes {D.CA-B, Depto.CAR, H.HA } {D.CA-A ,Depto.CAR,
H.HA} associated to their access privileges, therefore no one else but 'CA-A' and
'CA-B' will be allowed to access and manipulate patients 'A' data. The new access
tree has the following outcomes:

Figure 5.7: Access tree considering access to cardiologists CA-A and CA-B

When patient 'A' provides consent to Doctor 'DC' to collect his historical medical
information, she could state that only physician involved in his case would have
access to his psychiatric history, denying access to other physicians and personnel
of hospital 'HA'. In this case, the access Key of other physicians and personal will
not allow them to access to the psychiatric history of patient 'A'. The access to the
information is stated according to the consent of the patient and the access
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policies. The access then will incorporate the restrictions over information access,
making some of the information unable to access for other physicians even when
they could have access to the patient‟s EHR. This will be described and discussed
in Chapter 6.

5.3.1.3 Performance Testing and Analysis
Once the initial test conducted to determine the viability of implementing the
proposed solution were finished, a set at performance tests were executed. The
specification of the performance tests as well as their result will be presented in
this section. Two types of tests were performed, general test in which random
messages were created and then encrypted under a predefined set of attributes and
a specific test in which in which given a defined message this was encrypted using
a different set of attributes.

5.3.1.3.1 General Testing and Analysis
The initial set of tests considered the two scenarios described previously and
execute the application against a set of predefined message requests. In this
section, both the description of the experiments and the results are analysed and
discussed.

5.3.1.3.2 Time for File Generation and Encryption
To perform the testing of the interface, the two previously described cases were
implemented against a dataset of 300 message requests. The messages requested
were executed remotely, alternative A10 served as the requesting application
meanwhile alternative A12 as a remote data repository. Each one of the message
requests was associated to a specific patient‟s record within the electronic
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repository and randomly to one of the 25 possible messages implemented for the
prototype. Each message was created using the existing data of a patient and the
encryption was performed using one of the two access trees previously described.
The analysis considers the total time required to create and encrypt the message.
As it was explained in Chapter 4, the encryption algorithm requires the message m
and a set of attributes (polices) Ap. Therefore, it is assumed that the total time
required for the process will depend of the length of the file and the number of
attributes used as access structure.

(b) Sample of time required by seven
(a) Sample of time required by four attribute
attribute encryption
encryption
Figure 5.8: Processing time

Figure 5.8 shows the set of data obtained from the simulation. Two different sets
of data are displayer under different time ranges. The first set of data shows a time
with a range of 1.26 that goes from 0.32 to 1.58 seconds. The second set of data is
display with a range of 1.98 that goes from 2.7 to 4.05 seconds. The time
deference between both data sets is explained mainly by the number of attributes
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used during the encryption process. In fact, the original size of the file has a
limited incidence in the total processing time in comparison of the number of
attributes used in the encryption. In the simulation, the data processed under 1.58
seconds was encrypted using a four attribute tree. On the contrary, the second set
of data was encrypted using a seven attribute tree.
Let us consider both cases in more detail. Total time required for message creation
and data encryption using a four attribute has an average time of 0.68 seconds. On
the other hand, the time required to create and encrypt the message seven
attributes have an average of 3.22. The flatness of the respective fitting regression
lines show that the size (length) of the file would have a relatively reduced effect
in the total processing time. In the same way, the time required to process and
creates the message has an average time of 0.076 seconds and with a standard
deviation of 0.11. Which implies that the total amount of time required to process
a message request will be mainly affected by the number of attributes (polices)
included during the encryption of the file. This will be analysed in more detail in
section 5.3.1.4.

5.3.1.3.3 Size of the File
The size of the encrypted file is proportional to size of the original file.
Furthermore, as it is expected, the size of the encrypted file will be also affected
by the number of attributes used to encrypt the data. In the Figure 5.9 the set of
observations below the line correspond to the size of the files that have been
encrypted using 4 attributes. Meanwhile, the data set shown over the line
correspond to the size of the files encrypted using a 7 attribute set.
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Figure 5.9: File size

5.3.1.4 Specific Testing and Analysis
The second set of test was conducted considering a single message tested against
several set of attributes during the encryption process. The target of this test is the
analysis of performance. The description of the tests as well as their results are
presented and analysed in this section.

5.3.1.4.1 Encryption Time
A simulation experiment was performed to analyse the performance of the
interface for encrypting data using a different set of attributes. The experiment
considered a message encrypted using a different set of attributes. This setting
facilitates the analysis of performance when comparing data encryption using a
different number of attributes to encrypt a given file.
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The performance of the interface in terms of a number of attributes used during
the encryption process can be observed Figure 5.10. As it is expected, the number
of attributes (nodes) used to encrypt the data would have a direct effect in the
overall processing time. The growth of the curve varies accordantly with the
numbers of nodes (attributes) used. Between 1 and 6 tributes the average time is
1.16 seconds with a range between 0.55 and 1.9 seconds. When more than 8
attributes are used the time was increased over 5 seconds. In fact, the processing
time in the range of 8 and 33 attributes showed a decreasing growth with an
average of 6.55 seconds of processing time and a range that goes from 5.23
seconds to 8.08 seconds. In the range of 34 to 57 attributes, the data shows an
increasing growth with an average of 8.48 second and a range between 6.83 and
10.41 seconds. The final set of data also shows an increase in processing time of
almost 7 seconds of average difference from the previous data set. In fact, the
average time required to process the file is 14.77 seconds with a range between
13.8 and 15.8 seconds.
This corresponds to a nonlinear behaviour associated to time processing. It also
indicates that a major number of attributes will require an increasing processing
time which is an important antecedent for a full implementation of the proposed
solution. This defers from the testing data obtained by Bethencourt in
(Bethencourt, et al., 2007) in where the time of encryption optimised is lineal.
This difference can be explained by data which is not included in Bethencourt
such has time required to place the request, generate the HL7 message and deliver
the message.
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Figure 5.10: Interface performance accordantly to the number of attributes

5.3.1.4.2 File Size
Assuming the same approach as the previous section, in here the variation of the
size of the file will be analysed. The size of the encrypted file follows a nonlinear
increased depending on the number of attributes used to encrypt the data (see
Figure 5.11). Between 1 and 6 attributes the size of the file presents an average
increase of 6.3% over the size of the original file. Similar to the time analysis the
data shows an initial increase in the file size and then a decreasing growth after
the attribute number seven has been included. In fact, between 7 and 33 attributes
the average increase of the file size is 9.6% with a range between the 7% and the
12%. After the attribute 34 is included the data set shows an increasing growth
which is stopped at attribute 58. In this range, the average increase of the files is
13.98% with a range that goes between 12% and 16%. Finally, a new increase in
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file size is shown after attribute 59 is included. The average increase at this point
is 22.78% with a range between 22 and 23%.

Figure 5.11: Variation of the file size

5.4 Chapter Summary
In this Chapter, the implementation and testing of a prototype system interface
was presented and described. First, the process of selection of an open source
electronic health record system that is used to implement the proposed solution
was presented. The selected system not only provides the software infrastructure
required to test the proposed solution but also a data repository that is used to
generate a set of standardized messages. The messages generated from the data
repositories are later used during the analysis of performance of the prototype.
Section 5.3.1.2.2 provides a case study that is used for empirically testing the
proposed solution. The set of scenarios has been developed in order to evaluate
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the performance of a prototype based on the proposed solution. Finally, section
5.3.1.3 provides an analysis of performance of the proposed architecture. The
analysis is based on a set of random experiments using existing data from the
selected electronic health record systems.
The implementation of the prototype, the functionality and performance tests and
analysis of the results has shown that a software interface based on the
architecture presented in Chapter 4 is a solution to protect patient information in a
shared care environment. From the functionally perspective, the prototype has
demonstrated to be capable of processing an information request, creating a
standard HL7 message, encrypting the information accordantly to a set of
predefined policies (attributes) and replay an encrypted message. In the same way,
the application has proved to be able to detect an authorized user and provide
access to the encrypted data or deny access if the user does not possess the
necessary credential to decrypt the file containing the information.
From the point of view of performance, the application has performed within
expected parameters. Time and file size will be affected by the number of
attributes use during the encryption and the amount of data collected and included
in the HL7 message. As it was presented before, the differences in execution time
are mainly explained by the number of attributes rather than the extension of the
original file.
The next Chapter a real case study will be presented and used to empirically
analyse the proposed solution. This case will provide a scenario in which the
proposed solution will be analysed considering a real situation.
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Discussion Case Study

The exercise of analysing the flow of information in a shared care environment
provides an understanding of the ethical and legal implication of sharing medical
information among the medical staff. As it was discussed in Chapter 2, in a shared
care environment the protection of a patient‟s confidentiality is a responsibility
shared within the team of specialists providing care to a patient. However, when
multiple health care units are involved in the treatment of a patient, the
management of confidentiality becomes more complex. Even when specific
normative is in place, the implementation of different approaches, the
consideration of existing regulations and current technologies to access
information make difficult to provide a clear mechanism for the protection of
information.
To analyse this situation a real case study is presented, described and discussed in
this Chapter. The proposed solution will be contrasted and empirically analysed
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with this case in order to provide a technological solution to the issues that will be
exposed.

6.1 KJ v Wentworth Area Health Service
6.1.1 Overview
The medico-legal implications of using multidisciplinary approach in providing
health services as well as sharing medical information have been discussed in
Chapter 2. In the case of a shared care environment, the ethical and legal
responsibility of protecting the confidentiality of the patient is extended to all
members involved in the care of an individual. In Australia this responsibility is
initially regulated by The National Privacy Principles (NPPs) contained in the
Privacy & Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (PPIPA, 2009). The NPPs
provide a regulatory framework for the management of personal information in
the public and private sectors. Even though the NPPs are not specifically defined
for the protection of privacy in the health care, they provide a guidance for the
management of information contended within medical records.
The Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 of New South Wales was
fully operational by September 2004. This normative regulates the collection and
handling of patients‟ health information by New South Wales public and private
health sectors. The Act can be applied to health providers or to other organizations
that collects, maintain or use health information for primary and secondary
purposes (HHP, 2005).
Even though the case that will be studied in this chapter occurred before the NSW
Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 was fully operational, the
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consideration of the perspective given by both the National Privacy & Personal
Information Protection Act and the NSW Health Records Act provide a more
compelling understanding of how the proposed solution may perform in real
situation.

6.1.2 Setting the Case Study
The requirement of obtaining informed consent for maintaining and disclosing
medical related information is embodied within the public policies, medical
standards and current legislation. Informed consent has both an ethical and a legal
dimension. Ethically, it is recognized the right that individuals have to decide
which course of action health professionals may follow in order to provide care
services or the way in which the medical information collected when providing
health services will be used. Legally, health professionals have the responsibility
to storage and process the personal data in a fashion in which the confidentiality
of the information is guarantee at any given time (Clark & Findlay, 2005). In
Australia, this has been enforced not only by the directives of regulatory policies
but also by the law. In general, informed consent may fall into two categories:
1. Consent for treatment, which involves the informed consent in the application
of a course of action in a treatment in which a patient is involved, including
medical benefits or others relevant issues.
2. Consent for use of personal information, which include the disclosure of
sensitive information which has been obtained during the provision of medical
care. In this case, and according to the type of consent provided by the patient,
the disclosure of the information could be for primary or secondary purposes.
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In the case that will be described the effected argued that her sensitive information
was collected, stored and released without the proper consent to members of a
multidisciplinary health team.

6.1.3 The Case Study

6.1.3.1 Background
In 2004, the NSW Administrative Decision Tribunal informed its decision in the
case of KJ versus The Wentworth Area Health Service. This decision was ruled in
concordance with the events occurred in the period in which KJ was been treated
for cancer in the Wentworth Area Health Service.
KJ was referred by her practitioner to the Nepean Cancer Care Centre (NCCC), a
unit of the Nepean Hospital in the Wentworth Area Health Service. In there, she
was treated for cancer between the years 2000 and 2003. During this period she
also consulted the units of psychology and psychiatry. In both cases notes were
placed in her general medical records. The general medical file was available to
all members of the medical team treating her. Furthermore, there was also
evidence that access to the general medical record was also granted to two
physicians external to the Nepean Hospital (NSWADT, 2004).

6.1.3.2 Issues

6.1.3.3 Collected Information
In the year 2003 KJ complained to the Wentworth Area Health Service. In her
presentation KJ argued that she was not informed of any record been created nor
that the psychological information has been placed on her general medical file
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where it could be accessed by medical staff of the hospital. She was also not
informed that her medical records would be sent to physician outside the hospital,
including not only members of the medical staff treating her but also other
members of the organization. She argued that those actions were in violation of
the principle 10 of the Privacy & Personal Information Protection Act 1998,
which indicates the obligation that organizations have to inform individuals the
purpose for which information has been collected and to whom the information
will be provided to (PPIPA, 2009).

6.1.3.4 Disclosure of Personal Information
KJ argued that the placement of the psychological information in her general
medical record and further disclosure to two external physicians (her general
practitioner and surgeon) was a breach of section 19 of the Privacy & Personal
Information Protection Act 1998. In fact, the tribunal ruled that not only the
disclosure to the external physicians but also the placement of this sensitive
information on her personal file was in violation of the Act, since it is plausible to
consider that the exchange of information between units constitute disclosure. In
fact, the existence of such records implies that not only physicians but nurses and
other medical and administrative staff could eventually have access to KJ‟s
sensitive information.

6.1.3.5 Consent to Disclosure Information
KJ submitted that the patient registration form was not adequate for obtaining
informed consent form individuals, especially considering a shared care
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environment in which a multidisciplinary team was involved in her treatment.
She argued that it was not required to provide access to the psychological
information to members of the treating team. And that in any case the disclosure
of the psychological information should only occur with the express consent of
the patient.

6.1.4 Implication for the Health Records and Information Privacy
Act 2002
The concepts of share care and multidisciplinary team are not fully incorporated
neither by the National Privacy & Personal Information Protection Act 1998 nor
by the NSW Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002. For this reason,
the KJ versus Wentworth Area Health Service case provides an interesting
example especially in terms of informed consent and correct disclosure of medical
information under a multidisciplinary health team. In fact, under the principle 4
NSW Health Records and Information Privacy Act, the disclosure of health
information to a multidisciplinary team would be permitted; nevertheless
organizations would still be compelled to provide information regarding the use
and disclosure of the information to patients (HRIPNSW, 2002).
For that reason, it has been suggested that health organization should develop
management tools which allow, on one hand, a better provision of information to
specific patients and provide, on the other hand, education about the use of
information in a multidisciplinary team (Connolly, 2004). From a security point of
view, the implementation of security mechanisms that allow the protection of
privacy but at the same time ensuring the flow of information during the treatment
of a patient in a shared environment is also needed. In the following section this
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case will be used to analyse the proposed solution and determine how it may
perform in a real situation.

6.2 Analysis of the Case
Figure 6.1 provides an overview of the flow of information in the KJ versus
Wentworth Area Health Service case. In here, the reference to the general
practitioner (GP) to the Nepean Cancer Care Centre (NCCC) is represented by the
segmented arrow. In the same way, the red segmented line represents the argued
incorrect handle of KJ‟s psychological information which is made available not
only to the hospital medical stuff but also was delivered to KJ‟s general
practitioner (GP) and her surgeon (S).
In the figure it can also be observed including KJ‟s psychological information
within the general medical file makes this information available to other health
care units (HCU) of the hospital. Without the existence of an appropriated and
secure health information system, KJ‟s general medical records could have been
released to anyone with access to the information including other physicians ,
nurses or medical personnel.
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Figure 6.1: Case analysis, interaction and expected flow of information KJ v Wentworth Area
Health Service

6.2.1 Enforcing Access Policies
Let us assume that in the KJ versus Wentworth Area Health Service case KJ has
provided her informed consent for the collection and handle of her medical
records in both cancer related data and psychological information. Let us also
assume that regulatory policies for collection, management and disclosure have
been implemented as well as information exchange agreements have been signed
among the health units of the Wentworth Area Health Service. Finally, let us
assume a health information system which contains the electronic health records
of KJ is actually in use.
Under those conditions, medical and psychological information should be
maintained within her electronic health records. The collected information will be
used for the purpose for which KJ has provided consent. This assumption
provides a solution of the initial issue of the KJ versus Wentworth Area Health
Service case which is out of the scope of this research. It is also understood that
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the instrument used to obtain the informed consent of KJ has been adequately
designed in order to guarantee the correct interpretation by the patient, which
solve the third issue discussed in the KJ versus Wentworth Area Health Service
case and which also is out of the scope of this research.
Finally, access to the information will be managed considering the consent
provided by KJ. Therefore, access to the information will be provided accordantly
to KJ consent and the access policies put in place by the Wentworth Area Health
Service in order to guaranty the patient‟s confidentiality. This is the main issue
which concerns this research.

6.2.1.1 Sharing the Information within the Health Team
In order to simplify the analysis, the health information that has been collected
from KJ will be divided into cancer and psychological related data. Following
KJ‟s argument regarding appropriate consent, cancer related information would be
available to be accessed by the medical staff of the NCCC, KJ‟s general
practitioner and her surgeon. At the same time, her psychological information will
be only available by the psychology and psychiatry departments of the Nepean
Hospital. Other members of the medical staff would have limited or null access to
her electronic health records. Nonetheless, psychological information could be
disclosed to other medical staff, such as members of the NCCC treating KJ, her
medical practitioner or her surgeon, only upon providing the required consent.
It is assumed that KJ‟s medical information has been stored in the Nepean
Hospital‟s local electronic health record system, and that the secure access to the
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information will be provided by an attribute-based encryption infrastructure. As it
was discussed in Chapter 4, attribute-based encryption provides a flexible tool to
manage access policies to the information in scenarios such as the previously
described. In fact, the shared information can be encrypted using a multi-level
access hierarchy accordantly what is required.

6.2.1.2 Access Tree
Let us assume that all the information contained by KJ‟s electronic health record
can be described by



in which

represents KJ‟s

corresponds to KJ‟s psychological

cancer related information and
information.

As it was discussed previously, the medical personnel allowed to have access to
KJ‟s cancer related information would be NCCC medical staff involve in KJ‟s
case (P), KJ‟s general practitioner and KJ;s surgeon. Therefore, this information
could be encrypted using the attributes ({Pat.KJ},{Depto.NCCC,Hosp.NH},{D.P},
{D.GP },{D.S}). In this case, the access policy for the data is described by R (kg(c))=
(Pat.KJ)  ((D.GP) (D.S)  (D.P  (Depto.NCCC  Hosp.NH)). Since the
patient cannot have a secret key that includes ({Depto.NCCC,Hosp.NH},{D.P},
{D.GP },{D.S}) the access tree has only the outcomes described in Figure 6.2.

177

Chapter 6: Discussion Case Study

Figure 6.2: Access tree considering access to KJ‟s cancer related information

In the case of the psychological information, it can be encrypted using the
attributes ({Pat.KJ},{Depto.Psycho, Depto.Psychi, Hosp.NH }. Therefore, the
access policy for the data is described as R(kg(p))= (Pat.KJ)  ((Hosp.NH  (
(Depto.Psycho) (Depto.Psychi))). Since the patient cannot possess a secret key
that includes {Depto.Psycho, Depto.Psychi, Hosp.NH } the access tree has only
the outcomes described in Figure 6.3.

Figure 6.3: Access tree considering access to KJ‟s psychological related information

As it has been described, attribute-based encryption provides a suitable solution
for the issue of disclosure of sensitive information in the case of KJ versus
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Wentworth Area Health Service. This solution is flexible enough to guarantee that
only authorized user will be able to access specific contents of KJ‟s electronic
health records.
For example, Let us assume that nurses of NCCC have been granted access to
KJ‟s medical records, in this case the access tree will include new attributes to
represent

this

situation

as

is

({Pat.KJ},{Depto.NCCC,Hosp.NH},{nurse},

{D.P},{D.GP },{D.S}). In this case, the access policy for the data is described by
R(kg(c))= (Pat.KJ)  ((D.GP) (D.S) 

((DP

 nurse)  (Depto.NCCC 

Hosp.NH)))

Figure 6.4: Access tree considering access to KJ‟s cancer related information including nurses

In the same way, if access to the physiological information is granted to KJ‟s
general

practitioner

the

access

police

will

include

the

attributes

({Pat.KJ},{D,GP}{Depto.Psycho, Depto.Psychi, Hosp.NH }. Therefore, the access
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policy for the data is described as R(kg(p))= (Pat.KJ)  (D.GP (Hosp.NH  (
(Depto.Psycho) (Depto.Psychi))).

Figure 6.5: Access tree considering access to KJ‟s psychological related information including
KJ‟s General Practitioner

6.3 Chapter Summary
The KJ versus Wentworth Area Health Service case has provided a situation in
which the actual technology does not provide a clear solution. Specially,
considering a shared care environment in which a multidisciplinary team of
experts responsible of providing health care to a patient. Team work in health care
as become a generally accepted practice which the actual legislation has not been
able to completely cope. For these reason providing a solution for data sharing in
a multidisciplinary environment become a relevant task.
In the KJ versus Wentworth Area Health Service case,the ability of restricting
access to specific information is essential to provide a suitable technological
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solution . As it has been shown in this Chapter, attribute-based encryption
facilitates such possibility by allowing the encryption of the data according to a
set of attributes (policies) within different access levels. In fact, attribute-based
encryption permits the implementation of flexible access policies that not only
guarantee the protection of patient privacy but also allows the flow of information
within the health care team treating the patient.
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Conclusions

This research has been oriented to the analysis of security issues associated with
the exchange and release of electronic health records in interconnected healthcare
environments. More specifically, the present work has been focused on providing
an answer to the research question introduced in Chapter 1: “how could the secure
exchange and release of electronic health records be supported by incorporating
security services in a shared care environment?”
This chapter provides a summary of the contents presented and discussed through
this thesis. As a starting point, a summary of the main aspects are discussed and
key issues regarding the principal topic of the research as well as the proposed
solution are presented. It will be also discussed how the proposed approach
provides a fitting solution for protecting the confidentiality of the exchange
medical data. Finally, further research directions in the topic of security and
privacy are presented and discussed based on the findings of this research.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

7.1 Summary and Research Results
Electronic health record systems have become a crucial part of modern and
interoperable health information systems. One of the key functionalities of EHR
systems is their ability to provide reliable information to support the delivery of
health care services. Nevertheless, the high sensitivity of the data and the level of
accessibility maintained by EHRs raise concerns over the secure access and
release of information, especially in shared care environments. Protection of
patients‟ confidentiality in a shared care environment is the main point of interest
that was introduced in the research question and discussed from different
perspectives through this thesis. The approach followed to provide an answer to
the research question has considered several stages that will now be discussed.
1. Conduct a literature review of the topics associated with the studied
domain.
The first step of the research was the study of the topics associated to the studied
domain. For this reason, concepts such as health information systems and
electronic health record system were researched. The study of health information
systems and their impact in healthcare and future tendencies, allows us to
understand the magnitude in which these technologies may affect individuals and
health organizations. The review of these concepts has covered the definition,
purposes and dimensions of health information system and electronic health
record systems. The discussion also included aspects regarding communication,
interoperability, security, privacy and confidentiality of patients‟ medical data.
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The protection of patients‟ confidentiality has been the central point of discussion
through the thesis. The preservation of confidentiality over medical data has
become a concern not only for patients but also for physicians and other
stakeholders of the healthcare industry, especially considering the enormous
amount of sensitive data stored and accessed by health information systems.
Security issues associated to interoperable electronic health records systems in a
shared care environment have been one of the topics of discussion of this
research. For this reason, the legal, ethical and personal perspectives regarding the
access and release of medical records as well as an analysis of information and
security requirements for data exchange have been presented and discussed
through Chapter 2.
Shared care has been introduced as a model of service that is driving the
healthcare industry. This new paradigm is characterized for a gradual change of
the traditional approach of provision of health services, which is characterized by
the

continuous

incorporation of

new

information and

communication

technologies, the specialization of health services and an increasing mobility of
patients. Conceptually, shared care is the modality in which the care of a patient is
managed by several actors within the health care system. In fact, the
administration of care is provided by a multidisciplinary team which include the
participation of professional within an organization or the incorporation of
external specialists and healthcare units. From the point of view of information
management, shared care involves the capability in which information can be
fiscally and electronically accessed and exchanged among all participants in the
attention of a specific case.
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How it has been discussed in Chapter 3, in a shared care environment, information
regarding a subject of care should be available for all actors involved in his/her
treatment. But at the same time, the shared data should be protected against any
unauthorized access and release. For this reason, access to information should be
granted under the principles of relevance and “need-to-know”. The principle of
relevance indicates that the amount of information available to be accessed should
be the required by a user to perform an action. The principle of “need-to-know”
implies, on one hand, that only authorized personal should have access to the
information and, on the other hand, that the level of access that a user has over the
electronic health records will depend on the permission provided to the user over
the data. These principles are disused in more detail in section 2.2.
An important element for consideration is the capability that health information
systems have for exchanging information through the health system. Health
information standards are the key elements to allow such functionalities. A
discussion of the technical aspects regarding communication and interoperability
of electronic health records systems has been presented in section 2.4.1.
Finally, traditional as well as other techniques for authentication and access
control used by modern health information systems, such as passwords, PIN and
biometric technology, have been researched and discussed. A comparative
analysis of security approaches, such as Discretionary Access Control (DAC),
Mandatory Access Control (MAC), Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) and
extended Access control models (the three Level Access Security Model,
Contextual Role-Based Access Control Model and Situation Role-Based Access
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Control Model), has concluded that, even when all technological approaches can
be applied to provide different levels of security over sensitive medical data, there
still exist limitations to be overcome, especially considering shared care
environments. At the application level, the main security issue presented in
approaches based on MAC and DAC are inflexibility of the policies, complexity
in determining the ownership of the information, difficulty for implementing in
large shared care environments and restrictions considering delegation and
hierarchical access permissions to the data, which is fundamental to provide
different levels of access to the medical personnel responsible for providing care
to a patient. Implementation based on RBAC models present security issues
associated to the ambiguities that exist in the definition of roles and access
privileges among organizations, the non-existence of a common and/or
standardized framework for defining roles and access privileges and lack the
ability of fine-grained access to information. Extensions to RBAC have allowed
the fine-grained definition of access rights to data but at the same time increased
the complexity of the models. The discussed approaches have failed to provide
suitable solutions for exchange of date in scenarios that involve more than one
health care provider.
2. To define and provide a proposal for secure exchange of electronic health
record.
The research question pointed through the secure exchange and release of
electronic health records supported by the incorporation of security mechanisms.
As a result, a conceptual approach for access control policies using an attributebased encryption scheme is developed and presented in Chapter 4. Attribute-based
encryption allows the encryption and decryption of data based on polices, which
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are represented as attributes associated to the information. Polices are used to
reinforce restrictions over the encrypted data. In fact, attribute-based encryption
allows the encryption and decryption of data based on policies, which are
represented as attributes associated to the information. The approach allows an
independent but secure method to protect the privacy and confidentiality of a
patient‟s information transmitted over insecure channels. The model is flexible in
providing access to multiple users based on security policies, which are
represented as attributes that describe the access permissions over encrypted data.
The use of an attribute-based encryption scheme allows:


Control over access permissions of transmitted data: only user with the
private access key that satisfy the encryption protocol will be able to
decrypt the exchange information.



Delegation of access permission: Access to information can be delegated
or granted to other users by providing an access key which satisfies the
encryption protocols.



Protection of the patient‟s data: the transmitted information is encrypted in
a fashion in which only users with the appropriate key will be able to
decrypt the information. In addition, data can only be accessed when a
user possesses the appropriate access permissions, and information is
provided considering the principles of need-to-know and relevance.



Hierarchical access to rumpled data: User can access the complete
information or part of it, depending on the attribute set associated to the
private key.
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The conceptual definition, general requirements, flow of information, the state
machine and other artefacts for the implementation of the proposed approach are
discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
3. Analyse a set of Open-Source EHR systems in order to select suitable
software that will be used during the analysis of the case study.
To proceed with the implementation of prototype two opens-source health
information systems were selected. The selection of the software was based on an
overview of the actual level of development of the Open EHR systems according
to definitions and requirements provided by international standards. The goal of
the analysis was the examination of the systems to determine how their
functionalities and architectures conciliate with international standards. To reach
that goal several open EHRs under the public licence schemes were investigated
and assessed. From the analysis, two open source software were selected and then
used during the implementation of the prototype. The selected applications not
only provided the system infrastructure required for implementing the proposed
solution but also the data structures and information repositories needed to
generate standardized messages. The evaluation and selection of the open
electronic health records are presented in section 5.1.
4. Modify the selected software by incorporating a prototype version of the
proposed security solution.
A prototype version of the proposed conceptual specification was implemented
with the purpose of analysing how it may perform in a simulated situation. The
prototype was developed to be a platform independent solution and implemented
using Java language. The software was designed as a communication interface
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which considered three modules: HL7 message generation, security and
communication. The implementation was done using open source libraries for the
message creation module as well as the security module. The interface was
incorporated to the two open-source electronic health record systems selected with
that purpose. The description of the implementation of a prototype version is
discussed in Chapter 5.
5. Define case studies in which the solution will be analysed and tested.
In order to analyse the behaviour the prototype a case study was introduced. The
case study considered a complex environment and a single case from which
several scenarios have been derived to discuss different topics through the thesis.
The case study is introduced and described in Chapter 5. The testing of the
prototype based on the proposed scenarios, has demonstrated the viability of the
solution.
A real case was introduced in chapter 6 with the purpose of empirically analysing
the proposed solution. The KJ versus Wentworth Area Health Service case has
provided a valuable scenario in which the proposed specification can be analysed.
In fact, how it has been discussed, implementing attribute-based encryption would
allow overcoming the issue of correct disclosure of personal information in a
multidisciplinary team that has been introduced by this case.
6. Run simulations and test the prototype based on the case study. The data
collected by these simulations and tests will facilitate the validation of a
proposal for secure exchange and release of electronic health records.
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Finally, an analysis of performance of the proposed architecture was provided.
The analysis has been based on a set of random experiments using existing data
stored in the selected electronic health record systems. As it was expected, the
main element that affects the total processing time is the security module. In fact,
the number of attributes used to encrypt the data will reflect in the time required
to generate an encrypted message.
In conclusion, implementation and testing of the prototype had shown that
attribute-based encryption offers several security advantages over traditional
methods and also can be used for different purposes. In fact, it provides a flexible
access control mechanism that

can be implemented under dissimilar

circumstances.

7.2 Future Research Directions
The author presented a solution for secure exchange and release of electronic
health records. The proposed architecture considers a security module which
incorporates an attributes-based encryption scheme. A prototype version of the
architecture was implemented and tested. The testing was limited to functionality
and performance of the implementation. Future work will be to build a fully
functional version of the software and proceed with the quality assurance process.
The final result should provide a suitable, flexible and scalable solution for
complex health care environments.
Another point to be considered for further research is the alternative applications
of attribute-based encryption. The solution proposed in this thesis uses polices
represented as attributes that determine the access permissions over an encrypted
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data. However, as it was discussed on section 4.2.4.1 the error-tolerance of
attribute-based encryption schemes allow the implementation of fuzzy encryption
schemes

for

biometric authentication technology.

Fuzzy attribute-based

encryption biometric authentication technology offers several security advantages
over traditional methods and also can be used for different purposes. These
advantages are discussed in section 4.2.4.1. Future work in this area would be to
explore and provide a viable scheme for fuzzy attribute-based encryption using
biometric technology.
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